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Abstract 
Understanding intentionality, i.e. coding the object directedness of agents 
towards objects, is a fundamental component of Theory of Mind abilities. Yet it is 
unclear how it is perceived and coded in different species. In this thesis, we present 
a series of comparative studies to explore human adults’ and Capuchin monkeys’ 
ability to infer intentional objects from actions. 
First we studied whether capuchin monkeys and adult humans infer a potential 
object from observing an object-directed action. With no direct information about 
the goal-object, neither species inferred the object from the action. However, when 
the object was revealed, the monkeys retrospectively encoded the directedness of 
the object-directed action; unexpectedly, in an adapted version of the task adult 
humans did not show a similar ability. 
We then adapted another paradigm, originally designed by Kovács et al (2010), 
to examine whether the two species implicitly register the intentional relation 
between an agent and an object. We manipulated an animated agent and the 
participants’ belief about a ball’s presence behind a hiding screen. We found no 
evidence showing that humans or monkeys coded object-directedness or belief. 
More importantly, we failed to replicate the original results from Kovács et al’s study, 
and through a series of follow up studies, we questioned their conclusions regarding 
implicit ToM understanding. We suggested that, instead of implicit ToM, results like 
Kovacs et al’s might be interpreted as driven by “sub-mentalizing” processes, as 
suggested by Heyes (2014). 
We conclude that so called ‘implicit ToM’ may be based upon the computation 
of intentional relations between perceived agents and objects. But, these 
computations might present limitations, and some results attributed to implicit ToM 
may in fact reflect “sub-mentalizing” processes. 
Key words: intentionality, object-directedness, implicit ToM, belief, 
Theory of Mind, primate 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Theory of mind (ToM)  describes the ability to represent internal mental states, 
such as beliefs, desires, intentions, knowledge, and to use these representations to 
predict the behaviour of others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Since 1978 when 
Premack and Woodruff asked the question ’Does the chimpanzee have a theory of 
mind?’, ample research has focused on both the ontogenetic and evolutionary 
origins of ToM. The subject has long been investigated within many fields, including 
comparative and evolutionary psychology (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Herrmann, Call, 
Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare & Tomasello, 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), 
developmental psychology (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010; Baron-Cohen, Leslie 
& Frith, 1985; Perner & Wimmer, 1983), cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003; Umiltà et al., 2001) and many other fields. For example, from the 
comparative perspective, Call and Tomasello (2007) compared chimpanzees, orang-
utans and pre-schoolers using a battery of cognitive tasks and proposed a cultural 
intelligence hypothesis where they argued that humans outperform great apes in 
understanding social context. From the developmental perspective, Woodward and 
colleagues conducted a large amount of studies investigating infants’ abilities to 
understanding intentional actions (Woodward, 2009b); In addition, the field 
of neuroscience has added evidence about the neural basis underpinning ToM and 
intention understanding, e.g. Umilta and colleagues proposed that the mechanism of 
intention understanding could be explained by the mirror neuron system  (Umiltà et 
al., 2001). More than 30 years of research have brought us abundant knowledge 
about the ToM abilities of adults, children, infants, atypical people (e.g. autistic), and 
non-human animals (hereafter animals). However, we still know little regarding the 
cognitive mechanisms through which ToM is achieved. In this thesis we propose that 
understanding intentionality in terms of understanding object-directedness is a 
fundamental step in ToM abilities. We will examine the abilities of capuchin monkeys 
and human adults and investigate if they are able to understand object-directedness. 
In addition, we will examine if the participants are able to infer the object when 
directedness is perceived from intentional actions. We will mainly focus on the 
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directedness from an intentional action or an intentional agent to an object. Through 
these studies, we expect to find evidence supporting our proposal that intentionality 
is perceived as directed to an object and the ability to infer the object may be a 
fundamental step in developing theory of mind.  
We will start by introducing Theory of Mind: the ability to understand other’s 
mental states, and will then introduce intentionality and propose that understanding 
intentionality might be important for ToM development. After that, we will review 
the psychological and neuroscience studies with human infants and non-human 
primates to show evidence that both humans and primates can understand 
intentionality by coding behaviour and its relation to a goal as a full configuration. 
We will propose that the ability to spontaneously code object-directedness is the 
basic mechanism in the understanding of intentionality and suggest that inferring 
the goal-object of actions is a key issue to investigate. Though the four studies in this 
thesis, we will examine this proposal and we will discuss the results of the 
experiments and their implications. 
1.1 Theory of Mind 
In 1987, Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked a question: ‘Does the 
chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?’  In their original experiment they presented a 
female chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes where a human actor encountered 
several different problems. Later, the chimpanzee was given several photos to 
choose from. She consistently chose the one that depicted a potential solution to the 
problem faced by the human. The authors concluded that this demonstrated her 
understanding of the actor’s purpose. Although several researchers pointed out 
problems with the methodology and offered other explanations for the result (e.g., 
Heyes, 1998; Povinelli, Perilloux, Reaux, & Bierschwale, 1998; Savage-Rumbaugh, 
Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1978), this paper started the fertile field of Theory of Mind 
research, where researchers investigate whether individuals have the ability to 
understand mental states.  
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1.1.1 Belief understanding 
Following on from suggestions that emerged out of the debate generated by 
Premack and Woodruff’s paper (1978), Wimmer and Perner (1983) brought the 
question of ToM into developmental psychology by testing children’s understanding 
of false belief. Early investigation of theory of mind mainly focused on the 
understanding of belief. Understanding belief, especially false belief, is of special 
importance in ToM research because it indicates mental representation, rather than 
simple behavioural response (Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2014). If one forms a 
belief about a reality, but does not know then the reality changes afterwards, the 
original belief becomes false, or in other words, wrong, regarding the current reality. 
Therefore, to represent this false belief, one cannot depend on the reality or one’s 
own belief to understand another’s mind. Thus, understanding false belief indicates 
the ability to attribute to others’ mental representation abilities (Baillargeon et al., 
2010; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Sodian, 2009).  
In Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) experiment, they asked if children could 
explicitly represent another individual’s false belief. To investigate this question, 
they developed a story where a character, Maxi, put chocolate in one place A, but his 
mother moved the chocolate to another place B during Maxi’s absence. As Maxi was 
absent when the chocolate was moved, his belief about the chocolate’s location was 
not updated, and so conflicted with both the reality and the subject’s belief. If the 
subject understood Maxi’s false belief (FB), when asked where Maxi would look for 
his chocolate, they should indicate place A; otherwise, if they can only refer to their 
own belief, place B would be indicated. The task thus tested whether children can 
explicitly represent others’ FB. Typically developing children can reach the milestone 
of passing the classic FB task at around 4-years-old (see Wellman, Cross & Watson, 
2001 for a meta-analysis). Younger children, however, systematically make the 
mistake of giving a realistic response (indicating place B) in this task (Wellman et al., 
2001). The FB task (e.g., Sally-Ann task, Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Maxi Task, Perner 
& Wimmer, 1983) has been traditionally considered a key test of ToM, and passing 
the task is considered a benchmark in the acquisition of explicit ToM, which indicates 
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the acquisition of the ability to represent other’s mental states (Gopnik & Astington, 
1988; Wimmer & Weichbold, 1994). 
Though abundant evidence indicates that children typically pass the false belief 
task at around 4 years of age (Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004), many 
recent studies suggest that much younger children and infants may understand false 
belief to some extent, despite their failure in the classic task (see review in 
Baillargeon et al., 2010). This ability to succeed in a false belief tasks that does not 
require explicitly stating the representation of others’ belief is described as implicit 
understanding of false belief (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Infants in their second year 
may have established an implicit understanding of false belief. It is demonstrated by 
several non-verbal FB tasks, e.g., tasks using a violation of expectation paradigm 
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 1995; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2015; Träuble, Marinović, & 
Pauen, 2010), anticipatory looking tasks (Clements, Clements, Perner, Clements & 
Perner, 1994; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007), active non-verbal helping tasks 
(Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010). 
These findings suggest that humans understand false belief much earlier than 4-
years of age and that the ability to represent other’s mental states might emerge 
early in our development.  
In addition, similar approaches to the infant studies have also been applied to 
non-human animals to tackle this topic from an comparative perspective to 
investigate the evolutionary origins of this capability (Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, 
Goddu & Santos, 2011). For example, Marticorena and colleagues (2011) followed 
Onishi and Baillargeon’s experiment with infants and used a violation of expectation 
paradigm. Here  when the outcome is contrary to the participants’ expectation, they 
look longer at this unexpected outcome than they would at an expected one. To 
examine whether rhesus macaques understand another’s beliefs, they presented 
rhesus macaques with situations where an object might hide in one of two places 
and an agent, in this case, an experimenter, had different beliefs about the object’s 
location. When the agent searched in one of the two locations for the object, the 
monkey’s looking time was recorded to indicate if the location being searched 
conformed with the monkey subject’s expectation. For instance, when the object 
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was hiden in location A but the experimenter held a false belief (the object was in 
location B), the monkey, if it can understand false belief, should be surprised and 
would look longer when the experimenter searched at the location with the object, 
instead of the place where the experimenter believed the object should be. Their 
results, however, suggested no evidence that rhesus macaques understood the 
experimenter’s false belief (Marticorena et al., 2011). This experiment, as with many 
other FB tasks applied to non-human primates, suggested that non-human primates 
may not be able to understand other’s belief (e.g., Call & Tomasello, 1999; Kaminski, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2008).  
Nevertheless, it doesn't follow that non-human primates cannot understand 
other’s mental states at all. In Marticorena et al’s experiment, the monkeys were 
surprised when the experimenter searched at the wrong location while she had the 
right knowledge about the location of the object. It indicated that the monkeys 
understood the experimenter’s knowledge and the monkeys have some capability of 
recognizing other’s mental state.  
To briefly summarize, human beings have some ability to represent false belief 
from a very early age. Non-human primates cannot understand belief well, but they 
are able to understand some mental states.  
1.1.2 ToM abilities besides belief understanding 
Although much emphasis has been placed on false belief, ToM ability is not 
limited to belief understanding. From its original definition: the ability to understand 
other’s mental states, ToM also involves the understanding of emotions, desires, 
intentions, and knowledge, etc. (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). And abundant literature has reported evidence in pre-
schoolers, infants, and non-human primates regarding their understanding of 
different aspects of mental states besides belief. 
 For example, infants as young as 14-months have already adopted a 
fundamental understanding that other people have goals and intentions (Gergely, 
Bekkering, Király, Damme, & Wilson, 2002; Meltzoff, 1995); nfants’ ability to follow 
an other’s gaze, especially following the gaze geometrically  (behind visual obstacles), 
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provides evidence that at the end of their first year infants can understand others’ 
perception and attention (Moll & Tomasello, 2004; Shepherd, 2010).  
Not only children and infants have these ToM abilities, non-human primates 
also show evidence of understanding some mental states, such as other’s intentions 
and goals (e.g., rational imitation: Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; 
distinguishing intentional and accidental actions: Call, Hare, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2004; Phillips, Barnes, Mahajan, Yamaguchi, & Santos, 2009), and perception and 
knowledge (e.g., Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Flombaum, Santos, & Haven, 2005; 
Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare & Tomasello, 2004). Thus a range of 
studies suggest that, apart from belief understanding, there are many other early 
developed ToM abilities in human infants and shared ToM abilities in human and 
primates in dealing with mental states.  
1.2 Understand intentionality to understand 
ToM 
With the ample facts at hand, the main research question gradually shifts from 
whether infants and animals (especially non-human primates), can understand the 
meaning of other’s behaviour and mental states, to how this understanding is 
achieved (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Baron-Cohen, 1991, 
2001; Gómez, 2009; Leslie, 1987, 1994; MacLean et al., 2012). Many researchers 
have tried to tackle this issue by different ways. For example, Apperly and Butterfill 
(2009) suggested that implicit ToM might have emerged early in evolution and infant 
development to help deal with ToM relevant problems before it can be mentally 
represented; Gallagher and Frith (2003) used an fMRI approach to investigate the 
brain areas related to the ToM tasks; Gergely and Csibra (2003) argued that mental 
representation is not always involved, the perception of the other’s intention is more 
crucial. As we are particularly interested in a proposal that focuses on the 
understanding of intentionality and suggests that it is likely the foundation of ToM 
abilities (Gómez, 2008, 2009), in this section, we will introduce intentionality and 
why it might be important for ToM development. 
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1.2.1 Intentionality and Theory of Mind 
In philosophy, the term intentionality refers to ‘the power of minds to be 
about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs’ (Jacob, 
2010). It initially emerged from the Latin word intendere, which means being 
directed to an object (Jacob, 2010). The term was reintroduced by the German 
philosopher Franz Brentano, where it was often summarised as ‘aboutness’. It refers 
to the directedness from mental acts to the external world (Brentano, 1874; Gomez, 
2009). For example, if I say ‘He looks at the dog’, the mental act is looking and the 
external world, or in this case physical object, is the dog. Intentionality in this case is 
directed from his perception to the object. In another example, when someone 
reaches for a bar of chocolate, the intentionality is directed from his desire to the 
goal. Or when someone introduces a theory or an idea, the intentionality is directed 
from his mind to a mental object. In all of these examples, the mental ability 
connects the physical phenomena, e.g., looking and a dog, reaching and chocolate, 
introducing and a theory. Moreover, it always points from the subject to the object, 
and the directedness from the subject to the object is more than just the physical 
phenomena, but can have meaning beneath, which can be perceived or interpreted 
cognitively (Gomez, 2009).  
Intentionality is involved in various mental activities, which always act upon an 
object. Note that ‘object’ here is to the contrary of the term ‘subject’. It can indicate 
a specific thing but not necessarily so. For example, if I say ‘I know the dog’, the dog 
can be a specific individual but it can also be the concept of dog. Either way, it is the 
object of my knowing. Or if someone desires something, the desire has to be 
directed to a desired object. Similarly, one has to intend what is intended, perceive 
what is perceived, know what is known (Brentano, 1874).  
Note, however, that intentionality should be distinguished from the term 
intention (Gómez, 2009; Jacob, 2010). As introduced above, intentionality in our 
studies means the directedness to an object and will be interchangeable with 
‘object-directedness’ in this thesis. Intention, on the other hand, often refers to 
purposefulness (Meltzoff, 1995) or willingness (Call, Hare, et al., 2004) in 
psychological studies. For example, in an experiment that showed that 18-month 
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infants can imitate a demonstrator rationally, based on the demonstrator’s intention 
instead of his action, the term intention refers to being purposeful. To be specific, 
the infants in the experiment understand that the purpose of the demonstrator was 
to turn on the light; therefore when the demonstrator’s hands were occupied and he 
used his head to turn on the light, the infant turned the light on by the usual and 
more efficient approach, i.e., by hand. In the control group, where the demonstrator 
used his head to turn on the light while his hands were free, the infants imitated the 
head action too since they understood that the demonstrator purposefully didn't use 
his hand (Meltzoff, 1995). This experiment was about infants’ understanding of 
another’s intention in terms of purpose, but was not about the intentionality that we 
will talk about in the current thesis. For another example that explores intention in 
terms of willingness but not intentionality, infants and primates can differentiate an 
experimenter’s willingness. When someone failed to hand over a toy, infants as 
young as 9-months old could differentiate whether the agent accidentally dropped 
the toy or uncooperatively teased the infant (Marsh, Stavropoulos, Nienhuis, & 
Legerstee, 2010; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and, when tested 
under similar conditions, non-human primates also behave similarly to infants (Call, 
Hare, et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2009). In the latter case intention refers to 
willingness, which again should not be confused with intentionality.  
Now the meaning of intentionality is made clear, we would like to bring in 
Theory of Mind, which makes things more interesting. Theory of mind involves the 
ability to understand other’s mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Although 
the debate regarding whether primates and infants are truly capable of 
understanding other’s mental states continues (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Lurz & 
Krachun, 2011; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004), ample empirical evidence has demonstrated 
that they are at least able to adjust their behaviour according to their observation of 
others’ behaviour. For example, infants and many primate species can follow other’s 
gazing direction (Rosati & Hare, 2009) and chimpanzees even move around a barrier, 
which blocks the line of gaze, to look for an object of interest (e.g., Tomasello, Hare, 
& Agnetta, 1999). Some researchers concluded from this that chimpanzees 
understand others’ perceptions and intentions, and this was the reason that they 
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were not satisfied at finding only the barrier, but not something more interesting, 
along the gaze line  (Tomasello, Hare, & Agnetta, 1999; Itakura, 2004; Maclean & 
Hare, 2012); but other researchers insist that gaze-following doesn't necessarily 
involve understanding the mental experience of seeing or attending to an object 
(Heyes, 1998; Lurz & Krachun, 2011; Povinelli & Eddy, 1997). However, it is worth 
noting that there is never an actual line of gaze, no physical connection between the 
agent (or the agent’s eye) and the object: the line of gaze does not exist physically 
and cannot be observed directly. Primates’ ability to follow the non-existing gaze line 
and their understanding of the connection between the eye and the object of 
interest itself already indicates an understanding beyond the observable behaviour 
(Gómez, 2008, 2009). This understanding of the directedness from the gaze to the 
object has been suggested to be achieved through the perception of intentionality 
(Gómez, 2008, 2009).  
To perceive intentionality has been suggested as a possible corner stone for 
ToM abilities (Gomez, 2009). For example, by perception of intentionality, one can 
understand others’ perception and knowledge, as has been shown in the case above 
about gaze. Visual perception involves seeing an object, and acoustic hearing. By 
coding the intentionality from seeing and hearing to the object, the ability of 
understanding others’ perception and knowledge is enabled.  
In some other cases the object of intentionality is not a physical object, but an 
object that only exists mentally, or, in other words, ‘intentional inexistence’ or an 
‘intentional object’ (Brentano, 1874; Gomez, 2009). As Brentano suggested:  
‘this intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena... We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying 
that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally 
within themselves.’ 
 Since all mental activities involve intentionality (Brentano, 1874), ToM abilities 
are highly likely to relate to, and perhaps be built on, the ability to perceive 
intentionality (Gómez, 2009). Abundant empirical evidence that examines ToM 
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related abilities indeed indicates human and non-human primates’ ability in 
understand intentionality, as will be discussed below.  
1.2.2 Coding intentionality: to understand the relation between 
actions and objects 
In this section, we would like to review some empirical evidence that indicates 
infants’ and primates’ understanding and coding of intentionality. 
1.2.2.1 Evidence in preverbal infants 
A series of experimental findings indicate that young infants can understand 
intentionality, i.e., they can understand object-directed actions in the sense of 
coding a relation between an agent and an object (e.g., Hamlin, Hallinan, & 
Woodward, 2008; Woodward, 2009). In their first year, infants have already 
developed the ability to code object-directed actions, e.g., pointing and grasping, as 
directed towards a certain goal-object (Sodian & Thoermer, 2004; Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005; Woodward, & Guajardo, 2002; Woodward, 1998b, 1999).  
For example, in 1999, Woodward reported an experiment using a violation of 
expectancy paradigm (Woodward, 1999). Infants at the age of 9 months were 
habituated to an event in which an actor acted on one of two toys that sat side by 
side on a small stage. In the test phase, the toys changed position and the actor 
acted either towards the new toy by the old path (New Toy) or the old toy by the 
new path (New Path). Grasp was used as the object-directed action, in contrast to 
the non-object-directed action of flop (an accidental drop of the back-of-the-hand). 
Results showed that in the grasp condition, infants looked longer at the new toy than 
at the new path trials, indicating that they expected the action to be related to the 
previous goal object instead of the previous location. However, infants did not 
differentiate the two test trial types when the motion was a flop, suggesting that 
they discriminated goal-directed action from actions performed without a goal, and 
they did not relate non-object-directed action to an object. Younger infants at five to 
seven months olds also showed the same pattern of response as the 9-month-olds 
did (Woodward & Guajardo, 2003).  Subsequent experiments explored a broader 
range of goal-directed actions including gazing (Paulus, 2011; Phillips, Wellman, & 
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Spelke, 2002; Sodian & Thoermer, 2004; Woodward & Guajardo, 2003) and pointing 
(Woodward et al., 2002). Using the same paradigm researchers showed that by 12-
month of age, infants related others’ gaze (Woodward & Guajardo, 2003) and 
pointing gestures (Woodward et al., 2002) to a goal object in the same way as they 
did with grasping. These authors concluded that infants under one year of age 
distinguish between object-directed and apparently non-object-directed behaviour. 
They did not perceive others’ object-directed actions as simple movements, but 
coded a relation between the action and the goal-object (Woodward, 1999, 2009b).  
In 2012, Cannon and Woodward further followed up with an eye tracking 
experiment and suggested that 11-month old infants could predict the goal of an 
agent’s intentional action (Cannon & Woodward, 2012). In the experiment, they 
habituated the participants to videos where a grasping action was directed toward 
one of two objects. In the test events the location of the objects were swapped (as in 
the previous experiment), but instead of reaching for an object, the grasping action 
was incomplete and stopped between the objects. Eye tracking data revealed that 
infants looked from the hand to the object that was familiarized in the habituation 
videos significantly more often than at the other object. As a comparison, when the 
grasping action was replaced by a wooden claw, the infants did not look to the 
familiarized object more often than to the alternative one. The authors concluded 
that infants can ‘actively use goal analysis to generate on-line prediction of an 
agent’s next action’ (Cannon & Woodward, 2012).  
From the perspective of the understanding of intentionality, we suggest, 
however, that these experiments show that infants can perceive intentionality. 
Firstly, they can distinguish object-directedness from accidental actions, suggesting 
that they are able to identify intentionality. Secondly, when they perceive 
intentionality, they expect the object-directed action to be directed at its goal, 
suggesting that they code intentionality as a relationship from the subject to the 
object.  
In addition, it has been suggested that infants’ early understanding of 
intentional actions might be essential for attributing mental states, and might be a 
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precursor of later ToM development (Aschersleben, Hofer, & Jovanovic, 2008; 
Wellman & Phillips, 2001; Woodward, 1998b). Empirical work has indicated a 
correlation between infants’ attention to object-directed actions and pre-schooler’ 
ToM ability and was suggested as evidence (Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 
2004). For example, Aschersleben and colleagues (2008) presented a longitudinal 
experiment and claimed that infants’ understanding of intentionality predicted their 
ToM ability when they were around 4 years old. They first tested infants’ 
understanding of intentionality following the Woodward-paradigm (Woodward, 
1999) and then called the children back when they reached the age of 4 years to test 
them with a ToM scale, which included two false belief tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
They found that children’s performance at the false belief tasks correlated with the 
decrement of attention from the habituation to the test trial in the Woodward-test. 
They concluded that the correlation indicated a link between the understanding of 
intentional actions and ToM abilities and they further suggested that infants’ early 
understanding of intentionality was likely a precursor to later ToM development 
(Aschersleben et al., 2008). 
To briefly summarize, infants can identify and understand intentionality, and 
this ability relates to later development of ToM. 
1.2.2.2 Evidence in primates 
The ability to understand intentionality by appreciating the relationship 
between agent and object not only develops early ontogenetically, but also 
developed early evolutionarily, as it is not limited to human infants, but is found in 
non-human primates as well (Kano & Call, 2014; Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 
2008; Umiltà et al., 2001).  
For example, great apes were tested in a similar eye-tracking paradigm to that 
used with the infant’s (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Kano & Call, 2014). Bonobos, 
chimpanzees and orang-utans also showed an understanding of intentionality from 
the action to the object (Kano & Call, 2014). In the experiment, great apes were 
habituated to the event of a human grasping one of two objects. Then, as in the 
infant study, the positions of the two objects were swapped and the hand made an 
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incomplete reaching action between the objects. Eye-tracking was used to monitor 
great apes’ expectation of object-directed actions and it revealed that they 
predictively looked at the familiarized object instead of the alternative one. This 
finding indicated that great apes can also understand intentionality in the way that 
infants do. And primates, again like infants, expect object-directed action to be 
directed at its goal-object.  
Experiments with non-human primates using an eye tracking technique or 
looking time as the measurement are relatively sparse compared to those with 
infants (Kano & Call, 2014). Nevertheless, findings on their understanding of 
intentionality are not entirely absent. For example, numerous experiments of the so 
called “object choice paradigm” provide some relevant information regarding 
primates’ understanding of intentionality. This paradigm has been widely used in 
primates to study their understanding of informative actions such as grasping, gazing, 
and pointing (Anderson, Montant, & Schmitt, 1996; Anderson, Sallaberry, & Barbier, 
1995; Barth, Reaux, & Povinelli, 2005; Bräuer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 
2006; Call, Hare, & Tomasello, 1998; Itakura, Agnetta, Hare, & Tomasello, 1999; Mikl, 
Soproni, & Miklósi, 2006; Mulcahy & Call, 2009; Wood, Glynn, Phillips, & Hauser, 
2007; Wood & Hauser, 2011). In this paradigm, a food reward is first shown to the 
subject and then hidden (the process of baiting is not shown to the subject) in one of 
two occluded locations (usually in containers or behind occluders). Then the 
experimenter produces some informative cue (e.g., a pointing gesture) directed at 
the baited location, following which the animals are allowed to choose one location 
and retrieve the reward. After watching the action of reaching towards a location, 
apes and monkeys are able to follow the direction of the action and retrieve the food 
(Call, Tomasello, et al., 2004; Wood et al., 2007; Wood & Hauser, 2011), indicating 
that they can understand the relationship between the reaching action and the 
hidden object. In comparison, the accidental gesture flop (Wood, Glynn, & Hauser, 
2008) or the communicative gesture pointing (Call, Tomasello, et al., 2004) is not 
regarded as intentional by the participants, indicating that they can differentiate 
different actions in terms of object directedness. For the hand-flop, the gesture itself 
is not designed to be object-directed (Woodward, 1999) and accordingly is not seen 
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as intentional by rhesus macaques (Wood et al., 2008). Non-human primates 
generally fail to use communicative cues, pointing for instance, from a human 
experimenter (see reviews, Mikl et al., 2006; Mulcahy & Hedge, 2012; Rosati & Hare, 
2009) and are sometimes described as ‘performing poorly’ in the object choice task 
in contrast to human infants (e.g., Bräuer et al., 2006; Itakura & Tanaka, 1998). 
However, this could be due to different motivations, as suggested by Hare and 
Tomasello (2004). Primates may have difficulties in understanding communicative 
intentions and perform better in competitive than in communicative contexts. And 
their failure in utilizing the communicative gesture could also be due to a difference 
in their ability to understand different types of intentional behaviour. After all, 
pointing is not a natural action in the behavioural repertoire of primates but 
arguably exclusively human. Therefore we conclude from the above results that non-
human primates can distinguish intentionality from non-intentionality. 
To summarize, the above evidence from non-human primates showed that 
non-human primates can perceive intentionality too. As human infants, they can also 
distinguish object-directedness from non-intentional actions, although intentionality 
might be different in their perspective and the human perspective. Secondly, when 
they perceive intentionality, they also expect the object-directed action to be 
directed at its goal, suggesting that they can also code intentionality as a relationship 
from the subject to the object. In addition, since this ability is shared by primates 
and infants, and that of infants is likely a precursor of ToM, it might also play an 
important role in primates’ ToM abilities.  
1.2.2.3 Physiological evidence 
More than behavioural evidence, physiological studies about the mirror 
neuron system (MNS, see review, Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) support the proposal 
that agents appreciate the relationship between action and goal-object (Gallese, 
2007; Umiltà et al., 2001; Wood & Hauser, 2008). Mirror neurons, which are a type 
of neuron first discovered in the macaque pre-motor cortex, activate both while the 
same subject is performing or observing actions such as grasping, tearing, holding or 
manipulating objects (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti et al., 1988). The MNS 
therefore matches others’ actions with the observer’s own motor representation 
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(Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Umiltà et al., 2001). But what is more 
important for our topic of intentionality is that cell responses in MNS may reflect a 
coding of the interaction between an action and an object. These cells do not fire 
either when the subject just observes an action without a target object or observes 
the goal object without the action; only when the action is directed to the object, are 
the corresponding mirror neurons activated and therefore the alleged intentionality 
or object-directedness identified (Umiltà et al., 2001).  
This property indicates that mirror neurons may play a crucial role in coding 
the relationship between object-directed action and the goal-object. This has been 
illustrated by several studies (see reviews, Fogassi, 2011; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; 
Ocampo & Kritikos, 2011), among which a single-cell recording study by Umilta et al 
(2001) is of special interest. Here, they showed macaques a grasping action directed 
towards an object either in full vision or with the final goal-object hidden behind an 
occluder. In the occluded-cases, the monkey was always informed in advance 
whether the object existed or not, with the occluder only introduced afterwards. The 
researchers recorded that mirror neurons were activated with the same pattern 
when the object was directly observable and when it was behind the screen and 
therefore the actual grasping could only occur out of sight. It appeared that the 
neurons automatically reconstructed the missing goal of the action. However, the 
same neurons failed to respond in the control conditions when the monkey had 
been shown that there was no object behind the screen prior to the grasping action. 
Interestingly, the only difference in the two hidden conditions was the monkey’s 
awareness of the object’s existence based upon his previous ability to see the object 
or the absence of an object. Therefore, the authors concluded that the MNS does 
not just code the observation of the grasping action, but also the feature of object-
directedness (Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Umiltà et al., 2001). Or in other 
words, the MNS may be the biological foundation of the ability to understand 
intentionality.  
More importantly, this study suggested that object-directedness may be 
attributed to the action alone, without a full visual presentation of the goal-object, 
although in the current case it needs an appropriate supporting context, (previous 
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direct perception of the existence of the object). Building on this finding, we made a 
hypothesis: when coding intentionality, the subject, the object, and their relationship 
of object-directedness might be regarded not as independent pieces, but as a full 
configuration of intentionality. When part of the components, e.g., the object-
directed action and its goal-object, are observed, the implicit full configuration, i.e., 
the relation of object-directedness from the action to the object, can be 
automatically completed. It is similar to the gestalt perception where observable 
pieces are automatically perceived as a full configuration. For example, in Figure 1 -  
1, when we observe the fragments of lines, we can actually perceive a square instead 
of merely four corners. The action and the object perceived are (to some extent) like 
the corners, and intentionality is like the full configuration of the square. Infants and 
primates in the Woodward-experiments, as well as in the other behavioural 
experiments, may have perceived the complete configuration of intentionality and 
therefore, related the action to its goal-object. The macaque monkey in the mirror-
neuron-experiment knew about the object beforehand, and, upon observing the 
incomplete action, its mirror neuron system detected the gestalt intentionality. In 
this way, the directedness from the action to the object does not necessarily involve 
mental representation, such as intention. 
 
Figure 1 -  1 the Gestalt square 
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1.2.3 Understanding intentionality when the object is not 
directly observable 
The studies of infants and primates reviewed above are consistent with the 
proposal that intentionality is coded by the relationship between the action and the 
goal, which are perceived as a whole instead of being detected as two separate 
elements related by the attribution of an unobservable mental state (Gómez, 2009). 
What would be more interesting, however, is if the object is not directly 
observable and nor is it known about beforehand, will it always be assumed to exist? 
It is interesting because, in this case, the object is one that does not have to exist 
physically or in reality, but can be an object that only exists in mind, or the so called 
‘intentional object’ (Brentano, 1874; Gomez, 2009). In this case, it is no longer 
putting the action (or the subject) and the object together through an intentional 
relation, but uses the perception of intentionality to infer about the existence of the 
object. In other words, as intentionality is object-directed, there must be an object 
to which the action is directed to, even if none is or was immediately visible. Once 
the presence of the object is assumed, to interpret about the object would further 
complete the understanding of a social scenario. For instance, the simplest scenario 
is when the object is actually a physically one, (e.g., a food reward is expected in the 
object-choice task); an object of interest is found in the gaze following study. The 
interpretation of the object can also involve mental representation. For example, a 
monkey can believe that the sound from the bush indicates that a predator is hidden 
behind, and as a consequence the monkey runs away; when in fact it is another 
monkey playing and making the bush move. The physical object that moves the bush 
is the second monkey, but the first monkey reacts to the intentional object it has 
imagined: a non-existent predator. By means of interpreting the perceived 
intentionality, ToM ability might therefore be achieved and the perception of 
intentionality might thus be a first step of ToM. Nevertheless, what needs to be 
determined first is whether intentionality can be perceived when the object is not 
directly known about (Gomez, 2009). It would serve as a crucial link between coding 
intentional relations between agents and real objects, and coding intentional 
relations between agents and inferred object.  
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None of the literature has addressed this point directly, but some existing 
studies may be relevant for addressing the wider issue.  
1.2.3.1 Inferring objects from gaze 
A number of gaze following studies provide suggestive evidence that young 
human infants and some non-human primates may have the ability to infer 
previously unseen targets from others’ gaze (see review of general gaze following, 
Rosati & Hare, 2009). We mentioned earlier that non-human primates can follow 
another’s gaze around barriers (Tomasello et al., 1999) and that this ability is shared 
by human infants too (Moll & Tomasello, 2004). Moll and Tomasello (2004) reported 
that both 12-month and 18-month-old infants followed an adult’s gaze line around a 
barrier, and checked back at the adult’s gazing direction, as if making sure that they 
were looking at the same thing. Note that the infant had not seen behind the barrier 
beforehand and did not know if there was any object of interest. The authors 
reported that infants made efforts to go around the barrier, indicating that they 
expected the experimenter’s gaze to be directed not only to the directly observable 
barrier, but towards something unseen at the other side (Moll & Tomasello, 2004). 
As a result they suggested that when infants detected an agent looking at something, 
they have the understanding that other people are seeing something different from 
what they initially see on their side of the barrier. Other researchers argue that gaze 
following is merely a simple behavioural reflex, where as long as the subjects detect 
an other’s looking direction, they automatically follow it (see argument for simple 
behavioural reflex, Povinelli & Eddy, 1996, 1997). But if this was the case, the infants 
would not look for more when they’ve found the barrier in their gaze line. As they 
have no previous knowledge about what is behind the barrier, their expectation of 
the object of interest is likely to depend on their inference of an intentional object. 
The ability to follow gaze around barriers and past distractors is shared by human 
infants (Dunphy-Lelii & Wellman, 2004; Moll & Tomasello, 2004), great apes (Bräuer, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Okamoto-Barth, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Rosati & Hare, 
2009; Tomasello et al., 1999) and monkeys (Amici, Aureli, Visalberghi, & Call, 2009; 
Burkart & Heschl, 2006; Emery, 2000). It is often interpreted as evidence of 
understanding ‘seeing’ in a ToM sense – understanding that others must be seeing 
 
 
20 
 
an object and therefore, understand others’ perception and knowledge (see review, 
Call & Tomasello, 2008). 
From the perspective of understanding Brentanian intentionality, the subjects 
do not have to understand another’s perception as an internal, unobservable mental 
state, but may just perceive the other’s gazing as intentional in the Brentanian sense. 
Or in other words, they have established the intentional relation between the agent 
and a potential object (Gómez, 2009; Scerif, Gómez, Byrne, & Gomez, 2004). 
Moreover, it is important to note that before following the gaze behind barriers, the 
subject had not seen the potential object of attention in advance. The fact opens up 
the possibility that they may have been displaying the capability to infer or imagine 
the existence of unseen targets when they perceive intentionality from others’ gaze 
and attention (Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gómez, 2009). This suggestion is 
supported by a study of attention understanding in Diana monkeys (Scerif et al., 
2004). In this study, researchers showed Diana monkeys photographs of familiar 
conspecifics orienting towards one of two locations covered with screens, followed 
by the display of a toy, which was hidden behind one of the locations, appearing 
when the screens were lowered. The position of the toy either corresponded to the 
gaze direction or not. The researchers found that monkeys’ first inspection, total 
duration of looking, and number of looks were more likely to be directed to the 
position that the monkey in the photograph was orienting towards. In addition they 
checked back at the conspecific’s looking direction more often when the toy 
appeared in the opposite position. The authors concluded that the monkeys 
followed the attention in a ‘relatively automatic’ way, but expected the presence of 
a target to be linked to the looker’s attention before they actually saw the target. 
This would suggest that the monkeys expected a relationship of intentionality 
between the agent and the object of attention, which would be a different process 
from simple reflexive gaze following behaviour, and different from an understanding 
of others’ mental representations of intentions and goals (Scerif et al., 2004). 
From these studies, we suggest that infants and primates may have the ability 
to infer a goal from the gaze of others even when none is immediately available. But 
before closing the case, there are still some shortcomings and limitations to discuss.  
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Firstly, in the geometrical gaze following studies, the researchers suggested 
that when the apes checked back at the gazer, it provided evidence of expecting an 
object of interest when they found no object along the gaze line (Bräuer et al., 2005). 
However, this interpretation remains somewhat subjective and speculative. Maybe 
the subjects that failed to find an interesting object were just looking back at the 
face of the other because in the absence of a competing stimulus, the face itself is an 
interesting focus to observe; the ‘gaze direction’ is just a rich interpretation. The 
checking back behaviour only provides an indirect evidence of the expectation of an 
object aligned with the direction of gaze. Secondly, spider monkeys and capuchin 
monkeys (Amici et al., 2009) followed the gaze around barriers, but never checked 
back. It is difficult to tell if they had any expectation of an object or if they just 
followed the direction of the gaze in a reflexive way. To better examine whether the 
apes and monkeys understand gaze or other actions in the Brentanian sense, we 
need better paradigms that address more directly the issue of whether monkeys are 
or not inferring the existence of an object from the intentional behaviour of the 
agent.  
In addition, although the study of Diana monkeys (Scerif et al., 2004) adopted a 
new paradigm with the potential for addressing the two points above, the 
researchers only tested 6 monkeys and found a significant result in only 4 of them, 
which was a small number of subjects and did not provide strong statistical power. In 
addition, in this study, the gazing cues were displayed by photos of two different 
monkeys, i.e., a dominant one and a young female. The significant effect only 
occurred in the case of the dominant. It is possible that the dominant’s gaze is more 
significant for group members to attend to, but the number of comparisons was too 
limited and it remains possible that the effects were caused by other confounding 
factors. 
 Taking these limitations into consideration, we conclude from the above 
evidence that infants and primates may be able to infer the object from an 
intentional action, gazing, but that more direct and robust evidence is needed to 
support this hypothesis. Moreover, and more importantly, gazing is one specific type 
of action that might indicate intentionality, but alone it is not sufficient to argue for 
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the Brentanian understanding of intentionality. Intentional actions in general and in 
a wider range would provide more convincing  evidence.  
1.2.3.2 Inferring the object from intentional actions 
The literature directly addressing the issue of inferring an object from 
intentional actions is very sparse.  In most of cases, the existence of the object is 
known in advance and the inference of the object from actions besides gazing is not 
addressed. Nevertheless, some existing literature may provide some relevant 
information. 
Firstly, the object-choice task, which we introduced above, may provide some 
relevant information regarding the ability to understand others’ intentional actions 
and intentionality. We discussed that primates can differentiate intentional from 
non-intentional action earlier. However, when the subject observed the action 
directed to one of two occluded locations, the object was not directly observable, 
but the subjects could still understand the directedness. It suggested that from 
observing the actions alone, without direct access to the object, intentionality might 
be perceived. Note however, in most of the tasks, the object was shown in advance 
(e.g., Anderson, Sallaberry, & Barbier, 1995; Itakura & Tanaka, 1998) and therefore, 
the subjects did not necessarily have to infer about the presence of the object. In 
contrast to showing the object beforehand, in the mirror neuron experiment, the 
subject was shown the absence of the object (Umiltà et al., 2001). In this case, mirror 
neurons were not activated when the grasping action was observed, showing that 
the presence of the object was essential in coding intentionality. However, the 
experiment did not show whether intentionality could be perceived when the 
presence of an object was uncertain.  
From the commonly used paradigms investigating intentional action and its 
goal-object, direct evidence for the question of whether primates are able to 
perceive intentionality and infer possible potential targets from intentional actions 
remains lacking. To address the issue of whether the object can be inferred when 
intentionality is perceived, a new paradigm should be able to present the subject 
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with intentional actions and a situation in which there may, but not necessarily, exist 
a target of the action. 
A preliminary study using a violation of expectation looking-time design with 
Capuchin monkeys (Kersken, Rollins, & Gómez, n.d.) suggested a possible 
experimental paradigm. The violation of expectancy paradigm is commonly used 
with preverbal human infants to study their understanding of various physical and 
social scenarios (e.g., Baillargeon, 1995; Wynn, 1998; Xu & Carey, 1996). It has been 
adapted by researchers in comparative psychology for use with non-human primates 
(Anderson, Kuroshima, Kuwahata, & Fujita, 2004; Santos & Hauser, 1999). In this 
paradigm, subjects are presented with different events. If they detect an event that 
is unexpected (i.e. it is in violation of physical or psychological principles), they look 
longer at it than at a control event. Thus, duration of looking can be used as a 
measure of expectation (Baillargeon, 1995).  
In the study by Kersken et al., monkeys faced two screens and an experimenter 
sitting at the centre. As the screens were in a closed position at the beginning of 
each trial, the monkeys were not informed about the existence of an object situated 
behind one of the screens. The monkeys were presented with a grasping action 
directed to behind one of the screens, such that its final part was occluded by the 
chosen screens. All that was visible to the monkeys was the two screens, the initial 
hand action and the direction of grasping; but the object, its location, and the final 
part of the hand action were occluded and had to be inferred from the available 
information. In this experiment, after being shown a grasping hand disappearing 
behind one of the two screens, the screen was opened and the monkeys were 
confronted with one of two outcomes. In one, upon opening the screens, the object 
appeared in the corresponding location to the action direction. In the other, the 
hand had reached to the screen behind which there was no object. The six monkeys 
tested looked longer as a group when no object was found behind the screen 
corresponding to the action direction, which indicated a violation of their 
expectation. This was interpreted as evidence that the monkeys might have inferred 
the existence of an object from the grasping action alone. In a control condition, the 
grasping action was replaced by a hand-flop action, as in Wood et al’s experiment 
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(Wood et al., 2007), and the monkeys’ looking behaviour suggested that they did not 
expect the object to appear at the corresponding location of the action.  
In this paradigm, the subjects were never informed of the existence of the 
object, but only watched the intentional actions. Nonetheless, they predicted the 
presence of an object as the target of the action. From the results we can conclude 
that monkeys might be able to imagine objects when they detect an intentional 
action (e.g., grasping), but not a non-intentional action (e.g., flop), without having 
known the object before, or without the objects actually existing. Thus, the subjects 
may have perceived the intentionality of the grasping action in the sense of 
directedness to an object, with the object being completely ‘intentional’, not 
previously anchored in reality. 
In this new paradigm, the subjects are presented with a situation in which no 
object necessarily exists. This is different from Woodward’s (1998, 1999) paradigm 
where both the action and the objects are presented to the subjects in advance. It is 
also different from Umilta’s (2001) experiment where the monkey was informed of 
the presence or absence of the object, and therefore there was no need  to infer the 
object’s existence. Woodward’s and Umilta’s design may reveal the coding of an 
intentional the relationship between existing agents and objects, while this new 
paradigm may indicate the ability to infer or imagine an object from the intentional 
relationship, which is crucial to the Brentanian intentionality understanding 
hypothesis. In neither the gaze following experiments (Moll & Tomasello, 2004) nor 
the object task ones (e.g., Bräuer et al., 2006) did the researchers find direct 
evidence of the expectation of an object upon perceiving intentional actions. In 
comparison, the current paradigm directly addressed this issue. 
However, the Kersken et al’s experiment had a number of limitations. Firstly, 
although they found some positive evidence, their study only examined 6 capuchin 
monkeys, which is a limited sample size for a behavioural study. In addition, they 
also tested 4 Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana), but the result was not significant 
and indicated no support for the inference of the object from intentional actions. 
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The small sample size and inconsistent results between species questioned the 
robustness of the evidence from the capuchin monkeys.  
Secondly, when the screens were opened the monkeys were able to observe 
that behind the screen, either the hand grasping the object in the congruent 
conditions, or the hand in grasping position but without an object in the incongruent 
one. The authors interpreted that the longer looking time at the incongruent 
condition indicated that the monkeys’ expectation was violated since the grasping 
action was not directed to an object. However, an alternative interpretation could 
also plausibly explain the results: the grasping action at an empty void looked 
unusual and strange. As a comparison, for the flop action, the hand rested on the 
platform in a relaxed and resting way; however, the grasping hand shape was still in 
tense and was not in a comfortable resting appearance. Therefore, the monkey 
might have regarded the grasping action as bizarre and wanted to observe it more 
carefully. 
Thirdly, in Kersken et al’s experiment, when the experimenter conducted the 
action, her gaze always accompanied the action. Thus the hand action and the gazing 
cue were a combined signal and it was unclear whether it was from the hand action 
or the gazing cue that the expectation was generated. 
Despite of these limitations, this study provided some positive evidence for the 
assumption that an object is always expected when intentionality is perceived, even 
when none is immediately observable, which, as discussed above, is a key point in 
testing whether intentionality is perceived in the Brentanian sense. 
1.3 Aim of the current study 
From the current literature, we reach several conclusions. Firstly, there seems 
to be very good evidence that infants and non-human primates code intentional 
relations between objects and agents. As we have demonstrated above, infants can 
relate various actions, e.g. grasping, gazing, pointing, to their specific goal-object, 
and non-human primates have a similar ability for some actions such as grasping.  
 
 
26 
 
Secondly, some evidence suggests that when coding such relations, primates 
may not necessarily need to observe the action and the object simultaneously. When 
the object was shown beforehand, they may be able to ‘remember’ or represent it 
from the intentional actions to generate their representation of the intentional 
relation. It might be like the gestalt perception where a partially observed 
configuration would automatically reveal the full configuration.  
In addition, when the object was not shown beforehand, primates and infants 
seem to be able to infer about the existence of the object from others’ gaze. It 
suggests the possibility that the intentional relation can be coded from perceiving 
only the action, when no direct evidence of the potential object exists. However, 
gazing is not fully representative for intentional actions in general and there is no 
convincing evidence, other than the pilot study by Kersken et al, that investigates 
other intentional actions regarding the inference of the potential object.  
The aim of the current thesis is to build upon Kersken et al’s experiment and 
try to address the issue of understanding intentionality in the Brentanian sense, 
especially regarding the inference of object. We propose a hypothesis based on the 
reviewed evidence about human infants and non-human primates: intentionality is 
coded as a relation between intentional agents and objects, and the observation of 
certain actions will trigger the perception of intentionality. Thus, when perceiving 
an action as intentional, the observer automatically infers a potential object, even in 
the absence of any independent evidence about the existence of the object. This 
ability may be a fundamental step for ToM development. 
A way of testing whether behaviour is understood as intentional is to test if an 
observer expects an object when they perceive an intentional action. So the first two 
studies (chapter 2 and 3) aim to establish whether the presence of an unseen object 
can be inferred from an intentional action and whether this is only the case for 
actions with intentions, but not for actions without intentions. We will investigate 
whether the subjects will infer the existence of a goal object from a grasping action 
by a violation of expectation paradigm. We will examine two species, a non-human 
primate species, capuchin monkeys, and humans, in order to compare their 
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performance and investigate the possible evolutionary origin of this ability. Another 
two studies (chapter 3 and 4) will aim to investigate capuchin monkey and human 
adult understanding of intentionality. These two studies will not be focused on the 
inference of the object, but on coding the agent and the object together as a whole 
configuration of intentionality. 
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Chapter 2. Capuchin Monkey’s inference 
of objects from object-directed actions 
Summary 
The ability to understand intentionality is potentially important for the 
development of theory of mind. Ample evidence has suggested that human infants 
can code intentionality by relating an intentional action and an object together (e.g., 
Woodward, 2009). But evidence in non-human primates is sparse (Kano & Call, 2014). 
In addition, it remains unclear whether non-human primates can infer the potential 
object from object-directed actions, if the object has not been shown beforehand. 
To investigate these issues, we used an adaptation of the violation of expectation 
(VoE) paradigm to test if Capuchin monkeys possess such abilities.  
We presented 20 Capuchin monkeys videos of an object-directed (grasping), 
and a non-object-directed action (flop) action directed behind one of two screens. 
These were followed by one of three outcomes, there was: no object (Object-absent 
condition), an object present behind the congruent screen (congruent condition), or 
an object present behind the incongruent screen (incongruent condition). The 
monkeys’ looking time at the three outcomes was coded as a measurement of their 
expectation.  
The results suggested that the monkeys can differentiate the actions by their 
object-directed intentionality. They had no specific expectation about the object for 
the non-object-directed action flop. For grasping, however, the longer looking time 
at the incongruent than the congruent outcome indicated that the monkeys 
expected the object-directed action to be directed at an object in a particular 
location. However, when no object was shown behind the screens, the monkeys did 
not look longer in the grasping condition. This suggests that their object expectation 
may be activated only retrospectively after seeing an actual object. The results 
suggest that Capuchin monkeys can understand intentionality as object-directedness 
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by coding the goal-object from the object-directed action, but that there are 
limitations when the objects are not visible from the beginning. 
2.1 Introduction 
As described in the general introduction, ToM has long been a focal point in 
developmental and comparative psychology (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Call 
& Tomasello, 2008; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Perner & Wimmer, 1983; Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978; Umiltà et al., 2001). The main research question has gradually 
shifted from whether infants and animals, especially non-human primates, can 
understand the meaning of others’ behaviours and mental states, to how this 
understanding is achieved or, in other words, the different mechanisms of ToM 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Baron-Cohen, 1991; Gómez, 
2009a; MacLean et al., 2012; Sodian, 2009). We proposed that understanding 
intentionality, in the sense of directedness to an object, might be important in the 
development and evolution of ToM (see chapter 1 and also, Aschersleben, Hofer, & 
Jovanovic, 2008; Umiltà et al., 2001; Wellman et al., 2004; Wellman, Lopez-Duran, 
LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008) and therefore the ability to infer about an object from 
intentional actions is a key point to investigate (see chapter 1 and also Gómez, 2008, 
2009).  
The first aim of the current experiment is to examine whether a non-human 
primate species, the Capuchin monkey, can understand the relation between object-
directed action and a goal-object. Understanding intentionality by coding the 
relation between an action and an object develops early in human infancy 
(Woodward et al., 2002; Woodward & Guajardo, 2003; Woodward, 1998a, 1999). At 
as young as 6-months, human infants are already able to distinguish object-directed 
actions from other actions and to understand the goal-directed action together with 
its goal-object (Woodward, 1998a). Some findings shows that non-human primates 
can understand intentionality in a similar way too, but empirical work on this issue is 
very sparse (Kano & Call, 2014). 
In addition to perceiving the relation between actions and goals when 
presented together, we further suggested that the inference of an object from 
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intentional actions may happen automatically when interpreting object-directed 
actions whose object is not visible (see chapter 1 and also Gómez, 2008, 2009). 
Studies about geometrically gaze following (e.g., Amici, Aureli, Visalberghi, & Call, 
2009; Bräuer et al., 2005; Moll & Tomasello, 2004) provide some support for this 
proposal; however, direct empirical evidence, (except for a pilot  study, Kersken et 
al., n.d.), addressing this issue with intentional actions other than gaze is still lacking. 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate whether Capuchin monkey can 
infer an object from an object-directed action when the presence of the object is not 
shown in advance. This ability would be a fundamental component in understanding 
intentionality in a Brentanian sense (Gómez, 2008). 
We will use the violation of expectation paradigm to examine Capuchin 
monkey’s expectation of an object after watching an object-directed or a non-goal 
directed action. The design is based on the preliminary study by Kersken et al 
reviewed in chapter 1.   
The violation of expectation paradigm has been successfully used in pre-verbal 
infants and non-human primates in investigating their understanding of various 
physical and social scenarios (Anderson et al., 2004; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Santos & Hauser, 1999; Woodward, 1999; Xu & Carey, 1996). In this paradigm, the 
subjects are shown two events, one of which is in conflict with what one would 
expect (for example, an object that remains standing in mid air when its support is 
removed). In our experiment, we will present Capuchin monkeys with different T-
test events and will use their looking time as an indication of their expectation. After 
watching an object-directed action directed to one of two hiding spots, if the 
monkeys infer a potential object from the action, they should look for longer if no 
object appears in the corresponding location. However, if they do not infer an object 
from the intentional action, their looking times would not be different in the two 
conditions.  
We will present the Capuchin monkeys two different actions, one object-
directed (hand in grasping movement) and one non-object-directed (hand in flop 
movement). We expect the monkeys to only infer the object from the object-
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directed action. Grasping is chosen as the object-directed action because it is a very 
common intentional action in most primate species. In their everyday life, primates 
use their hands to grasp food, branches, and other objects, and to groom and 
interact with each other in play and aggressive interactions. Grasping hands are one 
of the defining adaptations of primates (Gómez, 2004). Thus, we regard this action 
as the most salient and universal goal-directed action related to objects. We will also 
present the subjects a non-object-directed action, an action of hand-flop, as the 
control condition (Wood et al., 2008, 2007; Wood & Hauser, 2011; Woodward, 1999). 
By presenting these two actions, we expect to be able to compare the monkeys’ 
expectations of intentional and non-intentional actions, in the sense of object-
directed (grasping is always about an object) vs non-object directed (flop is not 
about an object). This method will allow us to determine whether the subjects can 
infer the existence of an unseen object from the mere contemplation of an 
intentional action. 
To briefly summarise, in the current chapter we are concerned with the 
question: can monkeys infer objects from intentional (in the sense of object-directed) 
actions from observing the intentional actions alone when the object is not shown in 
advance?  
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Subjects 
We tested 20 brown Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella apella) at the Living 
Links to Human Evolution Research Centre at Edinburgh Zoo (see Table 2 -  1 for 
more information). Eleven of them were included in the final data analysis; the other 
nine were excluded for various reasons. Six monkeys participated in only one or two 
sessions because they did not come back to finish the all the conditions of the 
experiment. One, Carlos, stayed in the cubicle during the test but did not engage 
with the current experiment; the last two, Flojo and Sylvie, did not manage to attend 
to at least two trials in each condition.  
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Table 2 -  1 Monkey’s profile and participation in the experiment. 
(Monkey’s ages were when the experiments finished. The first 11 
monkeys were included in the reported results and statistical analyses) 
Monkey Age (Yr:m) Gender Finished sessions Included in stats 
Chico 3:8 M 9 Y 
Ruben 2:7 M 9 Y 
Junon 12:5 F 9 Y 
Anita 15:2 F 9 Y 
Inti 3:6 M 9 Y 
Figo 6:7 M 9 Y 
Diego 10:5 M 9 Y 
Diablo 41:? M 8 (Dead after 8th) Y 
Meako 4:9 M 9 Y 
Ximo 2:9 M 9 Y 
Torris 1:11 M 9 Y 
Flojo 1:7 M 8 (did not want to 
be separated) 
N, failed to finish at least 2 trials 
in each condition 
Sylvie 9:5 F 9 N, failed to finish at least 2 trials 
in each condition 
Carlos 6:6 M 7 N, not attending to the current 
T-test 
Rufo 3:3 M 6 N, Too anxious in cubicles 
Toka 9:1 M 4 N, Did not come back to be 
separated 
Alba 1:4 F 1 N, Did not come back 
Luna 1:8 F 1 N, Too anxious to be separated 
Lindo 1:5 F 2 N, Did not come back 
Lana 17:3 F 1 N, Did not come back 
 
The Capuchins monkeys were from two social groups, East group and West 
group, housed in two separate but similar enclosures, each with an indoor section, 
32.5m2*6m, and an outdoor section, approximately 900m2 (Griffey, 2011; 
Macdonald & Whiten, 2011). The monkeys were free to move from one section to 
the other through several entrances. Apart from these entrances, monkeys could 
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also enter or exit their enclosures via two rows of four transparent (Perspex) testing 
cubicles (each 0.5m*0.5m*0.5m), which were along the side of a research room 
beside their indoor section. Figure 2 - 1 indicates the enclosures and the research 
room (Griffey, 2011; Macdonald & Whiten, 2011). In addition, the Capuchins were 
housed in mixed species group with squirrel monkeys, which had their own indoor 
section and shared the outdoor section with the Capuchins. 
 
A 
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B 
Figure 2 -  1 The housing conditions and research environment (A. Living 
links from the air. Each inside enclosure includes an indoor section for 
Capuchins, a research room and an indoor section for squirrel monkeys. 
Photo: Stephen Evans; taken from Macdonald & Whiten, 2011; B. The 
east research room and testing cubicles. Photo: Mark Bowler; Taken 
from Griffey, 2011) 
 
Testing was conducted on each group once a day for two hours between 11:00 
and 16:00. Monkeys were fed three times daily with fresh fruits and vegetables and 
water was available ad libitum. The experiment was conducted in the research room 
where the cubicles were located (see Figure 2 -  1).  
The authorization for this experiment was provided by the Living Links Centre 
at Edinburgh zoo and the ethical permission to conduct experiments with the 
animals has been obtained from the Ethical Committee of University of St Andrews 
(see Appendix I). 
2.2.2 Apparatus 
The monkeys were separated and tested individually in the cubicles (see Figure 
2 -  2). They have been habituated to stay in the cubicles for research sessions by the 
Living Links Centre before the current experiment. The cubicles can be closed by 
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slides and the monkeys are allowed to go back to their group if they put their hands 
on the slides. A 17-inch computer monitor was located on a platform at equal height 
to the base of the cubicles and 0.5m directly in front of the front panel. Display of 
stimuli was controlled by a computer (Lenovo ThinkPad X220i) behind the monitor. 
Subjects’ visual behaviour was recorded by two digital cameras (Panasonic SDR-S26), 
one placed at the centre directly below the monitor and the other at either the right 
or left side of the monitor. Monkeys’ looking time data were extracted from videos 
and were analysed frame by frame using Coral VideoStudio Pro X4. 
 
A. The experimental setting. A platform with the monitor stands in front of one of the 
middle cubicles of the bottom layer. The monitor is controlled by the laptop behind it. A 
monkey is separated from its group and locked in the cubicle for the experiment session.  
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B. Top view. The monitor is 50 centre meters away from the front panel of the cubicle. 
 
C. The monkey’s view. The videos are displayed on the monitor. The 1st camera is located 
at the centre bottom of the monitor and the second camera at the middle of either the 
left or right side of the monitor. The experimenter is hidden behind the monitor during 
each trial. 
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C. The 1st camera’s view. The 1st camera records the monkey’s behaviour from the front 
panel. 
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D. The 2nd camera’s view. The second camera records the monkey’s behaviour in 
supplement to the 1st camera.  
Figure 2 -  2 The experimental settings  
2.2.3 Stimuli 
We created an introductory video clip and 12 different experimental clips for 
the monkeys to watch. All the videos were recorded in a quiet room in the School of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, at the University of St Andrews and were edited using 
Window Movie Maker. 
The videos showed two hiding screens (which could be opened 
simultaneously), an agent, who directed an action towards behind one screen, a 
curtain (which could occlude the agent’s face to eliminate gazing information) and 
three different outcomes regarding an object’s appearance.  
The introductory video introduced the general settings of the experimental 
videos (see Figure 2-3). In this video, the agent sat at the centre with her hands 
resting at the centre of two closed hiding-screens. Then the agent looked left and 
right behind the screens, indicating that she could see and she knew what lay behind 
the screens. After that, the curtain rolled down until just above the two hiding-
screens, occluding the agent’s face so that the gazing cue would not affect the 
results. The introductory clip lasted for 13 seconds.  
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Figure 2 -  3 Frames from the introductory video 
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Figure 2 -  4 frames from the experimental clips. The left and right 
showed the flop congruent and grasping incongruent condition 
respectively. 
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All experimental clips had four phases (see Figure 2-4). In the first phase, the 
screens were closed and the agent directed an action from the centre to behind one 
screen using the cross-lateral hand (so that the grasping action looks more natural) 
until the whole hand was occluded. This phase was crucial for monkeys to observe 
the action. In the second phase, the screens opened simultaneously and the agent 
drew the hand back to the centre. In the third phase, the screens remained open and 
the hands stayed resting at the centre. Monkeys could see the outcome (presence 
and location of object) in these two phases and their looking time during these two 
phases was used to indicate their expectation. In the last phase (after stopping the 
looking time recording), the agent picked up the object with both her hands, stood 
up, and left the scene; if the object was absent, the agent simply stood up and left 
the scene. The fourth phase was designed to inform the subject that the object was 
moved away and there would not necessarily be an object in the next trial. The four 
phases lasted for 4s, 2s, 8s and 4s (3s if the object was absent), respectively. And 
therefore, the whole video clips of the congruent and incongruent conditions lasted 
for 18 seconds and the videos of Object-absent conditions lasted for 17 seconds. 
 
Figure 2 -  5 The 6 experiment conditions (2 Action types X 3 Outcomes)  
In the experimental clips, there were two types of actions (i.e., Grasping, the 
object-directed action, and Flop, the non-object-directed action). Each action was 
directed towards one of two locations (right/left) which were paired with three 
different outcomes regarding the position of the object (i.e., Object-absent, 
Congruent, Incongruent). The combinations resulted in 12 different video clips. The 
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two crucial factors were the Actions and the Outcomes, leading to 6 different 
conditions (see Figure 2-5).  
If the monkeys can infer the object from the object-directed action, then they 
would look for a shorter time in the Congruent conditions than the Incongruent and 
the Object-absent condition. Note that if the monkeys anticipated the presence of a 
target object for the grasping action, they should be ‘surprised’ when none appeared 
at all and so look longer. If this is only the case for the object-directed action but not 
for the non-object-directed action, the looking times to the three outcomes would 
not be different for the non-object-directed action. 
In the Grasping condition, the agent raised a hand, formed the grasping 
gesture and moved towards behind a screen (see Figure 2 – 4). Then the hand 
stopped behind the screen (therefore invisible to the monkey) grasping the object 
(or mimicking grasping if there was no object. In the Flop condition, the agent raised 
and rotated the hand, formed the flop gesture and moved the hand behind a screen. 
The hand (now invisible to the monkey) stopped resting on the platform (beside the 
object if there was one) completely hidden behind the screen. When the screens 
opened simultaneously, the hand returned to the centre and rested at its initial 
position.  
In the congruent outcome, the object would appear behind the screen that the 
action was directed to. In the in-congruent outcome, the object was placed at the 
opposite position. In the Object-absent outcome, no object was present. 
Note that in the second phase, when the hiding screen opened, the hand was 
returning to the centre. The reason for doing this was to overcome some potential 
confounding factors from the Kersken study (Kersken et al., n.d.). In the Kersken 
study (see chapter one), after the action, the hand did not return but stayed at the 
location behind the occlude, either grasping the object or lying on the platform in 
grasping position but without an object (incongruent condition), or, in the flop 
condition, the hand laid besides the object or just on the platform (incongruent 
condition). 
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In addition, for the flop action, which was designed as an accidental hand drop, 
the hand was resting on the platform in a relaxed way; however, the grasping hand 
shape was still in its grasping shape. Therefore, the monkey might have regarded the 
stationary grasping position wihout an object as bizarre on its own and observed it 
for longer but without having predicted the presence of an object in advance, just as 
a reaction to an unusual configuration. We therefore decided to make the hand 
return to its original location as a way of ensuring that any differential reaction to 
the experimental conditions was to the expectation generated by the monkeys, and 
not to the nature of the existing configuration.  
One potential further advantage of moving the hand back to the centre is that 
the monkeys attention may be captured by the returning hand, and therefore return 
to the centre, thereby equalizing the attentional scanning necessary to find the 
object in both congruent and incongruent conditions. 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Each subject was presented with 9 test sessions on different days. Each session 
contained an introductory trial followed by six experimental trials, including the two 
action conditions paired with the three outcomes in a balanced order. The direction 
of action was randomized within sessions and balanced between sessions. The 
subjects were rewarded three raisins between trials to keep them motivated to stay 
in the cubicles regardless of their performance in the task. After the experimental 
trials, the subjects were rewarded a small handful of raisins for participating. At the 
end of each session, a peanut was put at the top centre, the bottom centre, the left 
centre and the right centre of the monitor to calibrate the monkey’s looking 
direction in the videotape. While coding for the monkeys’ looking time, these four 
points were used as reference of the monkeys’ looking direction, i.e., if the monkey 
was looking no wider than the four points, the duration of look was included in the 
looking time. 
2.2.5 Data analysis 
All looking behaviours was coded offline by rewatching the videos. The footage 
from the 1st camera served as the premier data source and the footage from the 2nd 
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camera was used as supplementary when a monkey’s gaze direction was not clear 
from the 1st camera. A look was defined as at least 4-frames (1/25 second per frames) 
of looking within the range of the monitor. Four out of 25 frames (25 frames = 1 
second) was chosen because in published looking time experiments with non-human 
primates, 5 out of 30 frames (30 frames = 1 second) are defined as a look 
(Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, Goddu, & Santos, 2011; Martin & Santos, 2014). Our 
camera and video coding software could only divide a second into 25 frames and 4 
out of 25 (0.16s) was similar to 5 out of 30 (0.17s). We added the frames of all looks 
during the 10-second-looking-time-window (which starts from when half of the 
object was revealed, including the second and third phases) to calculate the 
monkeys’ looking time. 
Two periods in each trial were crucial for data coding. The first period was in 
the first phase from 0.5 seconds, when the hand had formed the shape of the action, 
until 2-seconds, when half of the hand was occluded by the screen. We coded 
whether the monkeys looked or not during this period as an indication of their 
attention to the stimulus, i.e., whether they noticed the action and its direction. If 
they looked at least once for 4 frames during this period, we recorded the trial as 
being attended to and included it in further analysis.  
The second crucial period was the second and third phases. The screens 
opened and the outcome was revealed during the 10 seconds of the two consecutive 
phases, but the scenes were not the same. In the 2-seconds of the second phase, 
with the opening of the screens, the hand was still moving towards the centre of the 
platform; in the 8 seconds of the third phase, the hand was resting at the centre and 
the scene was still. Considering that the two phases were both showing the outcome, 
we added the two together and analysed the monkeys’ looking time and the number 
of looks during the 10 seconds for the main statistical tests. In addition, we also 
examined monkeys’ looking time in the two seconds of the second phase and the 8 
seconds in the third phase separately to determine if the still moving hand during 
phase 2 may have any effect on the monkeys’ attention.  
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We mainly used 2*3 two-way repeated-measure ANOVAs with Action 
(grasping/flop) and Outcome (Congruent, Incongruent and Object-absent) as within 
subject factors to assess the effect of the two factors. But because the Object-absent 
condition was not directly equal to the other two, we also examined the two factors 
using 2*2 two-way repeated-measure ANOVAs, excluding all the conditions where 
the object was not present. 
2.3 Results 
Firstly, we excluded all trials where the monkey was not paying attention, i.e., 
did not have at least one 4-frames look, to the initial action. It left us with 350 
attended trials from the 567 tested trials (62%) for looking time analyses. In addition, 
of the 9 sessions conducted, we decided to only include the first 6 sessions in further 
data analyses considering the drop of interest in the last three sessions (see detailed 
analysis in appendix II). Unless specified, the statistical analyses in the following 
sections only included the first 6 sessions. 
2.3.1 The effect of action type and outcome type on looking time 
and number of looks 
 We examined the monkeys’ total looking time and number of looks using a 
two-way repeated-measure ANOVA with Action (grasping/flop) and Outcome 
(Congruent, Incongruent and Object-absent) as within subject factors to assess 
whether the monkeys’ looking time was affected by different actions and different 
outcomes about the goal object.  
Looking time in the 10 seconds after object location is revealed 
Firstly, we analysed the individuals’ mean looking time during the 10-second 
window (see Table 2-4 and Figure 2-8). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption 
of sphericity had not been violated for the main effect of Outcome, (χ2(2) = 4.28, p 
= .12), or the interaction between the two factors, (χ2(2) = .32, p = .85), and 
therefore, all the reported tests were not adjusted for sphericity and the degrees of 
freedom required no correction. A significant main effect for Outcome was detected, 
(F(2,20) = 3.84, p = .04), but no significant main effect of Actions was found, (F(1, 10) 
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= 1.44, p = .26). More importantly, we found a significant interaction between Action 
and Outcome, (F(2, 20) = 4.43, p = .03), which indicated that the type of action had 
different effects on monkey’s looking time depending on the object’s state.  
 
Figure 2 -  6 Monkeys’ average looking time in the 10-second window in 
each condition 
To further analyse this interaction, we used a one-way repeated ANOVA to 
compare the three outcomes for each action. The results revealed a significant 
difference for Grasping (F(2,20) = 8.28, p = .002, Partial Eta Sqaured = .45), but not 
for Flop (F(2,20) = .13, p = .88, Partial Eta Sqaured = .013), Watching a grasping 
action significantly affected the monkeys’ looking time on the three different 
outcomes of congruency, while flop did not.  
Post hoc tests (Turkey test with Bonferroni adjustment) in the grasping 
condition revealed that the monkeys looked longer at the incongruent (t(10) = 3.26, 
p = .009) and congruent (t(10) = 3.09, p = .011) outcomes than the no-object 
outcome. There was no difference in looking time between the congruent and 
incongruent conditions  (t (10) = 1.85, p = .283. In addition, because the Object-
absent condition was not directly equal to the other two, where an object was 
presented, and we expected the participants to look longer at the incongruent 
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condition than the congruent one, we conducted a planned paired T-test for the 
congruent and incongruent outcomes of grasping. The T-test revealed difference 
between the two conditions, (t(10) = -1.848, p = .047), one-tailed, suggesting longer 
looking time at the incongruent outcomes than at the congruent outcome. In 
comparison, no difference was found for Flop by ANOVA, (F(2,20) = .13, p = .88), 
suggesting that the monkeys had no specific expectation about the object for the 
action flop. 
We also compared the monkeys’ looking time between the two action-
conditions at each outcome. Paired T-tests showed significant longer looking time at 
the incongruent outcome if the action was grasping than if it was flop, (t(10) = -2.26, 
p = .047), but showed no significant difference in looking time between the actions 
at the congruent outcome, (t(10) = -1.07, p = .31), or the Object-absent outcome, 
(t(10) = 1.20, p = .26).  
Table 2 -  2 Monkeys’ mean looking time and number of looks in each 
condition 
   Outcome    
 Action  Congruent Incongruent Object-absent Total 
Looking 
time (s) 
During full 
10 seconds 
 
Graspin
g 
Mean 2.08 2.54 1.48 2.03 
SD 0.59 0.87 0.56 0.80 
Flop Mean 1.85 1.89 1.75 1.83 
SD 0.57 0.88 0.72 0.71 
Total Mean 1.96 2.21 1.62  
SD 0.58 0.92 0.64  
Number of 
looks 
during full 
10 seconds 
Graspin
g 
Mean 3.01 3.26 2.30 2.86 
SD 0.97 0.88 0.78 0.94 
Flop Mean 2.78 2.56 2.58 2.64 
SD 0.55 0.71 0.73 0.66 
Total Mean 2.90 2.91 2.44  
SD 0.78 0.86 0.75  
Looking 
time (s) 
during the 
Graspin
g 
Mean 0.52 0.49 0.51 0.50 
SD 0.38 0.23 0.32 0.31 
Flop Mean 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.37 
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first 2 
seconds 
 
SD 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.20 
Total Mean 0.46 0.43 0.42  
SD 0.32 0.22 0.26  
Looking 
time (s) 
during the 
last 8 
seconds 
Graspin
g 
Mean 1.56 2.05 0.97 1.53 
SD 0.60 0.92 0.46 0.80 
Flop Mean 1.44 1.51 1.42 1.46 
SD 0.51 0.82 0.67 0.66 
Total Mean 1.50 1.78 1.19  
SD 0.54 0.89 0.61  
 
If we included all the 9 sessions in the analyses, the only significant difference 
lay between the looking time during the 10-second window after they watched the 
grasping action and the flop action, when the factor Outcome was combined 
together, (F(2,20) = 3.92, p = .04. The monkeys looked longer at the grasping action 
in general than the flop action. Although the results from all the 9 sessions were 
different from that from the first 6 session, the trend was similar. However, we 
believe that the data about the drop in attention to the actions during the first phase 
fully justify reliance on the results of the first 6 blocks. 
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Figure 2 -  7 Monkey’s average looking time in the 10-second window in 
each condition when all the 9 sessions are included 
Number of looks during the 10 seconds window 
Some of the monkeys’ looks were very quick checks and although they did not 
have very long looking time in total, their number of looks might indicate their 
attention to the scenario. Although the number of looks was not an independent 
measurement from looking time, it provides an additional way of exploring the 
results. We examined individuals’ mean number of looks (see Table 2-2 and Figure 2-
8) during the 10-second window as an additional test.  
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been 
violated for the main effect of Outcome (χ2(2) = 0.82, p = 0.66( or the interaction 
between the two factors (χ2(2) = 2.53, p = 0.28( and, therefore, all the reported 
tests were not adjusted for sphericity and the degrees of freedom requires no 
correction. There was a marginally significant main effect of Outcome (F(2,20) = 2.95, 
p = 0.08) but no significant main effect of Actions (F(1, 10) = 2.19, p =  0.17). Again 
we found a significant interaction between the type of action and the type of 
outcome (F(2, 20) =  4.32, p = 0.02), indicating that the type of actions had different 
effects on number of looks depending on the outcome of the object’s position.  
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Figure 2 -  8 Monkeys’ average number of looks in the 10-second window 
in each condition 
 
To break down the interaction, we again conducted a one-way repeated 
ANOVA comparing the three outcomes for each action. The number of looks at 
different outcomes was significantly different for Grasping, (F(2,20) = 5.21, p =.015) 
but not for Flop, (F(2,20) = .54, p = .59) reflecting that watching the grasping action 
significantly affected monkey’s number of looks at the three different outcomes of 
the object, while watching the flop action did not. Post hoc test (Turkey test with 
Bonferroni adjustment) for grasping revealed that the monkeys looked more often at 
the incongruent outcome than the Object-absent one (t(10) = 2.98, p = .041) and 
they tended to look more often at the congruent outcome than the Object-absent 
one (t(10) = 2.60, p = .076), but the difference between the congruent and 
incongruent conditions was not significant (t(10) = .75, p = 1.00). We again 
conducted a planned paired T-test for congruent and incongruent outcomes of 
grasping and with this measurement the T-test revealed no significant difference 
between the two conditions, t(10) = -.75, p = .47, suggesting no difference for the 
number of looks at the incongruent and the congruent outcome. This finding means 
that the significant difference found in the previous analyses of total amount of 
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attention, must be due to a longer duration of the fixations during the incongruent 
outcomes in the grasping condition. 
We also compared the monkeys’ looking time at each outcome between the 
two action-conditions. Paired T-tests showed marginally significant longer looking 
time at the incongruent outcome if the action was grasping than if it was flop, (t(10) 
= -2.20, p = .052), but showed no significant difference of looking time between the 
actions at the congruent outcome (t(10) = --1.20, p = .26), or the Object-absent 
outcome (t(10) = 1.44, p = .18).  
These results almost repeated the results using looking time as the 
measurement, and, therefore, supported the findings. The only difference was that 
the monkeys did not look more often at the incongruent outcome than the 
congruent one for grasping. This could be due to individual differences in inspection 
patterns, i.e., monkeys’ average number of looks (regardless of trial type) ranged 
widely from 2.00 times per trial to 3.61 per trial, perhaps making the variance too big 
to reach statistical significance. 
On the other hand, however, this also suggest that the overall longer looking 
time found in the previous analyses is due not to an increase in number of fixations, 
but to their longer duration during the incongruent grasping condition, which was 
also suggested by Wass and Smith (2014). 
Looking time in the first 2-seconds and the last 8 seconds 
Thirdly, we used the same analysis to examine the monkeys’ looking time 
during the first 2-seconds of the outcome, when the hand was moving back from the 
screen to the centre, and the last 8-seconds, when the hands were both resting at 
the centre and the scene remained still (see Table 2-4 for details). We wanted to 
know if the two periods were equally crucial in reflecting the monkeys’ expectation 
of the object. For example, phase two might contribute more to the looking time 
since the moving hand could still show the direction of the action; but phase three 
might also be the main influence as the hand was resting and no longer a distraction 
for the monkey who could now observe the outcome scene on its own. 
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Figure 2 -  9 Monkey’s mean looking time in the 2- and 8-second window  
For the first 2-seconds, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had not been violated for the main effect of Outcome (χ2(2) = .60, p 
= .74), or the interaction between the two factors (χ2(2) = 4.44, p = .11), and, 
therefore, the tests in the two-way repeated measure ANOVA were not adjusted for 
sphericity. We found a marginally significant main effect for Actions, (F(1,10) = 4.28, 
p = .06), which indicated possible longer looking time at grasping than at flop. But 
the results revealed no significant effect for the other main factor, Outcome, (F(2,20) 
= .12, p = .89), or for the interaction, (F(2,20) = .007, p = .91).  
For the last 8-seconds, we first conducted the Mauchly’s test. The results 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated for the interaction 
(χ2(2) = 1.03, p = .60), and, therefore we did not adjust for sphericity when 
reporting the interaction; however, the sphericity had been violated for the main 
effect of Outcome, (χ2(2) = 6.51, p = .039), so we reported the results of ANOVA 
using Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degree of freedom. There was a marginally 
significant main effect for Outcome (F(1.32,13.2) = 4.02, p = .057). But no significant 
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main effect of Actions was found (F(1, 10) = .18, p =  .68). Similarly to what we found 
for the whole 10-seconds period, we found a significant interaction between the 
type of action and the type of outcome (F(2, 20) =  4.23, p = .029), indicating that the 
type of actions had different effects on the monkey’s looking time depending on the 
outcome of the object’s position. To break down this interaction, we first performed 
the one-way repeated ANOVA comparing the three outcomes for each action. The 
result revealed significant difference for Grasping, (F(2,20) = 8.04, p = .03), but not 
for Flop (F(2,20) = .067, p = .94), reflecting that watching the grasping action 
significantly affected the monkey’s looking time at the three different outcomes of 
object, while flop did not. Post hoc test (Turkey test with Bonferroni adjustment) for 
grasping revealed that the monkeys looked longer at the incongruent (t(10) = 3.74, p 
= p = .012) and congruent (t(10) = 3.00, p = .040) outcome than the no-object 
outcome, whereas the difference of looking time between the congruent and 
incongruent conditions was not significant (t(10) = 1.57, p = .44). We also conducted 
the planned paired T-test for congruent and incongruent outcomes of grasping. The 
T-test revealed no difference between the two conditions, (t(10) = -1.57, p = .15). 
Again we compared the monkeys’ looking time at each outcome between the two 
action-conditions and no significant difference was found between any pairs, 
congruent, (t(10) = -.63, p = .54), incongruent, (t(10) = -1.71,  p = .12), Object-absent, 
(t(10) = 1.80, p = .10).  
To briefly summarize, for phase 2, the monkeys looked longer at the grasping 
condition than the flop condition when the hand was drawing back to the centre, but 
no significant difference between the three outcomes was found. The 8-seconds in 
phase 3 was more similar to what we found for the whole 10-seconds period: the 
monkeys’ looking pattern of the three outcomes was different for the two actions. 
They are more interested in, i.e., looked longer at, the condition where an object 
appears than otherwise, but only when the initial action was grasping. However, 
when the outcome phase is split into the 2- and 8-seconds phases, none of the 
phases reached significance in the crucial distinction between congruent and 
incongruent grasping conditions, which in the 10-second analysis is significant.  
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2.4 Discussion 
In this experiment, we tested if Capuchin monkeys understand the 
intentionality of actions in the sense of object-directedness by showing an ability to 
infer the existence of an object from an object-directed action (grasping), without 
previous information about the object. We compared the expectations of the 
monkeys (as reflected by their looking time) in response to the outcomes of two 
different actions: an object-directed action (grasping) and a non-object directed 
action (flop). We expected the monkeys to show longer looking times when the 
object directed action was revealed to have been directed at an incongruent or 
empty location with no object. 
2.4.1 Capuchin monkeys can distinguish object-directed and 
non-object-directed actions 
Firstly, the monkeys distinguished the two different actions in terms of object-
directedness, i.e. their pattern of looking time at the three outcomes was different 
for the two actions. For the non-object-directed action (flop) there was no looking 
time difference between the three outcomes (congruent object, incongruent object, 
no object). This suggested that the monkeys had no specific expectation about the 
existence of an object for the non-object-directed action. In comparison, the 
different looking times at the three outcomes for the object-directed action (grasp) 
suggested that the monkey did expect an object linked to the grasping action. 
Therefore, we argue that Capuchin monkeys are capable of detecting the difference 
between grasping and flop in terms of their intentional relation to an object even 
when the object is not immediately perceivable and it appears only after the action 
has ceased (the screens were lowered to reveal the outcome only after the hand had 
started to return to its original location). The longer looking time at the incongruent 
outcome than the congruent outcome for the object-directed action indicates 
“surprise” (violation of expectation) and is consistent with the interpretation that 
the monkeys expected an object as the goal of the object-directed action. 
Our findings therefore provide evidence that Capuchin monkeys understand 
object-directedness by coding the action as directed to a goal-object. This is in 
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principle comparable to the findings with pre-verbal infants and findings with other 
primate species suggesting that certain actions are perceived as directed to a goal 
object (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Kano & Call, 2014; Woodward et al., 2002; 
Woodward & Guajardo, 2003; Woodward, 1999). 
However, our findings go further suggesting that the object-directedness of 
grasping is not only perceived when both object and grasping are visible 
simultaneously, but also anticipated, when only the action is initially visible.  
This would be consistent with the findings of Umiltá et al. (2001) suggesting 
that monkeys can interpret an action as object grasping even if they cannot see the 
grasping of the object itself. It is enough for the monkeys to have seen the existence 
of an object behind a screen for their mirror neurons for grasping to fire when they 
see a hand in grasping position disappearing behind the screen. However, there is no 
mirror neuron firing for grasping if the monkeys previously saw that there was no 
object behind the screen. 
Our study goes beyond this finding by showing that the monkeys act as if they 
expect an object even when they have not been previously informed about the 
presence or absence of the object behind the screen. Our study suggests that 
monkeys can not only remember if there was an object and connect it to a 
subsequent grasping action, but they may anticipate or imagine the presence of the 
object from the contemplation of the grasping action alone. 
2.4.2 Do Capuchin monkeys infer the presence of the object from 
the action alone? 
There is, however, a problem with the interpretation that Capuchin monkeys 
understand the existence of the object from the grasping action alone. Thus far, 
we’ve mostly discussed about the congruent and incongruent conditions above, but 
the Object-absent outcome is also crucial for our study. In the condition where no 
object appeared in the end, the monkeys were not surprised as we had expected. 
We had predicted that if the monkeys anticipated the presence of a target object for 
the grasping action, they should be ‘surprised’ when none appeared at all. However, 
the no object condition produced no evidence of prolonged looking time: it was 
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instead the condition that provoked the least attention from the monkeys. This 
suggests that the Capuchin monkeys did not, in fact, spontaneously infer the 
presence of a potential object from observing the object-directed action of grasping. 
This seems to contradict the finding of the contrast between grasp and flop that 
suggested an expectation that there would be an object congruent with the grasping 
action, but not the flop. 
Note that the contrast between the flop and grasping conditions precludes a 
simple explanation of the results in terms of the appearance of an object logically 
requiring more attention than the appearance of no object. The nature of the action 
performed before the screens were removed did affect the attention patterns of the 
monkeys. 
One possibility is that this result, together with the mirror neuron study that 
we introduced earlier (Umiltà et al., 2001), suggests that monkeys might only 
represent the object-directedness of grasping once the presence of the object is 
known. In the mirror neuron experiment, although the object was occluded and 
could not be observed when the grasping action was conducted, the rhesus monkeys 
still understood that the grasping was directed at the object. As the monkeys had 
known about the presence of the object beforehand, they might remember its 
presence. However, in our experiment, the object was not displayed before the 
action was conducted and the Capuchin monkeys had no information about the 
presence of the object at all. 
One possible way of reconciling these apparently contradictory results could 
be that the monkeys cannot generate an object representation from watching the 
action only, or that any representation generated is overridden immediately by 
reality. Instead, the revealing of the object, in the congruent and incongruent 
condition, may retrospectively evoke the monkeys’ memory of the intentionality of 
grasping. Once they know that an object was present, their memory of the grasping 
action, still active, makes them assign the object to the intentional direction of the 
grasping, which led to the longer looking time in the non-matching incongruent 
outcome. This suggests an intriguing intermediate possible answer to the main 
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question of the experiment: although the Capuchin monkeys generate something 
like an empty “object slot” when seeing the grasping action, this slot needs to be 
filled by reality. It is not enough to create the expectation of an object, and in the 
absence of an object the action is not interpreted as object-directed and therefore 
generates no violation of expectation. 
If in Umiltá et al.’s (2001) experiment the monkeys needed a memory of the 
object to understand the subsequent action of grasping as object-directed (as 
indicated by a physiological measure of neurone firing), in our experiment the 
monkeys needed the subsequent presence of an object for their memory of the 
action to be interpreted as object-directed (as indicated by the behavioural measure 
of looking time). Thus, we could conclude that the monkeys did not infer the 
presence of an object from the grasping action alone, but did code the difference 
between intentional and non-intentional actions (in the sense of being object-
directed) because they reacted differently to the eventual presence of a congruent 
versus incongruent object depending upon the nature of the object. 
These results are compatible with a Gestalt interpretation of the perception 
and coding of intentional relations between agents and objects (Gómez, 2008), but 
one in which both the agent’s action and the object of the action must be perceived, 
although not necessarily at the same time. The monkeys may put together and code 
as intentionally related actions and objects that are perceived in succession. We 
found, however, no evidence that they could infer an as yet unobserved object from 
the action alone. 
2.4.3 Gaze and grasping as intentional actions 
In the gazing following experiments where great apes and monkeys tried to 
find an object of interest when they noticed others’ gaze (Amici et al., 2009; Bräuer 
et al., 2005; Bugnyar, Stöwe, & Heinrich, 2004; Burkart & Heschl, 2006; Dunphy-Lelii 
& Wellman, 2004; Moll & Tomasello, 2004; Tomasello et al., 1999), the object was 
not known beforehand (as in our experiment), yet the subjects seemed to 
understand intentionality from merely seeing the other’s gaze direction. We suggest 
that two reasons are likely to have resulted in the different results. In the current 
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experiment, we eliminated gaze cues to avoid the confounding of cues and therefore 
the impossibility of disentangling them. It is possible that non-human-primates can 
infer the object of intentionality only from gazing information, and maybe from the 
combination of gaze and action, but not from hand action alone. Indeed, the natural 
behaviour of primates, human beings included, would typically consist of gaze and 
action cues combined together. For example, if a monkey is grooming another one, it 
will be looking at where the hand is active. This opens up interesting questions about 
which cues of intentionality are necessary to identify object-directedness.  
The different methodologies of the experiments may also play a role in the 
different results. For example, the type of measurement and experimental 
environment in our looking time experiment may lead to less salient behaviour than 
in the gaze following experiments. In the geometric gaze following task, the 
participants can move in a larger arena and actively go around barriers to trace the 
gazing direction and, therefore, display more explicit behavioural evidence of 
expecting an object. In our experiment, the monkeys are confined in a much smaller 
cubicle, which won’t allow such locomotion to show their expectations. In our 
experiments, some monkeys, e.g., Chico and Ruben, tried to stand up and get down 
in an apparent attempt to look behind the screens in the initial phase, when the 
hand was reaching behind the screen. This might indicate that the monkeys had 
inferred that there might be something behind that screen the actor was reaching to. 
This was, however, not done by all the monkeys and it would be difficult to tell if 
they were simply trying to look behind the screen primed by the actor’s action 
without any specific object expectation.  
Using looking time as the main measurement may have potential problems too. 
Looking time (at least, when estimated from videotape recordings) may not be 
sensitive enough to detect subtle differences. For example, during the 2-seconds of 
phase two, when the screen was open but the hand was still moving back, the 
monkeys looked longer at the object-directed than the non-object-directed actions.  
Specifically, during those 2-seconds in the object absent condition grasp did not 
generate more attention than flop. But instead of coding the monkeys’ looking time 
and number of looked from the video, if we could record their visual behaviour in a 
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more  subtle way, for example, record the fixations and saccades using eye tracking 
device to make sure where specifically they are looking at, it might be able to show 
their initial expectation of an object (maybe what we tentatively called ‘an object 
slot’ above), but this was immediately overridden by reality.  
Finally, the gaze cue in the gaze following experiment was given by a real 
person and the screens and experimental scenario consisted of real objects, whereas 
the stimuli in our experiment were all presented by video, which might be weaker in 
drawing the monkey participants’ attention and therefore result in a weaker 
experimental effect.  
Eye-tracking techniques might help in providing more detailed information 
than the looking time measurement alone. They would help in recording the looking 
time more accurately and would help to identify the monkeys’ saccades and exact 
attention of focus during the study. For example, if the monkeys check the empty 
locations more often in the incongruent condition than the congruent condition, it 
might indicate that the monkeys remembered the direction of the action. But by our 
coding of looking time only, it is hard to tell where exactly the monkey was looking at.  
2.4.4 From an evolutionary perspective 
As mentioned earlier in the first chapter, our experiment was developed from 
a preliminary study with Capuchin monkeys and Diana monkeys using a violation of 
expectation design by Kersken et al (Kersken et al., n.d.). But the current experiment 
was different from their original one, mainly in that 1) we included the additional 
Object-absent condition in addition to their congruent and incongruent conditions, 
and 2) we used videos to conduct the experiment rather than human actors acting 
live onsite. In spite of the last difference, our results from the congruent and 
incongruent conditions are consistent with their results from the six tested Capuchin 
monkeys. With these consistent findings, we are able to more confidently conclude 
that Capuchin monkeys are able to understand intentionality in the sense of object-
directedness even when the action and the object are not perceived simultaneously.  
However, the results of our additional condition (object absent) indicate that 
their suggested interpretation (Capuchin monkeys can infer or imagine the existence 
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of an object from the grasping action alone) may not be correct. The monkeys 
showed no surprise to the complete absence of the supposedly inferred object, but 
just surprise to the fact that, if there eventually was an object, its location was 
incongruent with the direction of the action. This may appear to be a subtle 
difference, but it could reflect a crucial cognitive difference between humans and 
non-human primates: the ability to infer imaginary intentional objects versus the 
ability to code intentionally only real objects and actions, even if they need not be 
perceived simultaneously. 
In sum, our findings reveal a sophisticated intentional ability in Capuchin 
monkeys: they can code intentionally actions even if they are never perceived in 
conjunction with their objects. This supports behaviourally the physiological findings 
of Umilta et al (2001) with another monkey species, but also expands upon their 
study by showing that previous knowledge of the object is not necessary to trigger 
an intentional coding of an action. However, our findings also suggest that Capuchin 
monkeys may not be able to generate a representation of an intentional object 
before obtaining direct evidence of its existence. 
Although available evidence suggests that the ability to understand 
intentionality when both action and object are simultaneously visible is shared by 
several monkey species, great apes and human infants, the ability to code 
intentionality when objects and actions are presented sequentially, targeted by our 
paradigm, remains largely unexplored. In their pilot study, Kersken et al also tested 
Diana monkeys and these did not look differently at the congruent and incongruent 
conditions, which suggests that they did not interpret the actions intentionally. 
These different findings for the two species raise the question of the phylogeny of 
this ability, and the need to test more primate species with our paradigm, both for 
intentional coding of sequentially presented action and objects, and crucially,  our 
original aim of testing the ability to infer objects from the action alone. 
In the next chapter, we will test human adults with a similar experiment to 
explore if in human adults, using the same test, we find consistent evidence of 
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inference of the intentional object not dependent upon the direct perception of the 
actual object.  
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Chapter 3. Understanding of 
Intentionality in Adult Humans 
Summary 
Understanding object-directedness from actions is a key socio-cognitive skill; 
however, we still know little about how object-directedness is understood. In this 
chapter, we investigated whether adult humans could infer a potential object from 
object-directed actions performed without a visible object with the same stimuli 
used with monkeys in the previous chapter.  
In the first experiment, we presented adult humans with a reaction time task 
(measurement used instead of looking time), where they were required to press one 
of three keys to indicate the presence or location of an object that they had not seen 
beforehand. If they could infer the object from an object-directed action, we’d 
expect their reaction time to be shorter when an object appeared at the congruent 
location, than at the incongruent location, or when no object was present. The 
results, however, showed that the 20 tested adults’ reaction times in the congruent 
and the incongruent conditions were not different, indicating that they had formed 
no expectation about the object’s presence or location from the actions. Although 
the participants’ reaction time was always longer when the object was absent, it was 
not necessarily due to their expectation of the object’s presence. A follow up 
experiment where no action was conducted, showed that participants still 
responded more slowly to the object’s absence. In an additional control condition, 
when the participants knew about the object’s presence and location before 
watching the actions, the type of action did not affect their final response.  
We concluded that adult humans in the current paradigm failed to show an 
ability to automatically infer the potential object from the object-directed action. But 
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whether they truly lack this ability, or the experimental conditions failed to register it, 
requires further investigation. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we used looking time (LT) as a measurement 
investigate whether Capuchin monkeys can infer potential objects from object-
directed actions as opposed to non-object-directed actions.  
We had two major findings. Firstly, the monkeys could differentiate the two 
actions on intentionality: they expected the object-directed action, but not the non-
object directed one, to be congruent with the object location. However, they 
showed no ‘surprise’ when no object appeared behind the screens. From these 
results, we concluded that the monkeys had the ability to code an intentional 
relation without the need to perceive action and object at the same time. However, 
they lacked the capability to infer the presence of an object merely from watching 
the grasping or flop actions without previous or subsequent knowledge of the 
existence of the object. We suggested the interpretation that the presence of the 
object may trigger a memory of the object-directedness of the grasping action, or 
that the intentional, object-directed action generated some sort of “object slot” that 
was not activated unless an object was subsequently perceived.  
In the current chapter, we aimed to adapt the method explored with the 
Capuchin monkeys, to be used with adult humans. We asked adult participants to 
take part in a series of reaction-time tasks in which they watched object-directed 
and non-object-directed actions performed towards behind one of two barriers, 
without knowing what was hidden at each location. The position of an object was 
then made visible and the participants were required to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as possible to indicate the position of the object. We took their reaction 
time as the measurement of their expectation of the potential object, predicting that 
if participants anticipated the existence and position of an object from the object-
directed action, their reaction times would be faster..  
In the first experiment, we asked human participants to watch a short video 
clip similar to the one that we had shown to the Capuchin monkeys, i.e., a video 
containing an action directed to behind one of two hiding-screens, followed by three 
outcomes, i.e., congruent, incongruent and Object-absent. The participants needed 
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to press a matching key to decide if there was an object and which screen it was as 
quickly as possible when the hiding-screens were opened. In contrast to the monkey 
experiment, we recorded the participants’ reaction time as measurement of the 
participants’ expectation of the existence and the position of the object. Reaction 
time was used instead of looking time because the latter does not work well with 
adults, whereas RT has been successfully used as a measurement for implicit 
mentalistic reasoning generating similar results as looking time in human infants in a 
variety of tasks (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, 
& Samson, 2006; Cohen & German, 2009, 2010). Two factors were crucial in this 
experiment. The first was the type of action: object-directed or non-object-directed; 
the second was target-congruency, object position congruent to the direction of the 
action, object position incongruent to the direct of the action or no object at either 
location. According to our hypothesis that the agents would expect an object as the 
target of the object-directed actions, the incongruent and object absent conditions 
should be unexpected for the participants who watched the grasping action and, 
therefore, we predict that they would react more slowly in these two conditions 
than in the grasping-congruent condition. Given that the flop action was not object-
directed, the participants should not have any specific expectation about object and, 
therefore, we predicted that the reaction time after the flop-action video would not 
be affected by the different reaction targets.   
The second experiment was a follow up study to the first experiment. It 
consisted of three sessions to answer the questions that arose from the first 
experiment, as will be discussed later. It consisted of fewer repeated trials so that 
the results would not be largely affected by a practice effect. In addition, it also 
included a condition where the object would be shown beforehand so that the 
participants would not need to infer about the presence of the object, but could 
directly encode the intentional relationship between the actions and the object. 
It should be noted that the direction of the actions, even if it was not object 
directed, might bias the participants’ attention to one direction, resulting in faster 
reaction to the target if the object is at the congruent location.  However, we 
predicted that this effect should be the same for both actions, with the hypothesized 
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object expectation effect resulting in an additional shortening of the RT for the 
object-directed action.  
In sum, with the conditions in this task, we would be able to investigate (1) 
whether the participants differentiate object-directed actions and non-object-
directed action by expecting the object-directed action, but not the non-object-
directed action, to be always congruent with the object location, as the Capuchin 
monkeys did in our last experiment. And (2), whether the human participants would 
show evidence of inferring the presence of an object from the object-directed action 
when no object was shown at all, which the monkeys were not capable of. 
3.2 Experiment 1 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
A total of 20 participants (Female : Male = 12:8; average age = 21.0) were paid 
£5 each to participate in the current experiment. They were recruited from the 
participant-pool in the University of St Andrews. All participants were required to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had participated in similar 
experiments beforehand. They were invited to a quiet room in School of Psychology 
and Neuroscience to participate in the experiment. Ethical approval was granted by 
the ethical committee of University of St Andrews. 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus and general procedure 
The experiment was presented on an 18 inch flat-square CRT monitor (IIYAMA, 
LS902UT, Resolution: 1280*1204, Refresh Rate: 85Hz). The participants sat 
approximately 50 cm from the monitor, facing the centre of the screen (see Figure 3 
-  1). Their response was made on the keyboard and was recorded by E-Prime. The 
experimental procedure was controlled by E-Prime as well.  
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Figure 3 -  1 Experimental environment 
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter welcomed the 
participant to the room and read them the instructions for the task. The task was 
introduced as a reaction-time task but object-directedness per se was not 
mentioned.  
After signing the consent form, the participants first watched an introductory 
video clip where they were presented with the general scenario of the task. The 
introductory trial was exactly the same as that shown to the monkeys in the previous 
study (see Figure 3 – 2).  
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Figure 3 -  2 Procedure of the introductory clip 
The participants then watched the experimental video clips where an action 
was directed towards behind one of two hiding screens (see Figure 3 -  3). When the 
hiding screens opened simultaneously, they were required to press a key on the 
keyboard as fast as possible to indicate the presence/location of the object. 
Depending on the presence/position of the object, the participants should respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the key “left”, “down” or “right” to 
inform about the object as behind the left screen, absent, or behind the right screen 
using their index finger, middle finger, or ring finger, respectively (see Figure 3 -  4). 
The videos were exactly the same as those used in the monkey experiment before 
the opening of the screens. But there was a slight modification after the screens 
opened so that it better fitted the reaction time task, as will be discussed in detail 
later. 
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Figure 3 -  3 Procedure in each experimental video clip 
      
 
Figure 3 -  4 The response keys 
 
Grasping                                                                    Flop 
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After finishing the reaction-time task on the computer, participants were asked 
to fill in a brief questionnaire. The questionnaire was to collect the participants’ 
explicit views regarding the task and the two actions. For example, we asked if they 
noticed the different gestures in the videos and if they tried to ignore the movement 
of the hands. We also asked if they regarded either action as object-directed, 
intentional, or whether they felt that it affected their reaction to the object (see 
Appendix III for the complete questionnaire).  
At the end, the experimenter read the debriefing to the participant and 
described the purpose of the study, explaining that it was about understanding 
object-directedness. The experimenter remained seated quietly in the same room 
through the experiment but did not monitor the participant during the experiment. 
3.2.1.3 Design 
The experiment was a 2*3 with-in subject design (see Figure 3 -  5), the same 
as that in the monkey study. Again the two factors were Action and Outcome. For 
the first factor, Action, we again used the object-directed action, grasping, and the 
non-object-directed action, flop, as in the last chapter. If the participants inferred 
the goal only from the object-directed action, we would expect a difference in 
reaction time pattern to the two actions. The control action, flop, also helped to 
control for confounding factors such as the trajectory of movement and the direction 
of attention etc. 
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Figure 3 -  5 An illustration of the experimental conditions. 
The second factor was Outcome. It included three different conditions: in the 
congruent condition, an object appeared at the congruent location to where the 
action had been directed; in the incongruent condition, it appeared at the 
incongruent location to the action direction; and in the Object-absence condition, no 
object was present when the two screens opened. If the participants inferred the 
object from the object-directed action, we would expect them to respond more 
quickly in the congruent condition than the other two. But since the non-object-
directed action was not supposed to activate the participants’ expectation of the 
object, their reaction time was expected to be similar in the three conditions, unless 
there was attention cueing to one side, in which case there could be some bias of 
faster reaction time to the congruent condition. But in the latter case, we would 
expect the bias to appear for both actions and a larger difference between the 
congruent and incongruent condition would indicate the participants’ expectation 
about the object. 
It must be noted that, as in the monkey experiment, when the screens opened, 
the hand returned to the centre so that when the object was revealed, the position 
of the hand would not bias the attention of the observer to one side.  It also avoided 
the strange gesture of grasping at nothing or the hand resting by an ungrasped 
object. As in the monkey experiment, this served to ensure that the participants 
were responding to the action itself rather than just the final scene. 
During the 30-minutes reaction time task, each participant first had a practice 
block of 12 trials to get familiar with the reaction keys and the experimental scenario. 
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They then took 4 test blocks of 36-trials each and after each block they were allowed 
a brief rest if they wanted to. The 36 trials in a block included equiprobable factorial 
combinations of the actions (grasping or flop), cue direction (left or right) and object 
position (left, right or object absent). Each condition was repeated twice in a block. 
Within each block, the trials were presented to participants in a different 
randomized order. Feedback for correct and incorrect responses was given in the 
practice block but not in the test blocks. 
In addition, three probe questions were randomly presented in between clips 
in each block, asking which action was presented in the clip before. This was to 
ensure that the participants paid attention to the difference between the actions as 
opposed to simply waiting until the screen opens. 
3.2.1.4 Stimuli 
Reaction time task 
The stimuli displayed included an introductory clip and six experimental clips. 
They were essentially the same videos used in testing the Capuchin monkeys.  
In the introductory clip (see Figure 3 -  2), both hiding-screens were closed and 
an actress sat at the centre with both of her hands resting at the centre of the two 
screens. After she had looked left and right behind the screens, a curtain rolled down 
and occluded her face to eliminate the gazing cue. The introductory clip lasted for 13 
seconds and was exactly the same as in last chapter. 
Figure 3 -  6 illustrates the experimental clips. The experimental clips consisted 
of two phases: before and after the screens opened. The first phase lasted for 4 
seconds before the screen opens, presenting an action directed towards behind one 
of the two screens. At the beginning of the clip, the actress sat with both her hands 
resting at the centre of the platform. Then she performed an action, either the 
grasping or the flop, to behind either screen. The hiding-screens were closed all the 
time and the curtain occluded her face all through the video. This part was exactly 
the same as the first phase of the videos in the monkey study. But in the 4th second, 
when the hiding-screens opened simultaneously to show one of the three outcomes, 
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the video was slightly different to the monkey study. Instead of returning slowly to 
the centre, the hand was seen immediately back at centre after the screens opened. 
This adaptation had to be done due to the use of RT (instead of looking time) as the 
dependent variable. The participants had to respond as soon as possible after the 
opening of the screens, and if the hand took as long as 2-seconds to return to the 
centre, we could not eliminate the confounding factor of the hand being at one side 
at the time of response.  After the opening of the screens, therefore, a still image 
remained showing the final outcome (congruent, incongruent, or object absent) for 
3-seconds. The object in this experiment was an apple, as was used in the monkey 
study. 
A second difference with the monkey experiment was that, at the end of each 
video, we did not present the participants with the removal of the object, but 
instead, an instruction screen appeared, asking the participants to press a key to 
start the next trial. The removal of the object was presented in the monkey 
experiment to show that the presence of the object was not necessary in the next 
trials. But we decided to abandon this design, because the adult humans had 12 
practise trials before the test and they should be easily able to realize that the 
presence of the object was not relevant to its present or location in the previous 
trials. And given that the adults had many more trials (144 test trials) than the 
monkeys (54 trials if all 9 sessions were included), if all the trials included the 
removal of the object, the experiment would have reached an excessive duration.  
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Figure 3 -  6 Experimental procedure 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire administered after completion of the tasks included two 
sections. In both sections, the participants were required to rate statements on a 7-
point scale (see Table 3 - 1). 
Table 3 - 1 the 6-point scale of statement rating 
Score Description 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Somewhat disagree 
4 neutral 
5 Somewhat agree 
6 Agree 
7 Strongly agree 
In the first section, the participants were asked to rate five statements about 
the task (see Table 3 - 2). From these questions, we planned to investigate the 
participants’ general feeling about the task. In the second section, we planned to 
investigate the participants’ explicit view about the two actions. The participants 
were presented with the video of an action directed to behind one of two hiding 
screens, followed by 12 statements regarding this action and then the other action 
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followed by the 12 statements again. The 12 statements were categorized into three 
categories: 1) if the action was object-directed, 2) if the actress knew about the 
object, and 3) if they found the action relevant to the object, to examine different 
aspects of the participants’ explicit views about the agent, the action, and the object. 
The order of the actions presented was counterbalanced between participants. The 
order of the questions was randomized for each action and participant. 
Table 3 - 2 The statements in each section  
Section of 
questions 
Aim of the 
question 
Questions 
Section 1.  
Statements about 
the task 
Participants’ 
general feeling 
about the task 
The task is easy.  
I made some mistakes in the task. 
I noticed the different gestures in the videos. 
The video before the screens opens was 
distractive. 
I tried to ignore the movements in the video and 
focused on the moment when the screen open.  
Section 2. 
Statements about 
each action 
Object-
directedness of 
the action 
This action indicated the location of the object.  
This action had nothing to do with the object.  
This action did not inform about the object.  
The action was aimed to the object. 
The agent’s 
intention about 
the object 
The actress in the video knew if there’s an object.  
The actress did not know the position of the 
object. 
The actress tried to reach the object.  
I tried to figure out if the actress knew about the 
object.  
The general 
strategy in the 
task 
This action distracted me from the task. 
I ignored this video when making the judgement.  
This video was helpful for me to succeed in the 
task.  
This action looked random and irrelevant to the 
task.  
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3.2.1.5 Data analysis 
To examine the effect of the two actions and the three outcomes on the 
participants’ reaction time, I analysed the data of the correct responses in all four 
experimental blocks combined, (excluding the practice blocks). We used a 2*3 
repeated measure ANOVA with Actions (Flop or Grasping), and Outcome (congruent, 
incongruent, no object) as the two factors. When Mauchly’s test indicated violation 
of assumption of sphericity, the degrees of freedom were adjusted by the 
Greenhouse-Geisser approach. 
In addition, as in the monkey study, to explore the potential difference 
between the response to the object’s location and its absence we also conducted a 
2*2 repeated measure ANOVA with Actions (Flop or Grasping), and Congruency 
(congruent or incongruent) as the two factors.  
3.2.2 Results 
3.2.2.1 The Incorrect trials 
Before the main test, we first examined the rate of correct responses and the 
distribution of the incorrect trials in each condition. The participants responded 
incorrectly in 2.19% of all the test blocks (see Figure 3 – 7 and Table 3 - 3). A Chi-
square test showed that the number of incorrect responses was not distributed 
evenly across conditions (χ2(2) = 15.57,  p = .008). Mistakes were found more often 
when reporting the presence of an object in a particular location in the object absent 
conditions than in the congruent or incongruent conditions (χ2(2) = 12.10,  p = .002). 
The number of mistakes made for the two actions was not significantly different (χ
2(1) = 1.92, p = .17).  
We also excluded all the Object-absent conditions to examine if the location of 
the appearance of the object would affect the participants’ error rate differently for 
the two actions. Chi-square test revealed no significant difference, between the two 
actions and the two outcomes (χ2(1) = 2.59, p = p = .46).   
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Table 3 - 3 Number of errors in each condition of the testing blocks 
Condition Congruent Incongruent Object-absent 
Flop 10 7 20 
Grasping 4 8 14 
Note: 480 trials in total for each condition 
 
 
Figure 3 -  7 Number of errors in each condition of the testing blocks  
 
In the following results, we excluded all the incorrect trials when reporting the 
mean RT for each participant.  
3.2.2.2 The effect of Action and Outcome on reaction time 
We first examined the participants’ RT to each condition in the 4 testing 
blocks. . Contrary to our expectations, the results of the 2*3 ANOVA (See Table 3 - 4 
and Figure 3 -  8) showed no interaction effects, F(1.2,23.6) = .23,  p = .79. However, 
both main effects were significant. The reaction time was significantly higher for flop 
than grasping although the difference was only a few milliseconds (F(1, 19) = 5.78, p 
= .027). The main effect was significant for Outcome (F(1.04,19.79) = 35.75, p < .001), 
too. Paired T-test (with Bonferroni adjustment) showed that the subject responded 
significantly more quickly at both the congruent (t(39) = 7.98, p < .001), and the 
incongruent (t(39) = 8.20 p < .001), outcomes than in the Object-absent conditions. 
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But no difference was revealed between the congruent and incongruent conditions 
(t(39) = .020,  p = 1.00). 
We also conducted a planned 2*2 2-way ANOVA excluding the object-absence 
condition and assessed the effect of Action and Congruency. We found a significant 
main effect of Action ( (1,19) = 4.85, p = .040), where again reaction to Flop was 
slower than RT to Grasping. However, no main effect of Congruency was found 
(F(1,19) = .00, p = .99), indicating that the congruent and incongruent conditions did 
not have a different effect on the participants’ RT.  Again, there was no interaction 
(F(1,19) = .080,  p = .78). 
Table 3 - 4 Reaction Time in each condition (ms) of the testing blocks 
  Outcomes 
  Congruent Incongruent Object-absent 
Flop Mean 401.6 400.9 496.2 
 SD 56.5 56.8 81.6 
Grasping Mean 392.9 393.6 482.7 
 SD 66.4 62.0 94.0 
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Figure 3 -  8 Mean (SE) reaction time (ms) in each condition (Note: Con, 
InCon and Ob-Ab represents Congruent, Incongruent, Object-absent, 
respectively.) 
3.2.2.3 The effect of Action, Outcome and Block order on reaction time  
There was the possibility that the participants learned to ignore the actions 
during the repeated conditions of the test thereby suppressing any expectation of 
the object. Therefore, we examined if the block order (one, two three, four) had any 
effect or interaction with the two relevant factors, Action and Outcome. We used a 
three-way repeated measure ANOVA, adding in block order as the third factor, to 
investigate this issue. Figure 3 -  9 illustrated mean RT in different conditions in each 
block. Again we found significant main effects of Outcomes (F(1.0,19.8) = 35.48, p 
< .001), and Actions (F(1,19) = 5.92,  p = .025), but no interaction for these two 
factors (F(1.24, 23.62) = .18, p = .84). But notably, although the results revealed no 
main effect of Block order (F(3, 57) = 1.27, p = .30), it showed a significant two-way 
interaction between Block and Outcome (F(6, 114) = 3.62, p = .003) and a significant 
three-way interaction of the three factors (F(3.5, 66.4) = 2.94, p = .032).  
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A. Flop 
 
B. Grasping 
Figure 3 -  9 Mean RT (SE) at different Outcomes across the testing blocks 
for each action (A. Mean RT after watching flop, B. Mean RT after 
watching Grasping) 
 
To look further into how the reaction time varied over the testing blocks, we 
examined the effect of Action and Outcome in each block separately by with a 2*3 
ANOVA (Action * Outcome). Across all four blocks, the reaction time was significantly 
longer in the Object-absent conditions than the congruent or incongruent conditions, 
as shown in Figure 3 -  10 and Table 3 - 5. The interaction of Action and Outcomes, 
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however, was different across the 4 blocks. It was only significant in the first block 
(see  Table 3 - 5).  
  
                 A. Block 1                                                           B. Block 2 
  
  C. Block 3                                                             D. Block 4 
Figure 3 -  10 Mean RT in each condition in each block. (Dar and light 
grey represent flop and grasping respectively). 
 
Table 3 - 5 ANOVA test results for each block. 
 Two-way ANOVA 
 Action Outcome Action*Outcome 
Block No. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
1 4.6 0.046* 46.60 < .001*** 5.07 0.011* 
2 0.4 0.53 29.21 < .001*** 2.30 0.14 
3 11.0 0.004** 22.20 < .001*** 0.79 0.43 
4 0.059 0.81 15.22 .001** 0.18 0.74 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
We examined the first block more closely, in order to investigate the difference 
between conditions. We first compared the RT of the two actions for each outcome. 
When the outcome was Object-absent, the tests revealed significantly longer RT for 
flop than grasping (t(19) = 2.58, p = 0.019), but no difference was found between the 
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two actions when the outcome was congruent (t(19) = 1.07,  p = 0.39) or incongruent 
(t(19) = 0.08, p = 0.93). We also looked at the RT between the outcomes for each 
action, the reaction time was significantly longer in the Object-absent condition than 
the other two conditions for both actions (see Table 3-6 for t and p values). But, in 
contrast to what we had predicted, no difference was detected between the 
congruent and incongruent outcomes for either action, indicating no specific 
expectation regarding the presence of an object by the adults. 
Table 3 - 6 Paired T-tests for the outcomes for each action in the first 
block 
Action Outcome pair t(19) p 
Grasping Con - InCon 0.76 .46 
Con - Ob-Ab 0.46 .000*** 
InCon - Ob-Ab 8.42 .000*** 
Flop Con - InCon 0.15 .88 
Con - Ob-Ab 4.94 .000*** 
InCon - Ob-Ab 3.98 .001*** 
 
3.2.2.4 The practice block 
As mentioned above, the participants might have learnt from the task that the 
position of the object was random across the task and that the action was irrelevant 
to the task. They could have learnt this not only from the experimental blocks, but 
also from the practice blocks. Although the practice blocks were not originally 
designed as the main test, we decided to examine this very first experience of the 
participants in this task.  
The participants had fully understood the tasks in the four testing blocks, but in 
the practice block some of them were not familiar with the rules. As a consequence 
some participants did not respond as soon as the screens opened, but waited and 
observed the outcomes for longer; others guessed about the results and tried to 
respond before they actually saw the target. Therefore we added an additional 
criteria for the data in the practice block. Only RTs that fell in the range of 150ms to 
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1250ms were regarded as valid data for this analysis. With these criteria, we were 
left with 221 trials in the practise block.  
We conducted a two-way ANOVA with the remaining data (See Figure 3 -  11 
and Table 3 - 7). There was a significant main effect of Outcome (F(1.39, 26.35) = 
48.31, p < .001). But neither the main effect of Action (F(1, 19) = .38, p = .55), nor the 
interaction between the two factors (F(1.28, 24.31) = .90, p = .38) was significant.  
The data from the practise trials confirmed the results of the four blocks of the 
main test, suggesting that the lack of the predicted effect was not due to a practice 
effect.  
Table 3 - 7 Reaction Time in each condition (ms) of the practise block 
  Outcomes 
  Congruent Incongruent Object-absent 
Flop Mean 395.6 455.9 603.0 
 SD 84.1 111.2 151.3 
Grasping Mean 411.2 412.8 600.9 
 SD 60.7 115.0 139.7 
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Figure 3 -  11 Mean (SE) reaction time (ms) in each condition of the 
practise block 
3.2.2.5 The probe questions 
For the probe questions, which were implanted among the test trials randomly, 
the participants made mistakes in 49 (21.5%) out of 228 trials in total. The error rate 
was significantly lower than chance level (χ2(1) = 74.12, p < 0.001),  indicating that  
the participants noticed the difference between the two actions. Fewer mistakes 
were made in the first block (see Table 3 - 8).  
The tendency of the error rate in the probe questions to increase over blocks 
might indicate the participants progressively tended to pay less attention to the type 
of action. However, the level of correct judgment remained very high and, in any 
case, this only indicated the participants’ explicit awareness of the actions. If the 
actions had an implicit effect (which was the target of our study), it would not 
matter much if they could not explicitly make the correct explicit judgement. 
Table 3 - 8 Error rate of the probe question in each block 
Block number 1 2 3 4 Total 
Error rate 14% 19% 26% 26% 21.5% 
3.2.2.6 Questionnaire 
Table 3 - 9 shows the participants’ average score (from raw scores) on each 
question. We transformed the score of negative questions to a standard score and 
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grouped the questions into four categories. The first category involves the 
participants’ general opinion about the task; the second the directedness of the 
action to the object; the third the agent’s knowledge about the object; the fourth 
the role of the action in the task.  
Results suggest that the participants found the task easy. They noticed the 
difference between the two actions and were aware of the mistakes they made. 
They did not find the actions distracting for them to respond to the object and did 
not make efforts to ignore the actions to focus on the opening of the screens. 
Table 3 - 10 showed the participants’ average standardized score in the last 
three categories for the two actions. The participants did not in general find that the 
actions were directed to the object. In spite of this, a paired T-test revealed a 
significant higher score for Grasping than Flop regarding the four questions about 
whether the action was directed to the object (t(19) = 2.28, p = .03). It suggested 
that the participants explicitly regarded the grasping action as more object-directed 
than flop, despite the implicit measures revealing no such distinction. But for the 
four questions about the agent’s intention about the object, the two actions did not 
have different influence on the participants’ answer (t(19) = .24,  p = .81). Yet when 
asked whether the agent knew about the position of the object, and if she was trying 
to reach the object, the participants were more likely to agree when the action was 
grasping than flop. From the last four questions, we found that the participants did 
not find the actions very relevant to the position of the object or to help them make 
the right response. The two actions were not regarded differently for the last four 
question (t(19) = 1.34, p = .20). 
Table 3 - 9 Mean score on each question on the questionnaire (Score 1-6, 
strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, agree, 
strongly agree.) 
Questions Flop Grasping About 
the Task 
About the task    
I made some mistakes in the task.   5.1 
I noticed the different gestures in the videos.   5.0 
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I tried to ignore the movements in the video and 
focused on the open of the screens. 
  3.8 
The task is easy.   4.7 
The video before the screens opens was distractive.   3.7 
The action’s directedness to the object    
The action was aimed to the object. 2.3 2.7  
This action did not inform about the object. 4.9 4.3  
This action had nothing to do with the object. 4.5 4.3  
This action indicated the location of the object. 2.5 2.4  
The agent’s knowledge about the object    
I tried to figure out if the actress knew about the 
object. 
2.9 2.9  
The actress did not know the position of the object 3.2 3.8  
The actress in the video knew if there’s an object. 3.4 3.4  
The actress tried to reach the object. 2.3 2.9  
The distraction/relevance of the actions to the task    
I ignored this video when making the judgement. 4.1 4.3  
This action distracted me from the task. 3.5 3.7  
This action looked random and irrelevant to the task. 3.6 3.9  
This video was helpful for me to succeed in the task. 2.7 2.5  
Table 3 - 10 Standard score for the last three category of questions 
 Flop Grasping 
The action and the object (goal-directedness) 2.3 2.6 
The agent and the object (intention) 3.1 3.1 
The distraction/relevance of the actions to the task 3.1 3.0 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The main aim of this experiment was to compare the performance of adult 
humans with that of Capuchin monkeys in a task of inferring the presence of an 
object from an object-directed action using the same stimuli, but using reaction time 
in the place of looking time. 
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In contrast to the Capuchin monkeys, human adults failed to show any 
evidence of distinguishing between grasp and flop in terms of object directedness. 
They did not expect the object location to be congruent with the type of action 
3.2.3.1 The lack of difference between the congruent and incongruent 
outcome 
The first and the most important result that we expected to find was longer RT 
at the incongruent outcome for the object-directed action, grasping, as only the 
object-directed action was predicted to generate an expectation of an object based 
on the features of the action. However, we found no difference between the 
congruent and the incongruent outcome for grasping. The result was the same for 
the non-object directed action, flop. The human adult participants simply did not 
expect the object’s location to be congruent with the direction of the actions at all, 
thereby suggesting they may not have implicitly inferred the presence of an object 
linked to the performance of a typical object-directed action. There are two possible 
explanations that could have led to the lack of difference regarding congruency. 
Practice effect? 
One possibility is that the participants had too many repeated trials learning 
that the object’s location was not related to what happened before the screen opens 
at all. We may have trained them to ignore the events before the screens’ opening 
and just focus on detecting the object itself once the screens opened. However, 
when we examined the order of the blocks, and even the practise block, we found 
no practice effect.  
Posner effect? 
Another possibility is that the paradigm failed to detect the implicit 
understanding of intentionality. The actions might have triggered the participants’ 
implicit perception of intentionality and object expectation, but this might have 
decayed during the time interval between the initial perception of the action and the 
screens opening, with RT being an indication of voluntary behaviour, rather than of 
an implicit cognitive event (Shepherd, 2010). This might be plausible because in the 
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Posner paradigm, which is an experimental procedure very similar to the one used in 
the current experiment, findings indicate that when a cue, such as an arrow or a 
pointing gesture, is shown in a particular direction, adult humans will respond more 
quickly to targets appearing at the corresponding location only if the interval 
between the cue and the target is less than about 200 ms (Posner, 1980). With 
intervals longer than 400ms, the cue no longer affects the participants’ responses. In 
our experiment, the shape and direction of the hand could be recognized at around 
0.5 seconds into the trial; but the screen would not open until the end of the fourth 
second. In this case, the interval between the initial presentation of the cue (which 
continued until the hand was occluded by the screen at around 3-seconds) and the 
target was far longer than 400ms. Thus, if our grasping action provoked an object 
expectation similar to the Posner effect bias, its effect would no longer be visible at 
the time of response in our experiment. We will come back to this issue in the 
general discussion of this chapter. 
The longer reaction time to the absence of the object 
We predicted that if the participants expected an object from the grasping 
action, their reaction time should be slower when the object was absent than when 
it appeared at the congruent location for the goal-directed action. Although we 
indeed find results consistent with this prediction, there was every indication that 
the longer reaction time was not due to the expectation that an object should be 
present because the control action (flop) also produced longer RTs in the object 
absent condition. As only the grasping action was designed as object-directed, the 
control action flop should not have triggered the participants’ expectation of the 
object. But, in the experiment, the reaction time for grasping and flop was exactly 
the same: longer for the absent object than for the object appearing at the 
congruent or incongruent location to the direction of the action.  
This suggests two possibilities. Firstly, the control action might actually have 
been regarded by the participants as an object-directed action, and their longer 
reaction time to the absence of the object would indicate the participants’ inference 
of the object. Some participants indeed suggested after the experiment that the 
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action flop looked like requesting, which is a very commonly used gesture and 
typically object-directed. A way to address this problem would be to compare the 
two actions with another control action that is more neutral in terms of object-
directedness than either flop or grasping. This was done in a follow up experiment 
presented next in this chapter. 
The second possibility is that responding to the absence of the object may 
simply require more scanning time to make sure that there is no object at either 
location, whereas the response to object presence can occur as soon as it is detected 
in one location without having to check the second. In this case, the longer reaction 
time at the Object-absent condition should not be attributed to the violation of 
expectation to the inference of an object, but be an effect of the search task 
unrelated to the previously shown actions. In the follow up experiment, we will 
further examine if, when no previous action is shown, the participants still respond 
more slowly to the absence than to the presence of an object.  
3.2.3.2 The two actions and object-directedness 
Did the participants pay attention to and differentiate between the two actions? 
The pattern of reaction time to the three outcomes looked almost identical for the 
two actions and it seemed that only the outcome affected the participants’ reaction 
time. Did the participants focus only on detecting the object, failing to pay attention 
to the two actions? It didn’t seem so according to the probe questions. The 
participants gave the right answer to the majority of the probe questions (80%), 
suggesting they explicitly noticed the difference between them.  
Moreover, they scored a little higher for grasping than for flop at object-
directedness in the questionnaire. This may indicate that they explicitly regarded 
grasping to be more object-directed than flop. Nonetheless, the difference was small 
and it may also be possible that at a more implicit level (the one targeted by the 
reaction time measure) the two actions were coded similarly in terms of object-
directedness. Rather than jumping to any conclusions, we suggest that more 
empirical work would be helpful in answering this question. Again, to compare a 
more neutral action with the current two might assist in clarifying this issue. 
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3.2.3.3 Comparison with capuchin monkeys 
We expected a similar pattern of results for the Capuchin monkeys and adult 
humans, with the humans showing in addition evidence of expecting an object in the 
object absent condition. The results, however, turned out to be very different for the 
two species.  
Firstly, we expected the RT (Reaction time) and LT (looking time) to be longer 
at the incongruent outcome than the congruent outcome only for the object-
directed action. If the participants expected an object by perceiving object-
directedness, they would find the incongruent outcome violated their expectation 
and thereby, would look longer or respond more slowly in this condition only for the 
object-directed action. This was true of Capuchin monkeys, (i.e., longer LT at the 
incongruent than the congruent outcome for grasp, but similar LT for congruent and 
incongruent flop). In contrast, however, human participants’ reaction times to the 
congruent and incongruent conditions were not different for either grasp or flop. At 
first sight, this might seem to indicate that capuchin monkeys could understand 
object-directedness, while adult human couldn’t.  
However, we suggested that there are a number of reasons why humans failed 
to show their understanding of intentionality in our experiment. We tried to present 
the Capuchin monkeys and adult human with as similar a task as possible. So we 
presented them with the same videos. But the measurements were different. For 
the monkeys, we used looking time, as typically done in the violation of expectancy 
paradigms for infants, and for the humans we used reaction time as a comparable 
measurement, following the example of previous studies (for example, Kovács et al., 
2010). Nonetheless, the use of different measurements may bring in other 
potentially confounding factors.  
For example, when the screens were opened, the monkeys could still observe 
the outcome for 10 seconds, which might allow them to retrospectively code the 
relationship between the object and the previously seen action. But the adults had 
to make their response immediately after the object was shown, which might 
preclude any retrospective coding of an action-object relation. The adults’ reaction 
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time could only indicate their expectation about the object from watching the 
actions. They would not have the opportunity to generate the sort of retrospective 
relation that we suggested the monkeys could be encoding after seeing the object 
(see chapter 2). It remains undetermined whether adult humans would also code 
object-directedness from the action to the object once both of them were shown. 
Therefore, in the follow up experiment, we will examine if the action would affect 
the adults’ reaction time to the object, when they knew about the object in advance. 
Secondly, although the human adults did show longer RT to the object absent 
condition (consistent with the expectancy of an object), whereas the monkeys 
showed shorter LT (inconsistent with object expectation), we cannot conclude that 
this demonstrates the humans did infer an object from the action. On the one hand, 
as discussed earlier, the non-object-directed action was as effective as the object-
directed action in provoking this effect, and on the other, the effect could be 
explained as being due to the need to scan both locations before being able to 
respond that there was no object, which would always lead to a longer RT.  
It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the comparison between capuchin 
monkeys and adult humans on their ability to understand intentionality for now. We 
will come back to this issue in the general discussion of this chapter, after a follow up 
experiment with adult humans in which we will try to address some of the potential 
shortcomings identified in the experiment. 
3.3 Experiment 2 
3.3.1 Introduction  
In this follow up experiment we mainly aim to examine the potential 
shortcomings identified in the last experiment.  
The first is whether the longer reaction time to the absence of the object 
should be attributed to an inference of the object from the actions or to the fact that 
it is simply cognitively harder to respond to ‘nothing’ than to ‘something’ (e.g., the 
scanning needs to be more thorough to conclude that there is no object). Therefore 
in the first session of the current experiment, we eliminated the preliminary actions 
 
 
92 
 
and required the participants to respond directly to the three outcomes. If the 
participants again responded slower to the absence of the object, it would suggest 
that it took longer to respond to the absence than to the presence and location of 
the object. Otherwise, it would suggest that the actions in the last experiment had 
evoked the participants’ expectation of an object to be present. 
Secondly, it remains undetermined whether both grasping and flop were 
regarded as object-directed and whether a neutral more clearly non-object-directed 
action would be perceived differently. To determine this, we added another action, 
tapping at the centre of the platform between the screens. It was not directed to 
either location and never reached the object. By adding this control action, we 
sought to investigate whether grasping and flop were both regarded as object-
directed actions. In addition, this will also act as a control for the possibility that the 
actions directed to either screen would bias laterally the participants’ attention. Thus 
the three actions, grasping, flop and tapping were presented in the second session of 
the current experiment before the simultaneous opening of the two screens.  
In addition, the number of trials was reduced so that any practice effect would 
be minimised. In the current experiment, we presented the participants with only 
two repeated trials in each condition. 
The next question was whether previous knowledge about the object would 
affect the reaction time. To address this, in the third session of the current 
experiment, we showed the participants if the object was present or not and, if so,  
where it was. In this case, they always knew about the object before they watched 
the action, thereby eliminating the requirement of inferring the potential object 
from the action. Especially in the conditions where the object was present, revealing 
in advance the presence of the object might facilitate the processing of the 
subsequent action as object-directed. Specifically, we expected that the adults’ RT 
would be longer when the object location suggested by the action was incongruent 
with the previous knowledge. 
Finally, we made some modifications to the video clips to increase the 
proportion of efficient area on the computer screen. In the video clips of the last 
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experiment, large areas of the screen were not providing information regarding the 
action or object-directedness. For example, the hiding curtain that occluded the 
actress’ facial area occupied almost half of the screen but provided no information 
about intentionality; while the space between the two hiding screens, where the 
action could be seen, only occupied about 1/6 of the whole screen. The small area of 
effective information might not have drawn enough attention from the participants 
to the actions. In the current experiment, we modified the videos to increase the 
proportion of efficient area (see method for details). 
3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
A total of 30 (Female : Male = 23:7, average age = 27.7) participants were paid 
£2 each to participate in the current experiment. They were recruited from the 
participant-pool in University of St Andrews. All participants were required to have 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had participated in similar 
experiments, including our last experiment. They were invited to a quiet room in 
School of Psychology and Neuroscience to participate in the experiment.  
3.3.2.2 Apparatus and general procedure 
The apparatus was the same as in the last experiment. 
The participants were invited to the lab in the School of Psychology and 
Neuroscience at University of St Andrews. The experimenter first read them the 
instructions and they signed the consent form. At the beginning of the reaction time 
task, they were presented with an introductory video clip. Afterwards, they finished 
three sessions of reaction time tasks. In between every two they were allowed to 
have a short break if they wished to. At the end of the reaction time tasks, they were 
shown the debriefing form and the experimenter explained the purpose of the study. 
3.3.2.3 Design 
As described in the introduction, the experiment was divided into three 
sessions. In all the three sessions, the participants were required to respond by 
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pressing one of three keys to indicate the presence and location of an object, when 
the two hiding screens opened. The object in this experiment was a small toy lion. 
In the first session, the participants were presented with 6 trials without 
actions. This session had a single factor, the outcome when the screens were open. It 
included three conditions and was a within subject design. The three conditions 
were, object presented behind left screen, object presented behind right screen and 
object absent (See Figure 3 -  12).  
 
Figure 3 -  12 the three conditions in the first session 
 
In the second session, we used a 3*3 with-in subject design (see Figure 3 -  13). 
The two factors were Action and Outcome. Besides grasping and flop, we added a 
third action, tapping at the centre, as a neutral action. The three outcomes were 
again congruent, incongruent and object-absent. Note that here, although the action 
tapping was directed to the centre and therefore does not truly involve a clearly 
congruent or incongruent direction to the location of the object; for all the three 
actions, in the congruent condition, the arm and hand at the congruent side to the 
object were used to produce the action. Therefore, we kept the factor, Congruency, 
for this action as well. 
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Figure 3 -  13 the 9 conditions in the second session 
 
In the third session, the design was as used in the second session, but with the 
addition that the participants were shown the outcome before the actions (followed 
again by the outcome) to investigate whether the participants were affected by the 
actions when they knew about the outcomes in advance.  
3.3.2.4 Stimuli 
The stimuli displayed were videos similar to those used in the last experiment, 
but with the following adjustments to facilitate participants’ attention at the action 
area. 
The introductory clip lasted for 11 seconds with a similar procedure to the last 
experiment (see Figure 3 -  14) . However, instead of resting both hands at the centre 
of the screen, the actress sat with her arms crossed to reduce the participant’s initial 
attention to the hands. And, as the curtain was eliminated in the test sessions to 
enhance the participants’ attention to the critical area, i.e., the two screens and the 
space between where the action was visible, no curtain fell at the end of the 
introductory clip. 
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Figure 3 -  14 Procedure of the introductory clip 
 
Instead, in the experimental clips, the videos were cropped to exclude the face 
above the chin of the actress so that any information from the eyes or head 
orientation was eliminated (see Figure 3 -  14, 3 – 15). The video always began with 
the hiding-screens closed and the actress sitting at the centre with her arms crossed. 
At the end of the video, the hiding-screens opened simultaneously and one of three 
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outcomes was revealed: an object behind the left screen, an object behind the right 
screen, or an absent object. The participants were required to press a matching key 
as quickly and accurately as possible when the screens opened. 
For the first session each video clip lasted 2-seconds before the screen opened 
to reveal the outcomes. The actress sat still with her arms crossed without moving. 
 
 
     
Figure 3 -  15 Session one, no action 
 
For the second session, each clip lasted for 4-seconds before the screen 
opened, presenting an action directed towards behind one of the two screens. After 
1-second of sitting still with crossed arms, the actress performed an action: grasping, 
flopping, or tapping the centre (see Figure 3 - 16). At the end of the 4th second the 
hiding-screens opened simultaneously while the hand was drawing back.  
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Figure 3 -  16 the three actions in session two 
 
In the third session, the video clips were the same as in the last session except 
that the target scene (where the screens were open and the presence/position of 
the object was visible) was presented for 1-second before each trial with the aim of 
making the participants aware of the object position from the beginning. 
3.3.2.5 Data analysis 
We first examined the error rate for all the sessions. Then we used a 3*3 
repeated ANOVA to examine each session separately. Action and Outcome were 
again our two main factors. In addition, for the second and third sessions, we 
conducted an analysis excluding all the conditions where the object was absent and 
compared the congruent and the incongruent conditions. This was because the 
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longer reaction times in the first session indicated different cognitive processes 
when responding to the presence and absence of the object and thereby the 
reaction time at the absence of the object would not be directly comparable with 
the congruent and incongruent conditions. In addition, we compared the second and 
the third session to examine if knowledge of the object beforehand affected the 
participants’ behaviour in the experiment. Finally, we also compared the second 
session with the last experiment to investigate whether the participants inferred the 
object from the object-directed action when the effect of practice was reduced.  
3.3.3 Results 
3.3.3.1 The incorrect trials 
The participants responded incorrectly for 2.54% of all the test trials (Table 3 - 
11 and Table 3 - 12). The number of incorrect trials was too small for further analysis. 
Table 3 - 11 Number and percentage of incorrect trials in session 1 
Session  Left Right Object-absent 
1 No. 3 2 3 
 % 5 3.33 5 
Table 3 - 12 Number and percentage of incorrect trials in session 2 and 3 
Session Condition  Congruent Incongruent Object-
absent 
2 Flop No. 1 4 2 
 % 1.67 6.67 3.33 
Grasping No. 2 2 3 
 % 3.33 3.33 5 
Tapping No. 1 2 1 
 % 1.67 3.33 1.67 
3 Flop No. 0 0 2 
 % 0 0 3.33 
Grasping No. 1 0 3 
 % 1.67 0 5 
Tapping No. 0 0 0 
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 % 0 0 0 
 
In the following tests we excluded all the incorrect trials from analysis. In 
addition, following standard practice in RT experiments, we excluded the trials with 
reaction times shorter than 150ms (1.19%), in which participants were likely to have 
responded when the screen moved rather than when they found the object, or 
longer than 1250ms (0.8%), in which they might not have responded as quickly as 
possible. We calculated the mean RT for each participant in each condition and then 
the reported the mean in each condition as the average across participants. 
3.3.3.2 Reaction time to different positions of the object (Session one) 
We first examined the participants’ RT to different locations of the object in 
the first session, i.e., with no cuing actions (Figure 3 -  17 and Table 3 - 13). A 
repeated measure ANOVA with object position (Left, Right, Absent) as the factor 
revealed a significantly different RT (F(1.54, 43.04) =  37.78, p < .001) between the 
three conditions. Paired T-tests with Bonferroni adjustment showed that RT to 
Object-absent was significantly longer than to object-left (t(28) = 5.60, p < .001), or 
object-right (t(28) = 6.75, p < .001). But no difference was detected between object-
left and object-right conditions (t(29) = 1.61, p = .14). The results suggest that the 
participants responded much more slowly when the object was absent than when it 
was present even when no cue action was presented. This indicated that the longer 
reaction time to the absence of the object was not likely to be caused by the 
inference of the object from the intentional action, but by an inherent difficulty in 
detecting ‘nothing’ vs ‘something’. 
Table 3 - 13 Reaction time to different position/presence of the object in 
the 1st session (ms) 
 Left Right Object-absent 
Mean 493.8 456.0 695.5 
SD 125.6 128.5 207.4 
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Figure 3 -  17 Reaction Time to different position/presence of the object 
in the 1st session (ms) 
3.3.3.3. The effect of Actions Congruency on reaction time without knowledge 
of the object beforehand (session two) 
We then examined the participants’ RT in the second session (See Table 3 - 14 
and Figure 3 -  18) to test whether the actions and their congruency had any effect 
on the participants’ reaction time. We conducted a two way repeated measure 
ANOVA using Actions (Grasping, Flop and Tapping) and Outcome (Congruent, 
Incongruent and Object-absent) as the two factors.  
The 3*3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Action (F(2,56) = 3.12, p 
= .048) and Congruency, (F(1.2,34.6) = 41.17, p < .001). But the interaction was not 
significant (F(2.9, 82.4) = 1.49, p = .22). To examine the simple main effect of 
Congruency and Action, we used Paired T-tests with Bonferroni adjustment. We 
found a trend of longer reaction time to Flop than to Grasping (t(29) = ) = 2.48, p 
= .062), but the differences between Tap and Flop, t(29) = .68, p = 1.00) or Tap and 
Grasping (t(29) = 1.72, p = .33), were not significant. For Congruency, the results 
showed that the participants responded more slowly to the Object-absent condition 
than the Congruent (t(29) = 6.85, p < .001), and the Incongruent condition (t(29) = 
6.23 p < .001). No difference between the Congruent and Incongruent conditions 
(t(29) = .84, p = 1.00) was found. 
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Table 3 - 14 Mean and SD of reaction time in the 2nd and 3rd session (ms) 
Session Condition  Congruent Incongruent Object-
absent 
Session 2 
No Previous 
knowledge 
Flop Mean 410.4 432.3 560.0 
 SD 75.4 75.2 151.3 
Grasping Mean 408.4 413.9 513.7 
 SD 83.1 72.6 116.4 
Tapping Mean 417.7 411.5 556.5 
 SD 90.4 72.2 159.5 
Session 3 
Previous 
knowledge 
Flop Mean 344.8 369.8 411.4 
 SD 85.1 101.4 154.7 
Grasping Mean 347.9 368.6 439.0 
 SD 111.3 143.2 183.9 
Tapping Mean 353.0 329.7 414.7 
 SD 110.8 96.1 148.8 
 
Figure 3 -  18 Mean reaction time (ms) of each condition in the 2nd and 3rd 
session (SE)  
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In addition, because the first session revealed a significant difference for the 
outcome of object-absence, even if no action was presented at all, we conducted an 
additional analysis of session 2 excluding the Object-absent trials. We conducted a 
3*2 two-way ANOVA with Actions (Flop, Grasping and Tap) and Congruency 
(Congruent and Incongruent) as the two factors but found no significant main effect 
of either factor, Action (F(2,56) = 1.20, p = .31), Congruency (F(1,28) = .33), p = .57) 
or the interaction (F(1.5,42.0) = 1.35, p = .26).  
3.3.3.4 The effect of Actions and Congruency on reaction time with knowledge 
of the object beforehand (Session three) 
We then examined the participants’ RT in the third session (See Table 3 - 14 
and Figure 3 -  18) to test if the actions and the congruency had any effect on the 
participants’ reaction when they knew from the beginning the location or absence of 
the object. We conducted a two way repeated measures ANOVA using Actions 
(Grasping, Flop and Tapping) and Outcome (Congruent, Incongruent and Object-
absent) as the two factors.  
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the Outcome (F(1.4, 41.1) =  
15.41, p < .001). But neither the main effect of Action (F(1.6, 46.2) = 1.17, p = .31), 
nor the interaction (F(2.9, 81.6) = .96,  p = .41), were significant.  The participant 
response was slower to the Object-absent condition than the Congruent (t(29) = 4.56,  
p < .001), and the Incongruent condition (t(29) = 3.81,  p = .002). No difference was 
detected between the Congruent and Incongruent conditions (t(29) = .85,  p = .42). 
Again, we excluded the Object-absent trials and examined whether the action 
and congruency of the object location affected the participants’ reaction time. The 
3*2 ANOVA showed no significant main effect of either factor, Action (F(1.4, 41.4) = 
1.42, p = .25), Congruency (F(1,29) = .72, p = .40), although the interaction was 
approaching significance (F(2,58) = 2.89, p = .064). To further examine the 
interaction, we conducted Paired-T-tests for each action and found that the 
participants showed a trend to react more slowly to the incongruent than the 
Congruent outcome for flop (t(29) = 1.94, p = .062), but no difference was found for 
grasping (t(29) = .96, p = .34). The reaction time to the congruent outcome of 
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tapping, however, was significantly longer than that to the incongruent outcome 
(t(29) = 2.34, p = .026). 
3.3.3.5 The effect of knowledge (RT Decrease) 
The only difference between the 3rd and the 2nd session was that in session 3 
the participants had knowledge of the location of the object before the screens 
opened.  So the time difference between the 2nd and the 3rd session should be 
caused by this knowledge. We calculated the time decrease from session 2 to session 
3 by subtracting the RT of session 2 from session 3 (see Figure 3 -  19) to examine if 
the factors Action and Congruency affected the decrease of the reaction time in a 
different way. We examined the decrease of reaction time using a two-way ANOVA. 
The test showed a significant main effect of Action (F(1.6, 46.0) = 4.20, p = .029) and 
Congruency (F(1.3, 37.9) = 7.14, p = .007), but no interaction (F(3.1, 88.7) = 1.07, p 
= .37). The decrease of RT in the object absent condition was significantly more 
salient than in the Congruent (t(29) = 2.95, p = .025), and Incongruent (t(29) = 2.10, p 
= .028), outcomes. But the difference between the Congruent and the Incongruent 
conditions was not significant (t(29) = .96, p = 1.00). 
The decrease of reaction time was marginally significantly more salient for 
Tapping than for Grasping (t(29) = 2.48, p = .058), but no difference was found 
between Flop and Tapping (t(29) = .36, p = 1.00), or grasping and flop (t(29) = 2.03, p 
= .16). In addition, when the outcome was Object-absent, the decrease of reaction 
time showed a tendency to be larger for flop than for grasping (t(29) = 1.94, p = .62).  
Knowing that there was no object behind the screen was marginally less 
helpful when the ‘distractor’ action was grasping than when it was tap or flop. This 
suggested that grasping did convey a slightly stronger ‘suggestion’ of there being an 
object that may interfere with the knowledge that actually there is none. 
Interestingly, this supposedly stronger object cueing was only manifest when there 
was a conflict with previous knowledge, i.e., when the grasping action was known to 
be counterfactual in advance.  
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Figure 3 -  19 Mean reaction time difference (ms) to each condition 
between the 2nd and 3rd session (SE) 
 
3.3.4 Discussion of experiment 2 
In the current experiment, we tested human adults’ reaction time (RT) to three 
different outcomes (Left/right position or absence of an object) when they watched 
no cueing actions to examine if responding to ‘nothing’ is cognitively harder than 
responding to ‘something’. We also replicated experiment 1 with an additional, more 
clearly non-object-directed action, tapping, as a control condition. Finally we tested 
the influence of having previous knowledge of the outcome to examine the potential 
interference of counterfactual object-directedness upon RT. 
When no cueing action was conducted, it still took the participants longer to 
respond to ‘nothing’ than to the position of the object, regardless of whether it was 
behind the left or right screen. The longer RT to the object’s absence is therefore not 
caused by an expectation of an object from perceiving the intentionality of preceding 
actions. Responding to the absence of an object seems to be cognitively more 
difficult than responding to the presence and location of something. When the 
participants were making the judgement about the object, if the object was present, 
its appearance on the computer screen might have quickly attracted the participants’ 
attention and provided them with the information that they needed to respond. But 
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when the object was not present, the participants had to scan both locations to 
make sure of its absence before making the move to respond. Therefore it always 
took longer to respond when the object was absent. As the longer reaction time to 
the object’s absence is not affected by the actions, it seems reasonable to exclude 
the Object-absent condition from further analyse. In the following discussion, we will 
focus on the comparison of congruent and the incongruent outcomes. 
3.3.4.1 Adults do not distinguish object-directed action from non-object 
directed action 
The second goal of this experiment was to examine if the participants show 
sensitivity to object directed actions when a more clearly non-object directed action 
is used as control. The action flop in the previous chapter was potentially ambiguous 
(e.g., it could be interpreted as a request gesture), so in the current experiment we 
added the action of tapping on the centre of the platform: this was not an object-
directed action (beyond the apparatus itself) and its localised direction was always 
directed to the centre and therefore not cueing any of the potential object locations. 
However, contrary to our predictions, the reaction time pattern to the object’s 
locations after watching the three actions was not different from each other. And 
the pattern was consistent with the first session where there was no cueing action 
and with the results reported in chapter 2 for flop and grasping. The three actions 
were not coded differently and it seems that no action was regarded as indicative of 
the location of the object at all, as if the participants were not engaging in an 
intentional, object-directed coding of the action.  
Moreover, this could not be attributed to a practice effect (learning that the 
actions were not predictive of the objects), because we used a significantly 
shortened number of trials in the second session of this experiment and the results 
were still consistent with those in the first experiment. Therefore we conclude that 
the failure to find a significant effect of the object-directed action was not due to 
multiple trials, or in other word, practice effect.  
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3.3.4.2 When knowing about the object in advance, adults still did not seem 
to differentiate the three actions, but grasping might have indicated some 
evidence of object-directedness.  
In the third session of the current experiment, we provided adult humans with 
information about the object before presenting the actions. In this case, they had 
seen both the object and the object-directed actions before their final response. 
Through this manipulation, we expected to remove the requirement of imagining the 
object from the action and predicted that, if they expected the object-directed 
action to be directed at the object, their RT would be longer when the cue 
contradicted the previous knowledge about the object.  
In contrast to our prediction, however, the object-directed action (grasping), 
didn’t affect the participants’ reaction time at the objects’ location as we had 
expected.  The reaction time to the incongruent condition was not longer than the 
congruent condition for grasping or the other actions. We therefore failed to find 
evidence of coding object-directedness even when both information about the 
object and the action had been directly given.  
The only evidence suggestive of some degree of coding object-directedness 
came from an additional analysis. Knowing about the object in advance in session 3 
reduced RTs in general in relation to the previous sessions, but this was especially 
effective for reporting the absence of the object (despite this decision still being 
significantly slower, but much less so). Interestingly, the reduction in RT to report 
object absence was almost significantly smaller for the grasping action, as if this 
action produce a possibly stronger suggestion of the presence of an object than flop 
or tap. Moreover, the decrease of reaction time to the contradictory cue of grasping, 
say, to the right when the object had been seen to be on the left, showed a trend to 
be smaller than that of flop too, again indicating that counterfactual grasping might 
have produced a slightly stronger interference with the previous knowledge about 
the object than flop or tapping. 
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3.3.4.3 Conclusion 
To sum up, using the current paradigm we did not find direct evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that human adults generate an implicit expectation of a 
relevant object when they perceive an object-directed action alone. However, we 
did find some evidence that they were sensitive to the counterfactual nature of a 
goal-directed action that was in conflict with previously established knowledge 
about object presence and location. 
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Chapter 4. Adult human’s automatic 
encoding of other’s belief 
Summary  
In our last study with adult humans we found little evidence of the participants’ 
understanding of intentionality (in the sense of object-directedness, Chapter 3) in 
relation to an object that has not yet been perceived but could be inferred from an 
object-directed action. In comparison, however, a very similar task with a non-
human primate species, showed some understanding of intentionality in Capuchin 
monkeys, although only after the object was perceived (Chapter 2). To further 
explore the potential limitations of adult humans’ ability to code intentionality 
automatically, this chapter aims primarily to re-examine this issue with another 
paradigm originally designed by Kovács and colleagues (Kovács et al., 2010), which 
showed evidence of complex automatic ToM abilities in both human adults and 
preverbal human infants. With a modified version of this paradigm, including 
conditions that required responding to absent objects, we again found limited 
evidence for adults’ ability to encode intentionality in relation to objects that are not 
directly perceived. Having, in addition, failed to replicate some of Kovács et al’s 
results, we further investigate the paradigm and suggest that their positive results 
might only occur under certain limited experimental conditions, and question if they 
truly reflect an implicit detection of belief about objects. To conclude, we suggest 
that whether adult humans can automatically encode intentionality about non-
perceived objects in the sense of object directedness remains an open question.  
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4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the last chapter, we found conflicting results in Capuchin 
monkeys and adult humans. The experiment with Capuchin monkeys showed 
evidence that the monkeys could encode the intentionality of an action performed 
when its object was not visible as long as the object became visible (in some sort of 
retrospective encoding), but that they showed no evidence of having ‘inferred’ an 
object from the action alone. However, the results with human adults provided little 
evidence of a similar effect. The apparently better performance of Capuchin 
monkeys over adult humans was unexpected. The ability to code intentionality (in 
the sense of object-directedness) automatically might be an important component 
of ToM and humans are typically much more proficient in ToM abilities (Herrmann et 
al., 2007). Therefore we expected adult humans to at least equal with Capuchin 
monkeys, if not outperform them, in understanding intentionality about non-
perceived objects.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, one possible explanation of our negative 
results with humans might be limitations in the design of the paradigm. Specifically 
we discussed the possibility that the measurement of reaction time (instead of 
looking time, as with the Capuchin monkeys) might have failed to capture the actual 
implicit capabilities of the humans. Therefore in the current chapter, we attempt to 
use another paradigm to re-examine adults’ implicit understanding of ToM, one in 
which positive results have been reported with the use of RT with adults as an 
equivalent measure to Looking Time with non-verbal participants (in this case, 
human infants). 
The task was initially designed by Kovács et al (2010), where they reported 
automatic computation of other’s belief about object location and its interaction 
with the participants’ own beliefs in modulating the reaction times in an object 
detection task in human adults. These results were equivalent to those found with 7-
month human infants using Looking Time instead of RT as the dependent variable. In 
their task (see Figure 4 - 1), human adults are required to watch videos of an object 
hiding behind a screen and then, when the screen opens, they are required to press 
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a key if they detect the object. In their video, there is also an irrelevant agent (A) 
who believes that the object is either present (+, + stands for believing the ball hides 
behind the screen) or absent (-, - stands for believing the ball is not behind the 
screen) behind the screen.  
They found that only when neither the participant (P) nor the agent (A) 
believed that the ball was present (P-A- condition), adults respond more slowly (see 
Figure 4 - 1.II), which indicating a violation of their expectation. But when at least 
one of them (either P or A) believed that the ball was behind the screen (P+A-, P-A+ 
and P+A+), they respond more quickly. Especially intriguingly is that, in the P-A+ 
condition, the participants seem to ignore their own true belief about the absence of 
the object, and follow the irrelevant agent’s false belief about its presence. This key 
finding led to their conclusion that the participants’ automatically compute the 
beliefs of an agent even when the agent’s belief is erroneous and irrelevant to 
performing the task. The effect does not occur if instead of an agent, the video 
displays an inanimate entity such as a stack of boxes. This experiment provided 
evidence that adult behaviour is affected by an automatic registration of others’ 
belief attributable to an implicit ToM system (Kovács et al., 2010).  
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I 
 
II 
Figure 4 - 1 Procedure and results of Kovács et al’s task (Kovács et al., 
2010). A. Experiment procedure in the four conditions. Note: P and A 
represents the participant and the agent in the video respectively, + and – 
represents believing the ball is behind the screen and believing the ball is not 
behind the screen, respectively. B. Results of Kovács et al’s task in adult human 
Note: In experiment 1, the agent stands beside the screen when the screen 
opens. In experiment 2, the agent was not present when the screen opens. In 
experiment 3, a pile of boxes, instead of the agent, acted as the agent following 
the procedure in experiment 1. 
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One difference between Kovacs’ et al. task and ours is that in their displays no 
object-directed action is performed by the agent other than introducing the object 
and putting it down on the stage. The smurf figurine just enters or leaves the scene 
by sliding in or out, but does not subsequently act or specifically look in the direction 
of the target object. It just remains present possibly contemplating what is going on. 
In contrast, in our task we had a real agent conducting actions that were directed to 
an initially non-perceived object. 
However, the coding of intentionality relationship between agents and objects 
does not require the performance of particular actions performed upon objects. For 
example, an observer can code whether an agent has “witnessed” or not something, 
and therefore whether the agent has entered into an intentional relation (in the 
Brentanian sense of object-directedness or aboutness) with that object. So that the 
object now is intentionally “available” to the agent, or, if the object changes location 
during the agent’s absence, the object becomes intentionally “unavailable” (see 
Gómez, 2008, for an elaboration of the idea of “intentional availability”; and see also 
Apperly and Butterfiled, 2009, for their similar notion of ‘registration’ of events). 
It is therefore possible to try to re-interpret Kovacs et al. study from an object-
directed intentionality perspective. 
To explain Kovács et al’s results from this perspective, we suggest that object-
directedness to the target from either the agent or the participant is automatically 
registered by the participants when the hiding process of the ball is witnessed. The 
intentional relation featuring the hidden object is accessible when the hiding-screen 
opens and it helps enhance the participants’ response to the presence of the object. 
We emphasise the importance of registering the intentionality to an object, rather 
than the understanding of the other’s belief. All conditions start with the coding of 
an intentional relation to the ball by both the observer and the agent. In the P-A- 
condition, the intentional relation is broken for both the agent and the observer 
when in the final part of the display, the ball leaves the scene, and therefore the 
appearance of the object at the end is more unexpected and the reaction time is the 
longest. But in Kovács et al’s (2010) two key conditions (P+A- and P-A+), where the 
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participant’s and the agent’s exposure to the events conflict, one intentional relation 
with the object remains active — between the participant and the object in P+A- and 
between the agent and the object in P-A+, which evokes the participants’ 
expectation of the object and leads to a similarly faster response in detecting the 
object. And, of course, in the P+A+ condition both the participant’s own relation and 
the agent’s relation to the object remain active and accelerate RT. The key finding is 
that when the participant knows that the object is gone, the fact that the agent did 
not witness this, makes the participant react as quickly as when he knows himself 
that the object is there. Our proposal is that this happens because the agent-object 
relation has not been updated in the absence of the agent, and it guarantees that a 
representation of the object behind the screen is still active in the mind of the 
participant. Under this hypothesis, the crucial factor is whether the events witnessed 
by the participants have led them to keep active in their record of the situations an 
intentional relation featuring the object. We will refer to this explanation as the 
object-directedness interpretation. 
The alternative interpretation proposed by Kovács et al’s focuses on the match 
of the participant’s and the agent’s belief and the outcome to respond to: when 
either the participant’s or the agent’s belief matches the outcome, i.e. the object’s 
presence in the Kovács-experiment, it makes the presence of the object expected 
and therefore results in a shorter reaction time. To explain in more detail, in the P-A- 
condition, neither the agent’s nor the participant’s belief about the object is the 
same as the outcome, and therefore the participants’ reaction time to the outcome 
is longer than the other three conditions. In the P-A+ condition, the agent’s belief 
about the object being present shortens the reaction time compared with the P-A- 
condition; in the P+A- condition, the participants’ belief about the object’s presence 
shortens the reaction time in relation to P-A-; and in the P+A+ condition, both the 
participant’s and the agent’s correct and congruent beliefs produce the shortest RT. 
As long as one party, either the agent or the participant, holds a belief that is 
consistent with the final outcome when the hiding-screen opens, the participants’ 
reaction time is shorter than when the outcome violates all the beliefs. We will refer 
to this hypothesis as the belief-outcome congruency interpretation.  
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Both the belief-outcome congruency interpretation and the object-
directedness interpretation can explain the results. Kovács et al (2010)’s experiment 
cannot distinguish between these two interpretations. This is due to the fact that in 
their design the participants were only required to respond to the presence of the 
object, but never to the outcome of the object not being present. What was 
measured was their RT to the presence of the object when it was or not expected. As 
a result, when intentionality about the object is encoded, the belief also matches the 
outcome that the object is present. For example, in the P-A+ condition, the agent 
and the object form an intentional relation and at the same time, the agent’s belief 
conforms with the reality of the object being present. In the P-A- condition, no 
object-directedness is coded, which leads to longer reaction time to the object’s 
presence, but at the same time, the agent’s and the participant’s belief both 
contradict the outcome of the object’s presence, which might also result in the same 
effect. Hence, when the target response is about the presence of the object, the two 
interpretations will predict the same results.  
To disentangle the two possible interpretations, it is vital to design an 
experiment where the participants will behave differently according to the two 
hypotheses. A simple modification of Kovács et al’s (2010) experiment can achieve 
this. By requiring the participants to respond to the object’s absence, and not just to 
its presence, we expect different effects according to the two proposals (Figure 4 - 2). 
Firstly, the P+A+ and P-A- conditions will act as the two baseline conditions and the 
two mechanisms predict the same results that it will take longer to respond to the 
P+A+ than the P-A- condition. For the P-A- condition, as no object is expected from 
coding object-directedness and neither subject’s belief contradicts the outcome, the 
participants’ reaction time would be short since nothing violates their expectation. 
For the P+A+ condition, both parties had coded a relation to an object and both 
parties beliefs contradict the outcome, so the reaction time is long. Following the 
two different interpretations, the difference emerges between the P+A- and the P-
A+ condition where the agent’s and the participant’s intentionality coding and 
beliefs conflict. When one of the subjects believes that the object is present (A+ or 
P+), although one of subject’s belief conflicts with the outcome that the object is 
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absent, the other subject’s belief matches the outcome. Therefore, according to the 
belief-outcome congruency interpretation, since one subject’s belief is consistent 
with the outcome (A- or P-), this will lead to a shorter reaction time than the P+A+ 
condition (Figure 4-2.II.B), mirroring the results of the object present conditions. 
However, according to the object-directedness interpretation, the expectation of the 
object either by A+ or P+ will prolong the participants’ reaction time, making it 
longer than the P-A- condition (Figure 4-2.II.C).,  
 
Figure 4 - 2 The no-object-target version and the two predicted results. 
Note: A. Kovács’ original results in experiment 1. B. the predicted results of the 
no-object-target version task if coding belief explains their result better. C. the 
predicted results of the no-object-target version task if coding object explains 
their result better. 
In addition, we suggest that the object-directedness interpretation is 
consistent with the results of the additional experiment with infants reported by 
Kovács et al’s (2010). The authors used the same video presentations with young 
infants but a different measurement, looking time. In contrast to the adult study, in 
the infant experiments, they always showed the outcome where the object was 
absent, the one that we suggest could help in distinguishing the two interpretations. 
The infants’ looking time in the tested conditions fits the object-directedness 
hypothesis (Figure 4-3. A, B). The looking time of infants was longer at P+A+ 
condition than the P-A- condition, as would be expected. More importantly, the 
looking time in the P-A+ condition is longer than that in the P-A- condition. In a 
control experiment where no outcome is shown, the difference between the P-A+ 
and P-A- condition is eliminated. The infant’s performance in the experiment suggest 
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a promising direction that object-directedness might be the better interpretation of 
their results with adults than the belief-outcome congruency hypothesis. However, 
Kovács and colleagues never tested the infants in all four conditions, and therefore 
the contrast that we propose for each interpretation can not be tested with their 
published results. We believe that a direct comparison of all the four conditions is 
necessary to differentiate the two hypotheses.  
 
Figure 4 - 3 Results of Kovács et al’s task with infants (Kovács,Téglás & 
Endress, 2010).  
Therefore, based on the general idea and procedure of Kovács et al’s 
experiment, we conducted the current study with adult humans, first, to replicate 
their positive results in a task that seemingly requires the coding of agents’ relations 
with absent objects, and second to test whether the belief-outcome congruency 
interpretation or the object-directedness interpretation better explain the results. 
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4.2 Experiment 1 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
A total of 48 adults (Female : Male = 39:9, average age = 21.8) were paid £3 
each to participate in the current experiment. They were recruited from the 
participant-pool in the University of St Andrews. All participants were required to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had participated in similar 
experiments beforehand. They were invited to a quiet room in the School of 
Psychology and Neuroscience to participate in the experiment. Ethical approval was 
granted by the ethical committee of the University of St Andrews. 
They were randomly assigned to two groups, resulting in 24 participants in the 
group responding to the absence of the object and the other 24 in the other group 
responding to the presence of the object. Five participants were excluded from each 
group due to large number of incorrect responses, i.e., more than 10 incorrect 
responses (25%) in the test. The remaining 38 participants’ (average age: 20.9; 7 
males and 31 females) data were included in the data analysis.  
4.2.1.2 Apparatus and Materials 
They watched animated videos on an 18 inch flat-square CRT monitor (IIYAMA, 
LS902UT, Resolution: 1280*1204, Refresh Rate: 85Hz). The videos included an agent, 
a ball, a hiding-screen on a table and a bin under the table (see Figure 4 - 4) . The 
participants were required to press a key when certain events occurred.  
The participants were shown videos on the computer monitor. All videos lasted 
for 16.8 second and had four phases (see Figure 4 - 4). In the first phase, the agent 
came into the scene and the ball rolled and hid behind the screen. Phase I lasted for 
4.4 seconds. In the second phase, the agent stayed and watched the ball rolling in 
the scene. The final position of the balls was either behind the screen or in the bin. 
This phase lasted for 3 seconds. The agent left the scene at the beginning of the third 
phase. In his absence, the ball rolled again. The final position of the ball was either 
behind the screen or in the bin. The third phase was 4.6 seconds in total. The agent 
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returned at the beginning of the fourth phase and then the screen vanished, showing 
either the presence or the absence of the ball behind it. After the screen vanished, 
the scene stayed for 2.4 seconds before the trial’s end. The final phase was 4.8 
seconds in total. In addition, the ball could last be seen at 11.68s. 
 
Figure 4 - 4 The 4 phases of videos and the 4 conditions. (P: participant, A: 
agent, +: believe the ball is behind the screen, - : believe the ball is absent 
behind the screen. The time (seconds) in the brackets after each Phase 
indicates the duration of Mario’s movement and the ball/screen’s movement). 
 
The videos followed Kovács et al’s (2010) general methods in manipulating the 
participant’s and the agent’s belief about the presence of the ball behind the hiding-
screen. The first and the last phase were exactly the same in all conditions, but the 
second and the third phase varied determining the agent’s and the participant’s 
beliefs regarding the presence/absence of the ball behind the screen. Different 
combination of the participant’s and the agent’s beliefs resulted in four different 
conditions.  
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In Phase II of the P+A+ condition, the ball rolled out from behind the screen 
and then rolled back behind the screen. At the end of the phase, both the participant 
and the agent believed that the ball was behind the screen. When the agent was 
away in Phase III, the ball repeated those motions and stopped behind the screen. 
Therefore the reality did not change when the agent was absent and both the 
participant (P) and the Agent (A) still believed the ball was hidden behind the screen.  
In Phase II of P-A- condition, the ball rolled into the bin in the second phase 
when the agent was watching, leading to the result that both the agent and the 
participant believed the ball was not behind the screen. In phase III, it rolled out and 
back into the bin when the agent was away. Thus in this condition, both the agent 
and the participant still believed the ball was not behind the screen.  
In Phase II of P+A- condition, the ball rolled into the bin in the second phase 
and then rolled back from the bin to behind the screen in the third phase. In this 
condition, the agent’s initial belief that the ball is behind the screen was updated to 
the ball not behind the screen; meanwhile, the participant’s initial belief that the ball 
was not behind the screen was updated to the ball being behind the screen. 
In Phase II of P-A+ condition, the ball first rolled out from behind the screen 
and then hid again behind the screen during the agent’s presence, making the 
participant believe the ball to be behind the screen while the agent believed 
otherwise. Then the ball rolled into the bin when the agent was absent, leading to 
the agent’s belief of the ball being behind the screen and the participant’s belief of 
the ball not being behind the screen. 
Though the videos were similar to Kovács et al’s (2010), we made some 
modifications to ensure that the participants watched the same number of 
movements of the ball in each video. By doing this we were hoping to eliminate the 
possible difference of cognitive load for the participants if they watched the different 
number of events between conditions. For example, in Kovács et al’s original 
experiment, the ball did not move at all in the P+A+ condition after the first phase,  
but in comparison, it moved twice, i.e., leaves the scene and returns to behind the 
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screen, in the P+A- condition. In our experiment, the ball always moved twice, once 
in phase II and once in phase III in all conditions.  
4.2.1.3 Design and Procedure 
The experiment was a 2 (Agent’s Belief, AB hereafter, of object’s 
presence/absence behind the screen) * 2 (Participant’s belief, PB hereafter, of 
object’s presence/absence behind the screen)* 2 (Group: respond to 
absence/presence) mixed design. AB and PB are two within subject factors and 
Group was a between subject factor.  
We decided to use a between subject design, instead of a with-in subject block 
design, for three main reasons. Firstly, the switch of tasks between blocks of 
responding to the absence and presence might affect the participants’ reaction time 
after switching, especially over the first few trials and possibly over the whole block. 
The between subject design would avoid this problem. Secondly, we wanted to avoid 
too many repeated trials and keep the participants free from any practise effect. 
Lastly, the group of participants responding to the presence of the object could act 
as a replication of Kovács et al’s original experiment.  
Our experimental procedure was based on Kovács et al’s (2010) study. The 
participants were invited to the lab and were given verbal instructions by the 
experimenter (see appendix IV). Half of the participants were required to press the 
right key on the keyboard with their right hand when the screen vanished and they 
detected the ball behind the screen (presence group); the other half were instructed 
to press the same key when the screen vanished and they detected the absence of 
the ball (absence group). They were asked to respond as quickly as possible and 
were aware that their reaction time would be recorded. Again following Kovacs et al., 
all participants were also required to press a left key with their left hand when they 
detected the agent leaving the scene in the video, to ensure that they paid attention 
to this key event.  
The task started with 4 practise trials. After the practise trials, all participants 
were presented with 5 blocks of experimental trials. Each block contained one trial 
of each condition with randomized order. Therefore the participants each had 5 
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repeats of the four different belief-conditions paired with two outcomes, leading to 
40 trials in total in the experiment. The experimental process was controlled by E-
prime. 
4.2.1.4 Data analysis 
E-prime recorded the participants’ reaction time in each condition The 
recorded time was relative to the start of the videos. We then subtracted the time 
from the beginning of videos to the moment the hiding-screen opens to calculate the 
reaction time to the key event data. We excluded all trials that were incorrect (4.2% 
for the present group and 3.4% for the absent group) and then calculated the 
participants’ average reaction time in each condition.  
For statistical analyse, we first examined the effect of Groups on the 
participants’ reaction time by a mixed factor three-way repeated measure ANOVA 
(GLMM), with Group (Group: Absence/Presence) as the between subject factor, 
Agent’s belief (AB: A+/A-) and Participant’s belief (PB: P+/P-) as two with-in subject 
factors.  
Since the task for the two groups was different, we then examined the two 
groups separately. Using two two-way repeated measure ANOVAs, with Agent’s 
belief (AB: A+/A-) and Participant’s belief (PB: P+/P-) as two with-in subject factors, 
we were hoping to examine the effect of the participant’s own belief and the agent’s 
belief on their reaction time. 
We then used a one-way ANOVA with the four conditions as the only factor, to 
compare the four conditions directly. Paired T-test with Bonfferroni adjustment were 
performed to compare every pair of conditions. 
In addition, hoping to replicate Kovács et al’s (2010) finding, we adopted their 
method of data analysis and examined the two groups of participants separately 
again. Following their method, we regarded the P-A- condition, where neither 
believed the ball was behind the screen, as the baseline condition and used paired T-
tests to compare with the other conditions for the presence group. For the absent 
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group, except for using P-A- as the baseline, we also used P+A+ as the baseline 
condition to distinguish the interpretation of belief from object-directness.  
4.2.2 Results 
Figure 4 - 5 and Table 4 - 1 illustrate the participants’ reaction time to different 
conditions .  
Table 4 - 1 Two groups’ average reaction time (ms) to the four conditions 
in experiment one 
Group  P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Absent Mean 389.2 380.8 361.4 361.4 
 SD 77.1 84.0 78.3 66.7 
Present Mean 361.1 336.2 350.1 329.2 
 SD 92.8 94.4 80.0 81.8 
 
 
Figure 4 - 5 Two groups’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment one (error bar: SE)  
4.2.2.1 Responding to the presence/absence of the object 
The mixed factor three-way repeated measure ANOVA indicated that the 
participants were equally good at detecting the presence or the absence of the 
object: Group (F(1,36) = 1.52, p = .22).No interaction was revealed, suggesting that 
reacting to the presence or absence of the object did not have a different effect in 
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
400.0
450.0
A+ A- A+ A-
Present Absent
R
e
ac
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
m
s)
 
Conditions 
P+
P-
* 
 
 
125 
 
the belief-conditions: Group*AB*PB (F(1,36) = .017, p = .90); AB*PB (F(1,36) = .15, p 
= .70 ); AB*Group (F(1,36) = 1.34, p = .26); PB*Group (F(1,36) = 1.59 p = .22).  
Surprisingly, when the two groups were combined together, if the agent 
believed the ball was present, the participants’ response was faster regardless of 
whether they were responding to the presence or absence of the ball (F(1,36) = 6.69, 
p = .014). The main effect of participant’s belief was approaching significant too: PB 
(F(1,36) = 3.34, p = .076), indicating a longer reaction time when the participant’s 
believed the ball was absent.  
4.2.2.2 Effect of Participant and agents’ Belief in each group  
As the tasks for the two groups were actually different, although we found no 
interaction between Group and other factors, we examined the two groups 
separately. Each group was tested using two-way ANOVAs with AB (Agent belief) and 
PB (Participant belief) as the two factors. 
For the presence group, the participants responded significantly faster when 
they believed the object was behind the screen (F(1,18) = 9.13, p = .007). But the 
agent’s belief did not affect the participants’ reaction time (F(1,18) = 1.27, p = .27) 
and there was no interaction between the two factors (F(1,18) = .033, p = .86).  
For the absence group, however, the participant’s own belief did not affect 
their response to the absence of the object (F(1,18) = .11, p = .75). But surprisingly, if 
the agent believed the object was not behind the screen, the participants’ reaction 
time was longer at the absence of the object than when it believed it was present 
(F(1,18) = 5.85, p = .026). Again, no interaction was found (F(1,18) = .13, p = .73). 
4.2.2.3 Comparison of the four conditions 
To directly compare the four conditions, instead of using AB and PB as two 
different factors, we used a one-way ANOVA to examine the two groups separately.  
In the group responding to the presence of the object, the difference of 
reaction time in the four conditions was approaching significance (F(3, 54) = 2.46, p 
= .072). Therefore we compared each pairs of conditions to investigate where the 
potential difference was. The t (df=18) values and p values with Bonferroni 
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adjustment are shown in Table 4 - 2. The results indicated that the reaction time in 
the P-A- condition was significantly longer than that in the P+A+ condition (t(18) = 
3.06, p = .040) suggesting that the belief of the participant and the agent combined 
together may have affected the participants’ reaction time, as we had expected.  
In the Absence group, the difference between conditions was not significant 
(F(3.54) = 1.51, p = .22), and no RTs between pairs of conditions were significantly 
different (Table 4 - 2). 
Table 4 - 2 Results of the paired T-tests in experiment one 
 
Pair of 
conditions 
 
t(18) 
p(2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
no adjustment 
Presence P-A- vs P+A- 1.54 .84 .14 
P-A- vs P-A+ .78 1.00 .45 
P-A- vs P+A+ 3.06 .040* .007*** 
P+A- vs P-A+ -1.20 1.00 .25 
P+A- vs P+A+ .52 1.00 .61 
P-A+ vs P+A+ 2.02 .35 .058+ 
Absence P-A- vs P+A- .43 1.00 .68 
P-A- vs P-A+ 2.18 .26 .043* 
P-A- vs P+A+ 2.25 .22 .037* 
P+A- vs P-A+ 1.02 1.00 .32 
P+A- vs P+A+ 1.12 1.00 .28 
P-A+ vs P+A+ .004 1.00 1.00 
 
4.2.2.4 Following Kovács’ approach 
We followed Kovács et al’s approach and examined the group responding to 
the presence of the object using paired T-test. According to Kovács et al’s (2010) 
results, the participants in this group would respond slower to the three conditions 
(P+A+, P-A+ and P+A-) where at least either the participant or the agent believed 
that ball was behind the screen than to the baseline condition (P-A-), where neither 
believed the ball was behind the screen. In our experiment, paired T-tests with no 
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adjustment (Table 4 - 2) showed that the participant’s RT was longer in P-A- than 
P+A+ condition (t(18) = 3.06, p = .007) which conforms with our expectation and 
Kovács et al’s results. But crucially no difference was found for the other conditions 
compared with the baseline: P-A+ (t(18) =  .78, p = .45); P+A- (t(18) = 1.54, p = .14). In 
addition, the reaction time in P-A+ condition was marginally significantly longer than 
that in the P+A+ condition (t(18) = 2.02, p = .058). It indicated that the true belief of 
the participant, which contradicts the outcome of the object’s presence, might have 
prolonged the participants’ response.  
For the Group responding to the object’s absence, the P+A+ condition is the 
more surprising condition from the belief interpretation (Kovács et al, 2010). In this 
condition the agent and the participant’s beliefs both conflict with the reality and, 
therefore, it should prolong the RTs. Using RT in P+A+ as the baseline, the belief 
interpretation would predict shorter reaction time in the other conditions, where at 
least one subject’s belief was congruent with reality. Paired T-tests revealed that in 
fact the participants responded more quickly in the P+A+ condition (t(18) = 2.25, p 
= .037), than P-A-, which contradicts the expectation by the belief-interpretation. No 
difference was found between P+A- (t(18) = .43, p = .68) or P-A+ (t(18) = .004, p = 
1.00) and the baseline. 
Following the object-directed interpretation, on the other hand, the 
registration of the relationship between an agent and the object affects the 
participant’s reaction. In the case of responding to the absence of the object, the P-
A- condition becomes the baseline since only in this condition no registration was 
available, whereas for the other three conditions we expected a slowing down in the 
participants’ response. Paired T-tests revealed a significantly shorter RT to the P+A+ 
(t(18) = 2.25, p = .037), and P-A (t(18) = 2.18, p = .043) condition than the baseline, 
which are both in the opposite direction to the prediction of the object-directed 
interpretation. RT to P+A- was not different from to P-A- (t(18) = .43, p = .68). 
4.2.3 Discussion 
In this experiment, we again tried to investigate the question whether adult 
human understand object-directedness implicitly. By modifying Kovács et al’s (2010) 
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experiment, we expected to differentiate whether a belief-outcome congruency 
interpretation and an object-directedness interpretation. However, the results did 
not support either the object-directedness interpretation or the belief-outcome 
congruency interpretation; moreover, we failed to replicate the original results 
found by Kovács and colleagues.  
4.2.3.1 Interpretation of the results 
The group responding to the presence of the object was a replication of Kovács 
et al’s (2010) experiment, but we were able to replicate only part of their results: the 
participants’ behaviour was only affected when the agent’s and the participant’s 
beliefs were combined together, but one single party’s belief was not strong enough 
to affect the participant’s reaction time. When we followed Kovács et al’s (2010) 
statistical analysis more closely and conducted multiple paired T-tests without 
adjustment, we discovered that the participant’s own belief affected their reaction 
time, as found by Kovács et al. But the agent’s belief alone did not have the same 
effect, which provides the most important evidence that the participant can 
automatically understand other’s belief or register intentionality. We therefore 
failed to replicate these authors’ main findings. 
The results from the group responding to the absence of the object were even 
more surprising. The lack of difference between the two baseline conditions, the P-
A- and the P+A+, did not allow us to build the benchmarks of reaction time for the 
other two conditions, and the overall lack of different across the four conditions did 
not support either the belief or the object-directed interpretations. Counter-
intuitively, the participant’s own belief does not affect their RT at all in this task. 
When the participants know that the object has left the hiding place, we expected 
them to respond more quickly as the outcome should match their expectation. The 
lack of effect may indicate that they failed to engage in the experimental scenario, 
i.e., they might not have paid enough attention to the movements and location of 
the object, thereby failing to register the location of the object.  
To briefly conclude, although we followed the general procedure of Kovács et 
al’s (2010), we obtain different results and failed to reach their conclusion that 
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other’s belief automatically affect one’s own belief. The results from the object-
absence group are also unexpected and cannot help in distinguishing the belief-
outcome congruency interpretation from the object-directedness interpretation.  
4.2.3.2. Comparison of the methodology with the Kovács experiment 
The most significant difference between our video clip and the original clip 
used by Kovacs et al. is the stronger relationship between the agent and the object 
in Kovács et al’s. The so-called irrelevant agent in their experiment could in fact be 
described as the “owner” of the object, because he drops the object on the table in 
the scenario in the first place. This initial relationship to the object may have drawn 
more attention to the agent’s intentional relation to the object in the original study. 
In comparison, the agent in our experiment is truly irrelevant to the object, i.e., he 
only acts as a bystander and never interacts with the object directly besides 
watching in the direction of the hiding screen. Our scenario was targeting an 
intentional relation of witnessing or somehow perceiving the whereabouts of the 
object. However, it is possible that only when a strong relation between the agent 
and the object involving an action (even if it is one of dropping or letting go) is 
observed, will participants code object-directedness and expect the object to appear 
together with the agent.  
Secondly, our method to open the hiding-screen is different from Kovács et al’s 
(2010). In our experiment, the hiding-screen vanishes, leaving the frame of the 
screen still visible to indicate its previous location (see Figure 4 - 4); while in Kovács 
et al’s videos, the whole screen falls forward. The remaining frame in our experiment 
may have retained the participants’ attention in the object-area and led to their 
ignoring of the agent and its perspective.  
Thirdly, the procedures of our video presentation in the four conditions are 
different from Kovács et al’s (2010). To ensure that the participants experience the 
same number of movements of the ball, the ball always moved once when the agent 
is present and once again when the agent is absent, whereas in Kovacs et al. the 
agent leaves the scenario at different time points in relation to its return at the end 
in each condition. In addition, the agent is designed to leave at the same time point 
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in all conditions in our experiment. These two modifications were aimed to improve 
on the original study by standardizing the procedure and events in the videos of the 
four conditions and reducing the possibility that the participants are reacting to 
these secondary differences rather than the experimental manipulations. It could be 
argued that the original design has its pros, i.e., the movement of the object is more 
continuous, e.g., in P+A+ and P-A- condition, the ball’s movement is not interrupted 
by the agent leaving. The continuous movement of the ball might have provided the 
participants with a better understanding of the ball’s position; while the two 
movements, once before the agent’s leaving and once after, in our experiment might 
have made the participants confused about the position of the object. The increased 
cognitive load might disrupt implicit ToM processing (Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 
2012). But the cons of this design is that the differences in the video presentation in 
different conditions might bring in potential confounds that may affect the 
participants’ performance 
In addition, we used a different agent from Kovács et al’s (2010) experiment. 
However, they are both animated characters and should not have affected the 
results if belief or object-directedness is the crucial factor that influences the 
reaction time.  
To examine the difference between our experiment and Kovács et al’s original 
design that might have led to the different results, we conducted four follow-up 
experiments with adult humans. Before pursuing our exploration of the belief-
outcome congruency interpretation versus the object-directedness interpretation in 
their paradigm we need to be able to replicate Kovács et al’s (2010) results. 
Therefore in the follow up experiments, we only test participants’ response to the 
presence of the object, as in the original study, while trying different variations in the 
experimental design to pinpoint which one is the crucial one in order to replicate 
Kovacs et al original studies. 
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4.3 Experiment 2 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In the current experiment, we sought to replicate Kovács et al’s method (2010) 
more closely by strengthening the relationship between the agent and the object. In 
a sense, the lack of effect with the purely observational version of the clips in which 
the agent just witnesses the object movements, without a more direct involvement 
with the object, may be taken to favour an object-directedness interpretation over a 
Belief computation interpretation. It is because more clear signs of there being a 
relation of the agent to the object would be required. To test this possibility, we 
edited the videos from the last experiment by adding to the beginning a sequence 
where the agent puts the ball on the table before it starts rolling, so that the agent 
had the “ownership” to the object as in Kovács et al’s original design. We expected 
the stronger relation of the agent and the object would enhance the participants’ 
attention to the experimental manipulations and lead to a replication of Kovacs et al 
results. 
We also modified the opening method of the hiding-screen to make it closer to 
Kovács et al’s original design. When revealing the presence/absence of the object, 
we changed the screen from vanishing to falling forward, and also eliminated the 
remaining frame that suggested the position of the screen in the last experiment. 
With these modifications, we expected to avoid any undesired retention of the 
participants’ attention within the area of the hiding screen allowing them to pay 
closer attention to the whole scenario. 
4.3.2 Method 
4.3.2.1 Participants 
A total of 31 adults (Female : Male = 18:13, average age = 21.1) was paid £3 
each to participate in the current experiment. They were recruited from the 
participant-pool in the University of St Andrews. All participants were required to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had participated in similar 
experiments beforehand. They were invited to a quiet room in the School of 
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Psychology and Neuroscience to participate in the experiment. Ethical approval was 
granted by the ethical committee of University of St Andrews. 
Two of the participants were excluded from the data analysis: one participant 
due to program failure and another due to a large number of incorrect responses, 
i.e., more than 10 incorrect responses (25%) in the test. The remaining 29 
participants, including 13 males and 16 females, at the average age of 21.2 years, 
were included in the data analysis.  
4.3.2.2 Apparatus and Materials 
The apparatus was the same as in the last experiment. The materials were 
short animation videos, identical to those in the last experiment, except that at the 
beginning of each video, the agent came in with the ball in his hands and put it on 
the table; and at the end of each video, the screen fell forward instead of vanishing 
to a frame. 
4.3.2.3 Design and Procedure 
Aiming to replicate Kovács et al’s (2010) experiment, we only tested one group 
of participants, all responding to the presence of the object. The design was a 2 
(Agent’s Belief: object presence/absence behind the screen) by 2 (Participant’s belief: 
object presence/absence behind the screen) factorial design, resulting in 4 
conditions (P+A+, P-A+, P+A-, P-A-) in total. 
The procedure was identical to the last experiment, and in addition, 
participants were asked afterwards whether they knew the purpose of this 
experiment.  
4.3.2.4 Data analysis 
All the incorrect trials (2.1%) were excluded from the data analysis. Reaction 
time was calculated in the same way as in experiment one.  
For statistical analysis, we first conducted a two-way repeated ANOVA to 
examine whether the participant’s belief and the agent’s belief had any effect on 
participants’ reaction time to the object’s presence. Then we compared the four 
conditions directly using one-way repeated ANOVA. Lastly, we followed Kovács et 
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al’s (2010) approach and used t-tests without correction to compare the baseline, P-
A-, to the other conditions. 
In addition, we compared the current experiment results and the the results of 
the presence-group in experiment one to better determine the effect of the 
“ownership” relation. We conducted a two-way mixed ANOVA using the four 
conditions as with-in subject factors and Ownership as a between subject factor. 
4.3.3 Results 
4.3.3.1 Comparison of the four conditions 
Figure 4 - 6 and Table 4 - 3 show the participants’ average reaction time to the 
different conditions. The two-way ANOVA reveals no main effect of PB (F(1,28) = 
2.68, p = .11), nor of AB (F(1,28) = 2.05, p = .16). But the interaction is significant 
(F(1,28) = 4.28, p = .048), indicating AB affects the participant’s response differently 
with the two types of PB. 
 
Table 4 - 3 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment two 
 P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Mean 382.5 351.2 355.9 362.1 
SD 73.0 64.3 61.0 106.4 
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Figure 4 - 6 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment two (error bar: SE) 
 
To examine the interaction in detail, we conducted a one-way ANOVA using 
the four experimental conditions as the only factor. Mauchly’s test reveals that the 
assumption of sphericity is violated (χ2(5) = 24.25, p < .001). Therefore we report 
the p-values with Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment here. The reaction time in the 
four conditions are significantly different (F(3,84) = 3.35, p = .044). We then used 
paired T-test with Bonferroni adjustment to examine the difference between each 
pair of conditions (see Table 4 - 4). The tests reveal that RT in P-A- condition is 
significantly longer than that in P+A- condition (t(28) = 4.03, p = .002). Although RT in 
P-A- seems longer than that in P-A+ (t(28) = 2.64, p = .081), and P+A (t(28) = 1.82, p 
= .47), neither is statistically significant. No significant difference is detected 
between P+A- and P-A+ either. 
Table 4 - 4 Results of the paired T-tests in experiment two 
Pair of conditions 
 
t(28) 
P (2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
No adjustment 
P-A- vs P+A- 4.03 .002* .000*** 
P-A- vs P-A+ 2.64 .081 .014* 
P-A- vs P+A+ 1.82 .47 .080 
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P+A- vs P+A+ -.99 1.00 .33 
P-A+ vs P+A+ -.42 1.00 .68 
P+A- vs P-A+ -.66 1.00 .52 
 
4.3.3.2 Following Kovács’ approach 
Again we followed Kovács et al’s method (2010) and used P-A- as the baseline 
condition. We compared the other conditions to the baseline using paired T-test 
without adjustment (see Table 4 - 4). Reaction time in P+A- condition and P-A+ 
condition are both significantly shorter than the baseline, P+A- vs P-A- (t(28) = 4.03, 
p < .001); P-A+ vs P-A (t(28) = 2.64, p = .014), however, surprisingly, the difference 
between P-A- and P+A+ is approaching significance (t(28) = 1.82, p = .08).  
4.3.3.3 Comparison of the two experiments 
To investigate whether the ownership and the method of opening the hiding 
screen had any effect on the participants’ reaction time to the four conditions, we 
conducted a two-ways mixed ANOVA using the four conditions as a with-in subject 
factor and the two experiments as a between-subject factor. Mauchly’s test shows 
the assumption of Sphericity is not met (χ2(5) = 13.14, p = .022), so we report the 
ANOVA with Greenhouser-Geisser adjustment. The mixed ANOVA reveals a 
significant main effect of conditions (F(3,138) = 4.67, p = .007). But the interaction 
between experiment and conditions is not significant (F(3,138) = .93, p = .44), 
indicating the manipulation between experiments did not bring about any effect.  
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Figure 4 - 7 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment one and two combined (error bar: SE) 
Therefore we combined the data in the two experiments (see Figure 4 - 7 and 
Table 4 - 5) and analysed the effect of conditions using a one-way repeated ANOVA. 
Mauchly’s test suggests the assumption of sphericity is not met; therefore the 
following analysis is adjusted using Greenhouser-Geisser adjustment. The reaction 
times in the four conditions are significantly different, F(3,141) = 4.89, p = .005).  
Paired T-tests with Bonferroni adjustment show significant longer reaction 
time in P-A- than P+A- (t(47) = 3.67, p = .004), and P+A+ (t(47) = 3.16, I = .016), but 
not than that in P-A+ (t(47) = 2.47, p = .10). No difference is found between other 
pairs of conditions (see Table 4 - 6).  
When no adjustment is made, following Kovács et al (2010), the results are the 
same as Kovács et al ‘s findings, i.e., the reaction time in P-A- is significantly longer 
than in the other three conditions (see Table 4 - 6). 
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Table 4 - 5 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment one and two combined 
 P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Mean 374.0 345.3 353.6 349.1 
SD 81.2 77.0 68.4 97.8 
 
Table 4 - 6 Results of the paired T-tests for experiment one and two 
combined 
Pair of conditions 
 
t(47) 
P (2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
No adjustment 
P-A- vs P+A- 3.67 .004* .001*** 
P-A- vs P-A+ 2.47 .10 .017* 
P-A- vs P+A+ 3.16 .016* .003* 
P+A- vs P+A+ -.45 1.00 .66 
P-A+ vs P+A+ .46 1.00 .65 
P+A- vs P-A+ .46 1.00 .19 
4.3.4 Discussion 
4.3.4.1 Ownership and opening of screen are not the key factor 
By adding the agent putting the ball on the table, we sought to strengthen the 
relation between the agent and the object and replicate Kovacs et al findings. 
However, the strengthened relation did not generate the expected effect, i.e., the 
participants did not automatically register intentionality or the agent’s belief, in 
instead confirming the negative results found in experiment 1. Changing the opening 
method of the hiding screen did not change the results from experiment 1 either. 
When comparing the findings of the current experiment with the presence-group in 
experiment 1, the reaction time pattern to the four conditions was the same. 
Therefore we exclude the possibility that the failure to replicate Kovács et al’s 
experiment in experiment 1 was due to these two factors in the video stimuli.  
However, the results in the current experiment better replicated Kovács et al’s 
results when exactly the same statistical tests were used (i.e., comparisons without 
corrections), we found consistent results with Kovács et al’s findings: when either 
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the participant or the agent believed the ball was present (P+A- and P-A+), the 
participants responded faster than when both of them believed the ball was absent. 
The replication, however, was not perfect because the reaction time was not faster 
in the P+A+ condition (the one where both subjects hold the correct belief) than the 
baseline P-A- (both subjects hold the incorrect belief), questioning the interpretation 
that the particiants are automatically encoding the belief of the agent. 
4.3.4.2 The two experiments together replicates Kovács et al’s findings 
Given that the modifications in stimuli between the two experiments did not 
change the pattern of reaction time to the four conditions, we combined the data 
from both experiments to enlarge the sample size and found, with 48 participants in 
total, the same results as Kovács et al’s (2010), but only if we follow their approach 
of statistical analysis. As Kovács et al’s findings, the three non-baseline conditions 
(P+A+, P+A-, P-A+) affected the participants’ behaviour by enhancing their reaction 
time, indicating that the agent and the participants’ beliefs both modulated their 
reaction time to the presence of the object.  
We, however, have some doubts about Kovács et al’s approach to data analysis. 
Kovács et al’s approach of statistical testing might be problematic in not adjusting 
the significance level for multiple-paired T-test. The different between P-A- and P-A+ 
was only significant when no adjustments were made. However, the lack of 
adjustment may have increased the possibility of detecting a significant difference by 
chance. In comparison, when a Bonferroni adjustment for multi-paired T-test were 
made, the significance-level dropped from significance (p = 0.017) to non-
significance (p = 0.10), suggesting that the agent’s belief did not affect the 
participant’s reaction time. Although there was still a trend suggesting that the 
reaction time in P-A- was longer than P-A+, notably the sample size was twice the 
size of that as in Kovács et al’s experiment while the effect of condition was not as 
robust. It indicates the possibility that the agent’s belief alone was not comparable 
to the participant’s belief in affecting the participants’ behaviour.  
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4.3.4.3 Summary 
To conclude, the current experiment alone again failed to replicate Kovács et 
al’s findings. Although the first two experiments put together replicated Kovács et 
al’s findings, this was only possible when using their approach of data analysis 
without Bonferroni corrections, which casts some doubt over the validity of their 
interpretation, and at the very least suggests the effects are extremely fragile. 
4.4 Experiment 3 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Our previous two experiments both replicate part of Kovács et al’s (2010) 
results but neither successfully replicated all. Moreover, when combined, there still 
seems to be only some evidence supporting their findings, and the results were not 
as robust as those originally reported. Considering that they obtained robust results 
from three experiments using the same method, we have to be cautious before 
reaching a different conclusion. As discussed after experiment 1, the procedure for 
each condition in our experiments is not exactly the same as that in their 
experiments and it might have led to the different results. In the current experiment, 
therefore, we try to conduct the closest replication of the procedure and examine 
again whether we could replicate their results. We modified the videos in 
experiment 2 and created a set of stimulus that had the same procedure as Kovács 
et al’s (2010) experiment. 
4.4.2 Method 
4.4.2.1 Participants 
A total of 32 adults (Female : Male = 24:8, average age = 21.2) recruited from 
the participant-pool in the University of St Andrews took part in the experiment. One 
participant was excluded due to program failure and another was excluded due to 
pre-knowledge of the purpose. Thirty of them (average age = 21.0; Female : Male = 
22:8) were included in the data analysis.  
All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were 
naive to the purpose of the study and had never participated in our previous 
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experiments. And after the experiment, they all reported not knowing the purpose 
of this experiment. The participants each received £3 compensation for their 
participation. Ethical approval was granted by the ethical committee of the 
University of St Andrews.  
4.4.2.2 Apparatus and Materials 
The apparatus were the same as in the last experiment. The materials were 
short animation videos, which used the same agent from the last experiment. But 
the table is longer, lying across the scenario and the bin was removed as in Kovács et 
al’s experiment (see Figure 4 - 8). The procedure in each video was also different 
from the last experiment and was the same as Kovács et al’s (2010) experiment 
(Figure 4 - 8). 
 
Figure 4 - 8 Procedure of the videos in each condition in experiment 
three (Note: the red frame shows when the agent leaves the scenario) 
In the first phase, the agent put the ball on the table and the ball hid behind 
the hiding screen. Then the different events regarding the ball and the different 
attendance of the agent created the four conditions,described below.  
In the P+A+ condition, the ball rolled out of the scenario and then rolled back 
behind the hiding-screen. During the process, the agent stayed and was watching all 
the time. When the ball stopped moving, the agent left the scene. Therefore both 
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the agent and the participant knew the ball should be present behind the hiding-
screen. 
In the P-A- condition, the ball rolled out of the screen and rolled back, then it 
came out of the hiding-screen again and rolled all the way out of the scenario. The 
agent was present during the events and then left the scene when the ball had 
stopped moving. Thus in this condition, the participant and the agent both witnessed 
the ball leaving the scenario, i.e., not present behind the hiding-screen. 
In the P-A+ condition, the ball’s movement was the same as that in the P-A- 
condition. But the agent left before the ball rolled out of the screen and was not 
present for any of the events after the initial hiding in the first phase. In this case, 
the participant has seen all the events and knew the ball was not present behind the 
screen; however, the agent only saw the ball’s initial hide and should believe the ball 
is present behind the hiding screen. 
In the P+A- condition, the ball moved the same way as that in the P+A+ 
condition. The agent was present when the ball first rolled out of the scenario and 
then left before the ball rolled back. Therefore, missing the ball’s final move, the 
agent believed the ball was absent; witnessing all the moves, the participant 
believed the ball was present behind the screen. 
At last, in all conditions the agent returned before the hiding-screen opened. 
When the hiding-screen opened, the participants were required to respond to the 
presence of the object. 
4.4.2.3 Design and Procedure 
Aiming to replicate Kovács et al’s (2010) experiment first, we again only tested 
one group of participants, all responding to the presence of the object. The design 
was the same as in the last experiment. The procedure was equivalent to the last 
experiment. 
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4.4.2.4 Data analysis 
Participant’s reaction time was calculated as that in experiment one. Statistical 
analysis was similar as that in experiment two. The incorrect responses (2.2%) were 
excluded from the data analysis. 
4.4.3 Results 
4.4.3.1 Comparison of the four conditions 
Figure 4 - 9 and Table 4 - 7 show the participants’ average reaction time to the 
different conditions. A two-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of the participant’s 
belief was approaching significance (F(1,29) = 3.60, p = .068) i.e., the participants 
responded faster if they themselves believed the object was present behind the 
screen. But no significant effect of the agent’s belief was found (F(1,29) = 1.68, p 
=.21). More importantly, the agent’s belief affected participant’s reaction time 
differently when the participants’ own belief was different (F(1,29) = 34.15, p < .001). 
Table 4 - 7 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment three 
 P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Mean 463.0 403.0 404.1 430.6 
SD 121.6 113.3 93.8 100.7 
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Figure 4 - 9 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment three (error bar: SE) 
Table 4 - 8 Results of the paired T-tests in experiment three 
Pair of conditions 
 
t(29) 
P (2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
No adjustment 
P-A- vs P+A- 4.73 <.001*** <.001*** 
P-A- vs P-A+ 3.44 .011* .002* 
P-A- vs P+A+ 1.86 .44 .073 
P+A- vs P+A+ -2.67 .074 .012* 
P-A+ vs P+A+ -2.59 .089 .015* 
P+A- vs P-A+ -.097 1.00 .92 
 
4.4.3.2 Following Kovács’ approach 
We followed Kovács et al’s method (2010) and conducted paired T-tests 
without adjustment using P-A- as the baseline condition. We compared the other 
conditions to the baseline and found that RT in the P+A- condition and the P-A+ 
condition were both significantly shorter than the baseline, P+A- vs P-A- (t(29) = 4.73, 
p < .001); P-A+ vs P-A- (t(29) = 3.44, p = .002), however, the RT in P-A- only had a 
trend to be longer than in the P+A+ condition (t(29) = 1.86, p = .073).  
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4.4.4 Discussion 
4.4.4.1 Partial replication of Kovács et al’s results 
In the current experiment, we closely replicated Kovács et al’s (2010) method 
and found some similar results. The participant’s reaction seems to be affected by 
both their own belief and the agent’s belief. When the participants or the agent 
believed the object was present, their reaction time was shorter than if neither of 
them believed so.  
However, when both the agent and the participant believed the ball 
waspresent, the reaction time was not reduced. Although direct comparison using 
paired T-test (without adjustment for multiple comparison) showed a trend of longer 
reaction time in the P-A- than the P+A+, the difference did not reach significance. 
Moreover, when comparing multiple pairs, increasing numbers of separate 
comparison increases the chance of finding a significant difference that may only be 
attributed to chance, and therefore, making an adjustment is essential. But when 
Bonferroni adjustment is made, the difference between the reaction time in the P-A- 
and the P+A+ condition is far from significant (p = 0.44). These results are the same 
as those in experiment 2 when no adjustment for multiple comparisons is made for 
T-test in the last experiment. As has been discussed following experiment 2, due to 
the lack of difference between the P+A+ and P-A- condition, we argue that we 
should be cautious in reaching the conclusion that the positive results in the P+A- 
and P-A+ conditions indicate automatic registration of other’s belief. Longer reaction 
time in the P-A- than the P+A+ is a crucial precondition for reaching the above 
conclusion because in these two conditions, the participant’s and the agent’s belief 
are not conflicting and the difference between both is the most basic assumption if 
beliefs affect the participants’ behaviour.  
The lack of robust difference between these two conditions when the proper 
statistical tests are conducted makes it confusing as to why the reaction times in 
P+A- and P-A+ condition are both shorter than that in the P+A+ condition. In our 
expectation, when both the participant and the agent believed the ball is present, 
their reaction time should at least be equivalent, if not faster than when one party 
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believes so. Therefore we again suggest that whether the participant’s and the 
agent’s belief is the key factor that affects participants’ reaction time as suggested 
by Kovács et al (2010), needs further investigation. 
To conclude the comparison of the current experiment to Kovács et al’s, we 
replicated all their results when we follow their statistical analysis. But when a 
proper correction for multiple comparisons is applied, we are not able to replicate 
some of their results. The lack of difference between the two key conditions, P-A- 
and P+A+, suggests that we be cautious in reaching any conclusion regarding 
automatic belief registration.  
4.4.4.2 The real factor that may have affected participants’ reaction time 
Looking back to our three experiments, the current one generated the closest 
result to Kovács et al’s (2010) study. In comparison, the other two replicated fewer 
of Kovács et al’s (2010) results, i.e., in experiment 1 the participants reacted only 
faster in P+A+ than P-A- and in experiment two participants responded only faster in 
P+A- than P-A-.  
When examining the difference between the three experiments, the most 
significant modification is the change of the procedure of videos in the current 
experiment. It brings forward a question: is belief the direct reason to explain the 
difference of reaction time between conditions in the current experiment? Or could 
it be the specific procedure of the videos in the four conditions that led to the 
different reaction times? 
Therefore we examine the different procedures closely here. In the first two 
experiments, i.e., experiment 1 and experiment 2, the order of events in the four 
conditions are identical. The ball always moves once when the agent is present and 
moved again after the agent leaves in each condition. And the agent always leaves at 
the same time point relative to his return. In these, the participant’s reaction time is 
a little longer in P-A- condition than the other conditions. 
In the current experiment (and in Kovács et al’ original study), however, the 
agent leaves at different points in different conditions, which could potentially bring 
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about a difference in focus of attention considering the participants are also 
required to respond when the agent leaves. In P+A+ and P-A- condition, the ball has 
completed all movement before the agent leaves. So the participants’ response to 
the agent’s leaving is directly followed by the return of the agent and the opening of 
the screen. When the screen opens, the participant’s attention might still remain at 
the agent, and in order to perform the reaction task about the object, they have to 
shift their attention from the agent to the screen area. The time to shift their 
attention may be the reason why the participants responded more slowly in the P-A- 
condition. And there also a trend that it takes longer for them to make the response 
in the P+A+ condition. Firstly, T-tests without adjustment indicated longer reaction 
times in the P+A+ condition than the P+A- and the P-A+ condition. Secondly, 
although the majorityof the participants (18/30) responded slowest in P-A- condition, 
for the rest, two thirds (8/12) participants’ RT is the longest in P+A+ condition (see 
Table 4 - 9). In comparison, in P-A+ condition, the ball completes all movements after 
the agent has left. Thus, the participants have a long enough interval between 
responding to the leaving of the agent and to the object when the screen opens so 
that they could have shifted their attention from the agent back to the ball or screen 
area before the final response. No participant in the current experiment responds 
slowest in this condition (see Table 4 - 9). In the P+A- condition, the ball moves both 
before and after the agent’s leaving and the interval between the two reactions was 
shorter than P+A+ and P-A-, but longer than P+A-. Four participants’ reaction times 
are the slowest in this condition.  
We therefore suggest that the procedure of the conditions, rather than belief 
per se, might be a more direct factor that affects the participants’ reaction time in 
the current experiment. A follow up experiment using the identical procedure of 
video presentations will help in confirming this suggestion. Hence in the next 
experiment, we will use a different scenario and agent, but the same experimental 
design to investigate this issue. 
 
 
147 
 
Table 4 - 9 Number of participants that responded slowest at the 
condition in experiment three 
Condition P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
No. of participant 18 0 4 8 
4.4.4.3 Summary 
To sum up, whether adult humans can automatically register intentionality or 
other’s belief still remains unclear. We have concerns that, in the current experiment, 
the specific procedure of the task rather than intentionality or belief is a more direct 
factor in affecting the participants’ response.  
4.5 Experiment 4 
4.5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the last experiment, the longer reaction time in P-A- and P+A+ 
condition might have been caused by the specific procedures for the conditions. But 
before reaching this conclusion from a single experiment, we suggest further testing 
to confirm the results. In the current experiment, we will use the same procedure to 
replicate the last experiment.  
Instead of conducting an exact replication, however, we will use a different 
agent in a different environment, but provide a similar scenario: the background and 
the table in the last experiment are replaced by green grassland; the hiding-screen is 
replaced by a wooden board; the agent by a capuchin monkey’s profile picture and 
the ball by an orange (see Figure 4 - 10). This is for two main purposes. In the first 
place, it is a preparation for a future study (See Chapter 5) with monkeys as a 
comparison to the series of experiments in the current chapter. These stimuli are 
deemed to be more monkey-friendly and the current experiment will act as a better 
matched comparison to interpret the behaviour of the monkeys, as will be discussed 
in chapter five. On the other hand, it is included here because it also serves as a 
further attempt at replication of Kovács et al’s results, and as a measure of the effect 
of the procedure difference in Kovács et al’s paradigm. 
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4.5.2 Method 
4.5.2.1 Participants 
A total of 24 adults took part in the experiment (Female : Male = 23:1, average 
age = 21.2. They were recruited from the participant-pool in the University of St 
Andrews. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were 
naive to the purpose of the study and had never participated in our previous 
experiments. They were invited to a quiet laboratory room in the School of 
Psychology and Neuroscience to participate in the experiment. After the experiment, 
they each received £3 compensation for their participation. Ethical approval was 
granted by the ethical committee of the University of St Andrews. 
4.5.2.2 Apparatus and Materials 
The apparatus were the same as in the last experiment.  
The materials were short animation videos, which followed the method of 
Kovács et al’s (2010) experiment and were similar to experiment 3. But as described, 
the agent and the scenario were replaced by a monkey-friendly version (Figure 4 - 
10). In addition, the orange was initially emerged from one end of the scene on the 
grass, instead of putting down by the monkey. 
    
Figure 4 - 10 Examples of the scenario and agent in experiment three 
  
4.5.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were equivalent to the last experiment. The 
participants had to identify the presence of the target object as soon as possible 
after watching the same set of manipulations as in the previous experiment.  
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4.5.2.4 Data analysis 
Data analyses were similar to that in the last two experiments. All incorrect 
responses (3.6%) were excluded from the data analyse. 
In addition, we examined the number of participants that responded the 
slowest in the four conditions as we analysed in the discussion of the last experiment 
in order to examine if the procedure in the videos affected the participants’ reaction 
time.  
4.5.3 Results 
4.5.3.1 Comparison of the four conditions 
Table 4 - 10 and Figure 4 - 11 show the participants’ average reaction time to 
different conditions. A two-way ANOVA revealed that the participants’ belief had a 
significant main effect (F(1,23) = 7.14, p = .014) and the main effect of the agent’s 
belief was approaching, but did not reach, significance (F(1,23) = 3.34, p = .81). More 
importantly, there was an interaction between PB and AB: the agent’s belief affected 
participant’s reaction time differently when the participants’ own belief was 
different (F(1,23) = 18.89, p < .001). 
To examine the interaction, we compared the four conditions directly using 
repeated one-way ANOVA and the test showed a significant difference between 
conditions (F(3, 69) = 10.88, p < .001). Paired T-test with Bonferroni adjustment (see 
Table 4 - 11) revealed significant longer reaction time at the P-A- condition than the 
other three: P+A- (t(23) = 4.65, p = .001), P-A (t(23) = 4.01, p = .013), and P+A (t(23) = 
3.04, p = .035). In addition, RT in P+A+ had a trend to be longer than that in P+A- 
(t(23) = 2.80, p = .061). No difference was found between P+A- and P-A+ or P+A+ and 
P-A+. 
Table 4 - 10 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment four 
 P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Mean 428.6 365.5 376.8 392.2 
SD 71.8 58.9 45.4 72.1 
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Figure 4 - 11 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment four (error bar: SE) 
 
Table 4 - 11 Results of the paired T-tests in experiment four 
Pair of conditions 
 
t(23) 
P (2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
No adjustment 
P-A- vs P+A- 4.65 .001*** <.001*** 
P-A- vs P-A+ 4.01 .003* .001*** 
P-A- vs P+A+ 3.04 .035* .006* 
P+A- vs P+A+ -2.80 .061 .010* 
P-A+ vs P+A+ -1.32 1.00 .20 
P+A- vs P-A+ -1.07 1.00 .29 
 
4.5.3.2 Following Kovács’ approach 
We followed Kovács et al’s method (2010) and conducted paired T-tests 
without adjustment using P-A- as the baseline condition. We compared the other 
conditions to the baseline and found that RT in P-A- was significantly longer than in 
the other three conditions (see Table 4 - 11). In addition, with this analysis, 
participants responded significantly more quickly in the P+A- than P+A+ condition 
(t(23) = 1.32, p = .010). 
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4.5.3.3 Each participant’s RT 
In addition, for each condition we counted the number of participants who 
responded most slowly in that condition (see Table 4 - 12) and found that, as we 
found in the last experiment, more than half, 14 out of 24, of the participants in the 
current experiment responded most slowly in P-A- condition. For the rest, half (5/10) 
participants’ RT were the longest in P+A+ condition. Only five participants altogether 
took the longest time in either the P-A+ (3 of the 5) or the P+A- condition (2 of the 5).  
Table 4 - 12 Number of participants that responded slowest at the 
condition in experiment four 
Condition P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
No. of participant 14 3 2 5 
4.5.4 Discussion 
4.5.4.1 The procedure of video presentation, rather than intentionality or 
belief is the key factor 
When the order of events remains unchanged and the scenario, i.e., the 
background, the agent an etc., is altered, we find similar results to our last 
experiment: besides the shorter reaction time to the P-A+ and P+A- than to the P-A- 
condition, the reaction time in the P+A+ condition is also shorter than the P-A- 
condition. Following Kovács et al’s (2010) suggestion, these results indicate that the 
agent’s belief is automatically registered by the participant. But looking back to the 
four experiments, we suggest an alternative explanation of these results. The change 
of procedure in experiment 3 and 4 has led to a robust pattern of reaction times to 
the four conditions, i.e., longest reaction time in P-A- condition, shortest reaction 
time in P+A- and P-A+, and an intermediary the reaction time in the P+A+ condition. 
The longer reaction time in the P+A+ condition than the P+A- and P-A+ condition is 
hard to explain by the registration of intentionality or belief: if intentionality or belief 
registration assists the participants to respond faster in this object-detection task, 
P+A+ (where both the agent’s and the participant’s beliefs match the outcome) this 
should show reduced reaction time with an equivalent, if not a larger, effect than the 
asymmetrical belief registration where only one subject, either the participant’s or 
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the agent’s belief matches the outcome. That was what Kovacs et al. reported in 
their original study. Our suggestion is that the RT effects found in experiments 3 and 
4, as well as Kovács et al’s original experiment might reflect differences in the 
procedure of video presentation, rather than in the registration of intentionality or 
belief. 
In addition, at the initial stage of the current experiment, the orange was not 
placed on the grass by the monkey, but emerges from one side of the computer 
screen. That is to say, the ownership of monkey to the orange does not exist in the 
current experiment as in the third experiment. Hence the relation between the 
subject and the object is not as strong as in experiment 3. The weakened relation 
does not decrease the effect of different conditions in this experiment, suggesting 
that the ownership between the subject and the object is not essential, as has been 
suggested by experiment 1 and 2. It raises a further question: if the strength of 
relationship between the subject and the object is not important, is the intentional 
relation important to the effect at all? In other words, if the agent is not an 
intentional agent who does not have any belief at all, will the results turn out to be 
the same as in the current experiment? If so, the evidence would strongly argue that 
the procedure of the video presentation and its effect upon the participants’ 
attention, instead of the registration of intentionality or belief, is the real cause of 
Kovács et al’s findings (2010). In the next experiment, we will replace the agent with 
a stack of boxes to eliminate any attribution of intentionality and belief and 
investigate this issue. 
4.6 Experiment 5 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Aiming to establish whether it is the structure of events shown in videos or 
belief computation that leads to the results in experiments 3 and 4, we modified 
experiment 3 and replaced the agent with a stack of boxes to eliminate the effect, if 
there is any, of the agent’s belief.  
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In Kovács et al’s original study, they also used a stack of boxes (B for the boxes) 
to replace the agent as a control condition. They reported that the participants’ 
reaction time was not affected by any “belief” of the boxes, but was only affected by 
the participants’ own belief (see Figure 4 - 12, Experiment 3). In contrast to their two 
experiments containing an agent, the pattern of reaction time in the P+B+, P-B- and 
P+B- conditions in the control experiment was identical to that of P+A+, P-A- and 
P+A-. But the reaction time in the P-B+ was not shorter than in P-B- like that 
between P-A+ and P-A-. Therefore Kovács and colleagues concluded that in the B+ 
condition, the participants did not attribute a belief to the boxes’, as one would 
expect given that they are not agents, and therefore their presence or absence 
during key events was not able to affect the participants’ reaction time. But the 
longer reaction time at the two P- conditions than the two P+ conditions still 
indicated that the participants’ own belief affected their reaction time in the task. 
 
Figure 4 - 12 Results of Kovács et al’s task in adult human Note: In 
experiment 1 and 2, the agent was an animated figure. In experiment 3, a pile 
of boxes, replaced the agent and acted as the agent. (Kovács et al, 2010) 
 
In the current experiment, we followed this approach. The participants could 
still watch all the events about the object and hold their own beliefs about the 
presence or absence of the ball, but now there was no agent present in the scene 
that could form beliefs about the events depicted on the screen. If the differences of 
reaction time in the previous experiments were the result of belief computations, we 
expect differences to emerge only from the participants’ own belief, but not the 
boxes’ “belief”. In contrast, if the structure of events in the videos was the real factor 
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that affected the reaction time in the last experiment, we expect to find the same 
pattern of results as in experiment 4.  
4.6.2 Method 
4.6.2.1 Participants 
A total of 24 adults took part in the experiment (Male: Female = 8:16, average 
age = 22.4). They were recruited from the participant-pool in the University of St 
Andrews. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were 
naive to the purpose of the study and had never participated in our previous 
experiments. They were invited to a quiet laboratory room in the School of 
Psychology and Neuroscience to participate in the experiment. After the experiment, 
they each received £3 compensation for their participation. Ethical approval was 
granted by the ethical committee of the University of St Andrews. 
Two participants were excluded due to self-report of pre-knowledge about the 
purpose of the experiment. The remaining 22 (Male: Female = 8:14, average age = 
22.5)) were included in the data analysis.  
4.6.2.2 Apparatus and Materials 
The apparatus was the same as the last experiment. The materials were short 
animation videos, which were the same as in experiment three, except that the 
agent was replaced by a stack of boxes (see Figure 4 - 13).  
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Figure 4 - 13 Examples of the scenario in experiment 5 
4.6.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The design and experimental procedure were the same as in the last 
experiment. 
4.6.2.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis was similar to that in the last three experiments, except that the 
factor Agent’s belief was replaced by the factor Boxes’ Belief. All the incorrect 
responses (3%) were excluded from the data analysis. 
4.6.3 Results 
4.6.3.1 Comparison of the four conditions 
To examine the interaction, we compared the four conditions directly using 
repeated one-way ANOVA. Mauchly’s test revealed that the assumption of sphericity 
was violated (χ2(5) = 14.73, p = .012). Therefore we reported the p-values with 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment. The ANOVA showed significant difference between 
conditions (F(3, 63) = 10.32, p < .00). Paired T-test with Bonferroni adjustment (see 
Table 4 - 14) revealed significant longer reaction time at P-B- condition than P+B- 
(t(21) = 4.24, p = .002), and P-B+ (t(21) = 4.13, p = .003), but not than P+B+ (t(21) = 
2.52, p = .12). No other difference was found. 
Table 4 - 13 and Figure 4 - 14 show the participants’ average reaction time to 
different conditions. The two-way ANOVA revealed that the participants’ belief, 
(F(1,21) = 5.28, p = .032), and the boxes’ ‘belief’ (F(1,21) = 5.18, p = .033) both had a 
significant main effect. More importantly, the interaction was also significant, F(1,21) 
= 10.00, p < .001). 
To examine the interaction, we compared the four conditions directly using 
repeated one-way ANOVA. Mauchly’s test revealed that the assumption of sphericity 
was violated (χ2(5) = 14.73, p = .012). Therefore we reported the p-values with 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment. The ANOVA showed significant difference between 
conditions (F(3, 63) = 10.32, p < .00). Paired T-test with Bonferroni adjustment (see 
Table 4 - 14) revealed significant longer reaction time at P-B- condition than P+B- 
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(t(21) = 4.24, p = .002), and P-B+ (t(21) = 4.13, p = .003), but not than P+B+ (t(21) = 
2.52, p = .12). No other difference was found. 
Table 4 - 13 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment five 
 P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Mean 434.9 364.9 370.0 391.0 
SD 83.8 58.6 58.9 69.5 
 
 
Figure 4 - 14 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment five (error bar: SE) 
 
Table 4 - 14 Results of the paired T-tests in experiment five 
Pair of conditions 
 
t(21) 
P (2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
No adjustment 
P-B- vs P+B- 4.24 .002*** <.001*** 
P-B- vs P-B+ 4.13 .003*** <.001*** 
P-B- vs P+B+ 2.52 .12 .020* 
P+B- vs P+B+ -2.42 .15 .025* 
P-B+ vs P+B+ -1.60 .75 .12 
P+B- vs P-B+ -.61 1.00 .55 
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4.6.3.2 Following Kovács’ approach 
Using P-B- as the baseline condition, we used paired T-tests without 
adjustment and compared the other conditions to the baseline. The results showed 
that RT in P-B- was significantly longer than in the other three conditions (see Table 4 
- 14). In addition, participants responded significantly more quickly in P+B- than P+B+ 
condition (t(21) = 2.42, p = 0.025). These results are identical to Kovács et al’s 
experiment using the animated character as the agent, but different from that using 
the stack of boxes as the agent. 
4.6.3.3 Each participant’s RT 
In addition, for each condition we counted the number of participants who 
responded slowest in that condition (see Table 4 - 14) and found that, similar to 
what we found in the last experiment, more than half (13/22) of the participants in 
the current experiment responded slowest in P-B- condition. And for the rest, 4 
participants’ RT were the longest in P+B+ condition, 3 in P-B+ and 2 in the P+B- 
condition. 
Table 4 - 15 Number of participants that responded slowest at the 
condition in experiment five 
Condition P-B- P+B- P-B+ P+B+ 
No. of participant 13 3 2 4 
 
4.6.4 Discussion 
In the current experiment, we aimed to eliminate the agent’s intentionality, or 
belief, but keep all the other features of the experiment, e.g., the trajectory of the 
ball and the movement pattern of elements, in order to check for the possibility that 
other factors, rather than intentionality or belief, determined the results in the 
previous experiments. Therefore, following the lead from one of Kovacs et al. 
controls, we used a stack of boxes, which has no perspective or belief, to replace the 
agent in the experiment. The prediction was that only the participants’ belief should 
affect RTs. 
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However, we again found longer reaction time in P-B- condition than the other 
three conditions, and the pattern of results is the same as in experiments 3 and 4, 
where either an animated agent or a monkey photo acted as intentional agents with 
potential perspective and belief. The similar results in the current experiment and 
the previous two experiments (experiment 3 and 4) suggest that either the stack of 
boxes does not successfully eliminate belief computation, or belief is not the main 
factor that has affected the participants’ reaction time in the last three experiments. 
We suggest that the latter is more likely the case for the following two reasons. 
Firstly, the stack of boxes, as suggested by Kovacs et al., eliminates  any cues of 
belief or intentionality. Although the boxes exactly follow the trajectory of the agent 
in experiment 3, they do not look like intentional agents. For example, it does not 
have a front or back and hence does not face to or look at the hiding-screen as the 
agent does, and it does not turn around when it leaves the scenario. With these 
manipulations, the stack of boxes delivers no cue of an animated being or sign of 
intentionality. As a consequence, any belief computation of the agent should have 
been eliminated.  
Secondly, if it is the belief that determines the participants’ reaction time, in 
the current experiment only the participants’ own belief would affect the results. 
However, the results indicate that not even the Participants’ own belief is not the 
only relevant factor: if it were, RT in the two P+ conditions would be faster than that 
in the two P- conditions since although the agent’s belief is eliminated, the 
participants still have their own belief. This is what Kovács and colleagues reported 
in their control experiment with a pile of boxes instead of the agent. Our results, 
however, do not follow this pattern and do not show the effect of the participant’s 
own belief. A potential explanation for this difference might be that, the pile of 
boxes in Kovács et al’s control experiment was stationary and “was present in all the 
movies during their entire duration” while the stack of boxes in our experiment 
mimicked the agent’s movement in the videos. Note that the movement does not 
reproduce the kinematics of an animated being: it is a simple displacement that 
could be entirely mechanical. Therefore we argue that it is the movement of the 
boxes and the agents (in the previous two experiments) that had an effect on RT, 
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perhaps by introducing a potential distraction to the participants’ attention that 
might have affected their response in the task.  
Moreover, the comparison of the last three experiments with the first two 
experiments suggests that the change in experimental procedure indeed determines 
the participants’ pattern of reaction time to the four conditions. It remains 
unchanged that the reaction time in the P-A- condition is the longest among all the 
conditions. But the major difference is that the reaction time in P+A+ is longer than 
in the P+A- and P-A+ condition. This finding is in accord with what we have discussed 
after experiments 3 and 4 that the specific procedures of the video presentation and 
their effect on the participants’ attention, instead of any belief or intentionality 
computation, is the real cause of the findings in our last three experiments, as well 
as for Kovács et al’s findings (2010). 
4.7 General Discussion  
The studies reported in this chapter emerged as an attempt to address the 
surprising results found in Chapters 2 and 3, suggesting that Capuchin monkeys did 
better than adult humans in coding the object-directed intentionality of actions 
when their objects are not directly shown.  
To address the possibility that the negative results with humans were due to 
an inability of our experimental procedure to capture their true skills, we decided to 
use another paradigm, a visual detection task, which was originally applied 
successfully in human adults (with RT measurements) and infants (with LT 
measurements) to access their implicit belief understanding (Kovács et al, 2010), to 
examine again if adults can automatically register object-directedness. Our initial 
suggestion was that the results of Kovacs et al. could actually be due to the ability to 
code object-directedness, rather than belief computation, and we modified their 
design to test the alternative interpretations 
A summary of the five experiments 
Building upon Kovács et al’s visual detection task, we conducted a series of five 
experiments with adult humans.  
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In experiment 1, we tried, first, to replicate their original experiment based on 
detecting object presence, and second, to distinguish between predictions made by 
their Belief interpretation and our Object-directedness interpretation using a novel 
condition involving the detection of object absence. Unexpectedly, we failed to 
replicate Kovács et al’s results in the object present group, the one that reproduced 
their original study. And the result for the Object-absent group did not support 
either the belief or the object-directed interpretations. Given that the results in the 
presence group were not consistent with Kovács et al’s original experiment, we 
focused the next experiments on understanding the failure to replicate their results.  
In the second experiment, we strengthened the relationship between the 
agent and the object, hoping to replicate their results with a closer reproduction of 
their stimuli, which might also emphasise the coding of object-directedness. 
However, again the effect of the agent’s and the participants’ beliefs did not match 
Kovacs et al. original results, suggesting that the relation of ‘ownership’ of the agent 
to the object was not the key factor in causing our different results. 
As the pattern of reaction time in the four conditions was similar between 
experiment 1 and 2, we combined the data and this revealed the same results as 
Kovács et al’s, but only when we exactly followed their approach of data analysis. 
However, this approach of data analysis might be problematic because it does not 
adjust for multiple comparisons, which may lead to a higher probobility of detecting 
a difference by chance. When proper adjustments were made, we could not 
completely replicate their results because of a lack of effect in the condition with 
asymetrical beliefs between the agent and the participant (P-A+). This indicates that 
the agent’s belief alone is not effective in affecting the participants’ reaction, which 
is key to Kovacs et al. claim that there is automatic encoding of others’ beliefs. 
Given the results of the first two experiments, we felt it was not possible to 
conclude that adults can automatically register object-directedness or belief as has 
been suggested by Kovács et al (2010).  
In an attempt to disentangle the factors that control for the effect they report, 
in the next experiments we tried to exactly replicate Kovács et al’s method, 
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abandoning our attempt to ensure that the video presentations in the four 
experimental conditions were structurally equivalent and detailed description in the 
method section of experiment one), by exactly following Kovács et al’s original 
design and detailed description in the method section of experiment three). Despite 
this, in experiment three, we again only partially replicated Kovács et al’s results, and 
failed to reproduce the difference between two crucial baseline conditions: P-A- and 
P+A+, without which the results cannot be interpreted as demonstrating automatic 
computation of agents beliefs. In experiment four, where we used a living being, i.e., 
a Capuchin monkey’s profile picture, instead of the animated character, we finally 
replicated Kovács et al’s findings in the agent condition, but unfortunately we found 
exactly the same results in a control condition using a stack of boxes instead of an 
animated being, This finding suggests that it is not Belief (or object-directedness) 
that produces the pattern of results, but the specific procedures of video 
presentation that affects the participants’ attention differently in the different 
conditions (see detailed discussion in the discussion section of experiment 3). 
Kovacs et al had used a “pile of boxes” control condition in which they 
reported only an effect of the participants’ own belief upon RT, but no effect of the 
boxes “belief”. However, Kovács et al’s control experiment did not follow the same 
procedure of video presentation used with the agent. We did use the exact same 
presentation for the Agent and the Object, and found the same resuls for Agent and 
Boxes. Thus our results suggest that the structure of events in the video presentation, 
rather than any Belief computation might explain the results (see more discussions 
in the discussion of experiment 5). This finding would support a recent critical re-
assessment of the infant and adult implicit false belief literature by Heyes (2014) 
suggesting that, rather than implicit mindreading skills, the findings could reflect 
“submentalizing” processes based upon domain-general cognitive mechanisms such 
as automatic attentional orientation, or the automatic coding of spatial locations of 
objects. 
To summarize, given the failure to replicate Kovács et al’s original study, we 
were not able to pursue our original aim of further exploring the ability to code 
object-directedness in human adults by using a “proven” paradigm that might go 
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beyond any procedural limitations of our paradigm in Chapters 2 and 3. Instead we 
found consistent evidence that challenges Kovacs et al’s much heralded findings of 
the automatic encoding of other’s beliefs by human adults, which, added to our 
previous failure to find evidence of automatic encoding of object directedness to 
unperceived objects, casts doubts on the assumed abilities of humans to implicitly 
code mental states. This finding is in strong contrast with the increasing evidence of 
implicit mindreading in adults (Apperly et al., 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010; Butterfill 
& Apperly, 2013; Kova et al., 2014; Kovács et al., 2010), but fits with recent critical 
interpretations of the literature suggesting that some of the purported effects may 
be due to domain general processing constraints (Heyes, 2014). 
Although we failed to replicate the neat results reported by Kovacs et al., we 
nonetheless found some potentially interesting effects. For example, in the first two 
experiments of this chapter, in which we improved Kovacs et al. design by ensuring 
that the event structure of the video sequences was fully comparable across 
conditions, whenever a significant difference was detected in the object present 
conditions (p < 0.05), this involved the reaction time being longer in the P-A- 
condition than other conditions (P+A+, P+A- or P-A+). For example, when the two 
experiments were put together, the participants’ reaction time was significantly 
longer in the P-A- condition than in the P+A- and the P+A+ condition; in experiment 1, 
significantly longer in the P-A- than the P+A+ condition; experiment 2, significantly 
longer in the P-A- than the P+A-, and a trend of longer reaction time in the P-A- than 
the P-A+ (p = 0.08). The consistently longer reaction time in the P-A- condition may 
indicate that the presence of another agent in scenarios with conflicting events (e.g. 
ball appearing in one, disappearing in another), may have some effect on the way in 
which such scenarios are processed, even if this influence is not due to the 
computation of false beliefs or intentional relations with objects 
The group of participants responding to the absence of the object in 
experiment 1 was initially designed to distinguish the belief-outcome congruency 
hypothesis and the object-directedness hypothesis, but it generated very 
unexpected results that could not be explained by either hypothesis. The reaction 
times in the four conditions are not significantly different from each other, indicating 
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that neither intentionality nor belief had any effect on the task when the response 
required is to recognise the absence, rather than the presence of an object. This is 
reminiscent of the results of chapter 3, using the object-directed actions paradigm, 
in which the participants always responded much more slowly to the absence than 
the presence of an object. It might be that in both paradigms responding to “nothing” 
requires more effort or a different type of processing than responding to 
“something”. and this may mask any effect of the experimental conditions upon the 
participants’ reaction time in this task. 
Be that it as it may, in Chapter 2, with the object-directed action paradigm, we 
unexpectedly found more evidence of sensitivity to the object-directedness of the 
actions in the monkeys than in the humans. In the next and final experimental 
chapter, we will test if the same happens with the current design based on Kovacs et 
al, and whether Capuchin monkeys show a different sensitivity to the conditions 
displayed in the same stimuli. 
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Chapter 5. Capuchin monkey’s 
automatic encoding of other’s beliefs 
Summary 
This chapter aims to employ the Participant/Agent Belief paradigm developed 
with adult humans in the previous chapter to investigate whether Capuchin monkeys 
can automatically register others’ beliefs or intentional relations to objects. A total of 
18 monkeys were presented with the same videos used in Experiment 5 in the 
previous chapter where the monkeys’ own belief and an agent’s belief (a picture of 
another  monkey) about an object’s location were manipulated. The result showed 
that the monkeys’ looking times were not influenced either by their own belief or 
the other agent’s belief about the object’s location. The negative results suggested 
that the monkeys don’t have the capability of belief attribution even in an implicit 
ToM task and any coding of intentionality had no effect on their visual behaviour in 
this task. In comparison with human performance, the monkeys showed no evidence 
of retroactive interference, which suggests that they attended to the videos in a 
different way to the humans. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, we tried to adapt an object-detection task originally 
developed to test implicit coding of false beliefs to seek for evidence of adults’ ability 
to understand object directed intentionality. However, we failed to replicate the 
original results reported by the creators of the task and ended up concluding that 
this paradigm, when applied with appropriate controls and correct statistical 
analyses, shows little evidence of either Belief or object-directed intentionality 
coding. Our results seem instead to support recent proposals that the original 
findings can be better explained through “sub-mentalizing” processes. 
The finding could be considered to be consistent with what we detected in 
chapter 3 using another reaction time paradigm, where adult humans failed to show 
the ability to code object-directedness when the object of the action was not directly 
shown. In comparison however, a primate species, the Capuchin monkeys, showed 
some signs of coding object-directedness in the experiment presented in chapter 2 
using the same stimuli as those used in chapter 3 with adults. In this chapter we 
sought to test the Capuchin monkeys using the same task and stimuli used in the last 
chapter (experiment 4, chapter 4) to complete our comparative investigation of 
monkey and human performance in implicit mentalistic tasks.  
As we have discussed in the introduction of chapter 4, the experimental 
paradigm was developed from an object-detection task originally designed by Kovács 
and colleagues to access humans’ implicit understand of others’ belief (Kovács et al., 
2010), with a suggestion that it could also provide evidence for the ability to code 
object-directed intentionality. In Kovács et al’s original experiment, they present the 
participants videos in which the belief of the participant and an animated agent are 
manipulated to create four conditions with different beliefs about an object’s 
presence behind a hiding-screen. After watching these videos, the participants are 
required to respond to the presence of the object when the hiding-screen opens. If 
the participants’ expectation is affected by their own belief and/or the agent’s belief, 
their reaction time will be prolonged by the violation of the belief content. From 
their results, Kovács et al concluded that humans can automatically register others’ 
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beliefs (Kovács et al., 2014; Kovács et al., 2010). In comparison, however, from our 
five experiments, which all closely reproduced the experimental conditions of Kovács 
et al’s study, we suggested that the results with adult humans should not be 
attributed to the implicit understanding of belief, but instead, to reactions to 
differences in the video presentations across the four conditions, which would 
support the “sub-mentalising” interpretation recently proposed by Heyes (2014) 
As in the object-directed actions task presented in Chapters 2, with the 
Capuchin monkeys we will be using a looking time paradigm, instead of the RT 
paradigm used with adult humans. One possibility is that the different structures of 
the video presentations do not affect the results of the experiment as much in the 
looking time task. In the reaction time task, the participants are required to press a 
key as quickly as possible to decide if the object is present when the hiding-screen 
opens and the outcome is shown. Given that, in some conditions the participants are 
also required to respond to the agent’s leaving (as a way of ensuring that they have 
noticed this key event affecting the agent’s Belief), this might have differently 
affected the participants’ attention to the hiding-screen-area when the object was 
revealed. The shift of attention to the location of the object might have resulted in a 
longer reaction time in the P+A+ and the P-A- conditions due to this procedural 
difference (see experiment 4 in chapter 4 for details). However, when looking time is 
used as the measurement of the participants’ expectation, the participants have a 
relatively long ten second period to observe the outcome, and they are not required 
to respond to any intervening event.  
As with reaction time, the prediction is that the looking time will also be 
prolonged by any violation of expectation and will therefore indicate whether any 
belief or object-directedness is encoded. 
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Figure 5 - 1 The procedure of video presentation in the four conditions 
 
The looking time paradigm has been used with both non-verbal human infants 
and non-human primates (Kovács et al., 2010; Martin & Santos, 2014). As an 
equivalent of the reaction time task with adults. Kovács et al (2010) used looking 
time as the measurement to test 7-month-old infants with exactly the same stimuli 
as the adults, reporting positive evidence for infants’ implicit registretation of others’ 
beliefs (see details of the infant study in the introduction of chapter 4). After we had 
completed our own study presented in this chapter, Martin and Santos (2014) 
published a new experiment in which they adapted Kovacs et al. (2010) paradigm to 
non-human primates using the same looking time paradigm to investigate rhesus 
macaques’ implicit understanding of other’s belief. However, although they found 
that the monkeys’ looking time was indeed affected by their own belief in the task 
(i.e., they looked for longer if no object was revealed behind the screen when they 
thought there was one), the monkeys failed to show any evidence of encoding the 
belief of another agent spontaneously (see Figure 5 - 2, Martin & Santos, 2014): i.e., 
the agent’s belief that the object was present or absent did not affect the monkeys’ 
looking time at all. The authors concluded that rhesus macaques, in contrast to 
human adults and babies, do not understand the false beliefs of others. 
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Our study therefore can be seen as an extension of Kovacs et al (2010) 
paradigm to a new species of primate, Capuchin monkeys. However, in addition, it 
offers a direct comparison with the performance of humans in exactly the same 
tasks (Martin & Santos only tested monkeys), and one in which the humans did not 
perform as predicted by Kovacs et al’s interpretation. 
 
Figure 5 - 2 Rhesus macaques’ average looking time in the task (Martin & 
Santos, 2014) 
 
Both Kovacs et al. looking time experiment with infants, and Martin and 
Santos’s looking time study with monkeys were based upon the presentation of a 
different outcome from the original adult experiment, i.e., in looking time the object 
was always absent when the hiding-screen opened. In the current study, we will 
follow suit and present the Capuchin monkeys with the absence of the object as the 
outcome. With this outcome, P+A+ and P-A- still act as the two baseline conditions, 
i.e., we expect to find longer looking time in the P+A+ than the P-A- because of 
violation of the expectation that the object will appear behind the screen. However, 
returning to our two alternative hypotheses (the object-directedness hypothesis and 
the belief-outcome congruency hypothesis) presented in the last chapter, we predict 
different results for the P+A- and P-A+ conditions. If monkeys encode object-directed 
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intentionality, we expect their looking time to be longer in both the P+A- and P-A+ 
condition than the P-A- condition, because the coding of intentionality suggests the 
existence of the object, which would violate the outcome of the object’s absence. On 
the other hand, if the monkeys code beliefs, the looking time should be shorter in 
the P+A- and P-A+ condition than in the P+A+ condition, because either the agent’s 
or the participants’ belief that there is no object conforms to the outcome and will 
shorten the reaction time. See the introduction of chapter 4 for more details on the 
rationale for these alternative predictions.  
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
A total of 18 Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella apella) took part in the 
experiment. All monkeys were housed at the Living Links to human evolution 
research centre at Edinburgh Zoo (see Table 5 - 1 and chapter 2 for more details). 
Table 5 - 1 Monkey’s profile. 
(The age shows the monkeys’ age when the experiment finished) 
Monkey Age (Yr:m) 
Sex 
Chico 05:00 M 
Junon 13:10 F 
Penelope 08:05 F 
Flojo 02:10 M 
Ruben 03:10 M 
Anita 16:03 F 
Carlos 07:09 M 
Toka 09:04 M 
Figo 07:10 M 
Diego 11:09 M 
Ximo 04:00 M 
Alba 02:07 F 
Inti 04:07 M 
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Rufo 04:06 M 
Luna 02:11 F 
Pedra 06:02 F 
Torres 03:03 M 
Sylvie 10:08 F 
 
5.2.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
Figure 5 - 3 illustrates the setup in the experiment (see also Figure 2 – 1 and 
Figure 2 – 2 in chapter 2). Monkeys were separated and tested individually in 
cubicles to which they had been habituated and were motivated to stay for research 
sessions. A computer monitor (Dell™ E198WFP Flat Panel Monitor, 19 inch) was 
located on a platform at an equal height to the base of the cubicles and 0.5m directly 
in front of the front panel. Display of stimuli was controlled by Microsoft Powerpoint 
on a laptop (Lenovo ThinkPad X220i) behind the monitor. Subjects’ visual behaviour 
was filmed by two digital cameras (Panasonic SDR-S26) for offline coding. One 
camera was placed at the centre directly below the monitor and the other at either 
right or left side of the monitor (Figure 5 - 3. B & D). Monkeys’ looking time data 
were coded offline frame by frame using Coral VideoStudio Pro X4. 
 
A 
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D 
Figure 5 - 3 The experiment setup. (A. the whole view; B. Top view; C. 
Experimenter’s view; D. Monkey’s view) 
 
The stimuli were the same short animation videos used in Experiment 4 of 
Chapter 4 with human adults. They involved an orange (the object), a wooden hiding 
board and a profile photo of a capuchin monkey (the agent, A) on the background of 
a grassland (see Figure 5 - 1 & Figure 5 - 4). We modified Kovács et al’s (2010) 
method and created four testing conditions to manipulate the participant’s (P) and 
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the agent’s perspective about the presence of the orange behind the hiding board 
(Figure 5 - 1). The stimuli also included an introductory video clip (all the videos were 
created by 3D flash animation (Version 4.9.8.7). 
In the introductory clip, the orange moved from the left to behind the wooden 
board and then the board opened at 2.8 seconds, revealing the orange. The video 
then stopped and remained still for 10 seconds as in the last picture in Figure 5 - 4. 
During the 10-seconds, the participant’s looking time was recorded. In the 
introductory trial, the outcome was consistent with both the agent’s and the 
participant’s belief and it served as an introduction to the scenario.  
 
Figure 5 - 4 The introductory trial 
 
The four testing conditions involved a similar scenario to the introductory clip 
(Figure 5 - 1). The orange first moved to behind the board. But then it kept moving 
after the initial hiding process. At a certain point in different conditions, the agent 
left the scenario and therefore was ignorant as to any movement of the orange if it 
moved again, leading to the four belief conditions (P+A+, P-A-, P+A-, P-A+). At the 
end, the agent returned to the scenario, sat beside the board and looked at the 
location behind the board when the board opened at 7.4 seconds. In all 
experimental conditions, the orange failed to appear behind the board or anywhere 
else on the screen. The final outcome scene lasted for 10 seconds. 
In the P+A+ condition, after the first hiding behind the board, the orange rolled 
out of the screen but then returned and rolled behind the board. The agent watched 
all this movement and then left the scenario. Therefore, both the participant and the 
agent believed the orange was behind the board. When the agent returned to the 
 
 
173 
 
scenario, the board opened, revealing no orange. Thus the outcome contradicted 
both the agent’s and the participant’s belief, or their object-directed encoding. As a 
consequence, the participant should experience a violation of expectation and be 
surprised and look longer at the outcome. 
In the P-A- condition, after the initial hiding, the orange emerged from behind 
the board without leaving the scene and moved back to behind the board. Then it 
rolled out of the board again and left the scene. The agent was present all through 
the process, resulting in both the agent and the participant believing the orange 
should not be resting behind the screen. Then the agent left and came back. When 
the board opened, no orange was there, which was consistent with both parties’ 
beliefs, or with both parties lack of encoding of object-directedness given the 
disappearance of the object, and therefore, the monkey’s looking time was expected 
to be the shortest among all conditions.  
In the P-A+ condition, the movement of the orange was the same as in P-A-, 
but the agent left before the orange emerged from behind the board. In this case, 
the agent held a false belief that the orange was behind the board while the 
participant had the true belief that the orange had left. The outcome did not 
contradict the participant’s belief but, from Kovacs et al. automatic Belief coding 
perspective, the participants would look longer if they had registered the agent’s 
belief to the object, which contradicted the outcome. From the object-directedness 
perspective, we predicted that, since the object had been seen to disappear from 
the scene, no object remained to be encoded, and therefore looking time should be 
comparable to condition P-A-. 
In the P+A- condition, the orange left the scene from behind the board in the 
agent’s presence but then, while the agent was away, the orange rolled back and hid 
behind the occluder. The agent, therefore, believed the orange to be away while the 
participant believed the orange to be behind the board. When the board opens, the 
outcome is opposite to the participant’s own belief, but consistent with the agent’s 
belief. The Belief interpretation would therefore predict a similar looking time to the 
P-A- condition. In contrast, from the object-directedness perspective, we predicted 
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that, since the participant had last encoded the object to be present, looking time 
should be longer as this constituted a violation of the expectation. 
5.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The experiment was a 2 (Agent’s Belief, of the object’s presence/absence 
behind the board) * 2 (Participant’s belief, of object’s presence/absence behind the 
board) factorial design, resulting in 4 conditions (P+A+, P-A+, P+A-, P-A-) within 
subjects.  
Each participant had 4 experimental sessions in total, resulting in 4 repeated 
trials for each condition. In each session, all the participants watched 2 introductory 
videos at the very beginning. Then they were exposed to two testing clips before 
another introductory clip, followed by the other two testing conditions. A session 
contained the four conditions each and the order of conditions was counter 
balanced between sessions. A session started when a monkey was separated and sat 
comfortably in a cubicle. After each trial, the monkeys had short breaks with 2-4 
raisins as rewards. After each session, they again had some rewards before being 
allowed to go back to their social group. The interval between sessions was at least 
one day. 
5.2.4 Data analysis 
As in chapter 2, we coded the monkey’s looking time offline frame by frame 
(25 frames = 1 second). As in chapter 2, only looks longer than 4 frames were 
included in the looking time data. The looking frames were added up in the 10-
second-looking-window to calculate a monkey’s total looking time in each condition.  
In addition, we examined the monkey’s attention at the videos before the 
hiding-board opened and categorized the trials into two categorize:  attended, 
where the monkey watched at least for 4 frames when the orange was visible; not 
attended, where the monkey did not look at the screen area at all.  
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Monkeys’ attention in the experiment 
First, we assessed monkeys’ attention to the videos displayed (see Table 5 - 2). 
The monkeys did not pay any attention to 64 out of the 286 test trials (22.4%) and 63 
of the 215 introductory trials (29.3%). We excluded these trials in the following 
analysis. This left us with 222 test trials and 147 introductory trials that were 
attended to. In the following analysis, we report all the data from the attended trials.  
Table 5 - 2 Monkey’s attendance to the videos (Note: H1, H2, H3 
represent the first, second and third introductory trial.) 
Attendance P-A+ P+A+ P-A- P+A- H1 H2 H3 Grand Total 
Not 16 12 19 17 21 24 23 132 
Attended 55 60 53 54 50 48 49 369 
Total 71 72 72 71 71 72 72 501 
5.3.2 Looking time at the attended trials 
Table 5 - 3 and Error! Reference source not found. show the monkeys’ average 
looking time in different conditions. And Table 5 - 4 shows the data of each 
individual. We first averaged the looking time in each condition for individual 
monkeys and then calculated the monkeys’ average looking time in the four 
conditions. 
Table 5 - 3 Monkeys’ average looking time to different conditions of the 
attended trials(s) 
 H1 H2 H3 P-A+ P+A+ P-A- P+A- 
Mean 1.70 1.28 1.15 1.40 1.41 1.50 1.53 
SD 0.94 0.81 0.84 1.02 0.86 0.77 1.01 
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Figure 5 - 5 Monkeys’ average looking time in different conditions of the 
attended trials (error bar: SE) 
 
Table 5 - 4 Individuals’ average looking time in each condition of the 
attended trials(s) 
 P-A+ P+A+ P-A- P+A- H1 H2 H3 
Chico 2.82 2.41 2.80 4.46 4.01 2.56 2.46 
Junon 1.19 2.87 1.61 1.86 1.09 2.36 0.66 
Penelope 0.72 0.83 0.88 1.12 0.80 0.52 1.17 
Flojo 2.99 1.88 2.59 2.49 2.68 1.66 1.74 
Ruben 2.95 2.91 2.36 2.77 2.49 2.01 2.33 
Anita 2.84 1.55 1.24 1.45 1.73 1.97 1.42 
Carlos 2.92 2.65 2.29 2.44 2.22 2.21 1.87 
Toka 0.70 1.26 0.63 1.36 0.80 0.22 0.88 
Figo 1.00 0.97 0.74 0.83 3.16 0.62 0.12 
Diego 1.02 0.42 1.24 0.46 0.78 0.72 0.56 
Ximo 0.44 0.68 2.08 0.79 1.57 0.42 0.22 
Alba 0.68 1.49 2.09 1.26 1.84 2.32 2.52 
Inti 0.88 1.19 0.00 1.17 1.68 1.33 0.00 
Rufo 0.38 0.05 0.94 0.10 1.20 0.25 0.15 
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Luna 0.47 0.85 1.57 0.78 1.12 0.90 0.70 
Pedra 1.86 1.46 0.75 1.45 1.41 1.19 1.53 
Torres 0.37 0.37 1.75 1.68 0.28 1.39 
 Sylvie 0.89 1.59 1.40 0.99 1.78 0.44 1.16 
 
A one way repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant difference across 
the three introductory trials (F(2,32) = 5.83, p = .007). T-test with Bonferroni 
adjustment showed a trend of drop of looking time in the second introductory trial 
from the first (t(17) = 1.92, p = .08), but no difference was found between the second 
and third introductory (t(16) = .470, p = .81). In addition, the looking time at the third 
introductory was significantly shorter than the first (t(16) = 2.91, p = .03).  
For the four testing conditions, a two-way repeated ANOVA using the Agent’s 
Belief and the Participant’s Belief as the two main factors revealed no main effect of 
either factor: AB (F(1,17) = .58, p = .46), PB (F(1,17) = .036, p = .85). The interaction 
was not significant either (F(1, 17) = .005, p = .94). In additions, we compared the 
four conditions directly using a one-way repeated ANOVA. Again, the results 
revealed no significant difference between conditions (F(3,51) = .24, p = .87). 
Following Kovács et al’s (2010) method of analysis with their adult participants, 
we also used paired T-test to compare P-A- with other conditions. The looking time 
was not significantly different between any pair: P+A+ (t(17) = .44, p = .67), P+A- 
(t(17) = .174, p = .86), and P-A (t(17) = .46, p = .65). 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Capuchin monkeys showed no encoding of Belief or 
Intentionality 
The results show that the monkeys did not look differently at the four testing 
conditions, suggesting that they did not automatically encode either other agents 
beliefs or their intentional relation to objects. This finding is consistent with the 
findings reported by Martin and Santos in their own adaptation of the paradigm. 
However, in contrast to their study, we unexpectedly found that the Capuchin 
 
 
178 
 
monkeys also did not react to their own belief about the presence of the object: they 
showed no prolonged looking time when the object they last saw disappear behind 
the screen failed to re-appear. This could be taken to indicate that they failed to 
engage with video presentation of the task or failed to encode the relevant aspects 
of the scenes.  
The most surprising finding is indeed the lack of difference between the two 
baseline conditions P-A- and P+A+. This suggests that even when the agent’s and the 
monkey’s beliefs are consistent to each other and both violate the outcome, the 
Capuchin monkeys did not find the outcome surprising. Even if the Capuchin 
monkeys were not able to understand the other’s belief, they should at least be 
affected by their own belief or encoding of the object location.  
One possible explanation of these unexpected findings might be that the 
Capuchins failed to understand the videos. Martin and Santos experiment was 
conducted with real people acting out the scenes, and maybe the videos failed to 
engage the Capuchins attention. However, our positive results in Ch 2 suggest that 
Capuchins do in principle have the ability to perceive what is going on in the videos 
and react differently to different outcomes and conditions. 
 The videos in the current experiment may, however, have been particularly 
difficult to follow for the monkeys. The actions displayed in chapter 2 had physical 
contact with the object, while the agent in the current experiment only stood and 
watched the movements of the object; the object was moved by the agent in 
chapter 2 while it moved itself in the current experiment; the agent was a human 
experimenter acting out in chapter 2, while the agent in the current experiment was 
only a profile photo of a Capuchin monkey. 
The fact that the only significant effect that we found was a steady decline in 
the amount of attention payed to the outcome of the introductory trials suggests 
that indeed the monkeys progressively lost interest in what was being presented to 
them in the videos. 
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There are some additional reasons why the performance of both 7-month-old 
human infants in Kovács et al. (2010) and rhesus macaques in Martin and Santos 
(2014) might have been better. In Kovács et al’s experiment with infants, the video 
presentation is an infant-controlled presentation, i.e., when the infants look away, 
the video pauses until the infants look back at the screen. As a consequence, it 
ensures that the infants are more likely to perceive all the relevant details of the 
experimental scenarios. In comparison, in our experiment the videos were presented 
continuously although we were able to exclude the trials where the monkeys had 
not looked at the video at all during the presentation. However, this post hoc check 
could not guarantee that the monkeys were as fully engaged in watching the 
relevant part of the stimuli as the infants were.  
Martin and Santos’ (2014) experiment with rhesus macaques did not use a 
macaque-controlled presentation, but, as mentioned, instead of using videos to 
present the four conditions, the human experimenters performed the conditions live. 
Their experiment was conducted by an experimenter using a foam core stage and a 
plastic apple, while ours was displayed through animation videos and the object was 
an image of an orange. Monkeys’ attention might be better when both the scenario 
and the object look more realistic, as in Martin and Santos’ experiment. Therefore 
the rhesus monkeys might track the ‘real’ apple’s location better than the capuchin 
monkeys tracked the orange’s on the videos. But the fact that in our experiment the 
capuchin monkeys’ own beliefs did not affect their looking time suggests that they 
may have failed to understand the scenarios in the videos altogether.  
 Secondly, to ensure that the Capuchin monkeys would attend to at least some 
of the presentations of the scenarios, in our experiment each Capuchin monkey had 
more trials than the infants and the rhesus macaques. The Capuchins had three 
experimental trials and four test trials in one session and they all had four 
experimental in total. In comparison, Kovacs et al’ infants had only two introductory 
trials and two test trials each, and Martin and Santos’ rhesus macaques had only one 
test trial after the two introductory trials. Maybe the shorter experimental sessions 
and fewer trials maintained a higher level of curiosity and attention in the infants 
and the Rhesus. In the case of our Capuchin monkeys, although using more trials 
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achieved the goal of getting at least one attended trial in each condition for each 
Capuchin monkey, the longer experiment and more repeated trials might have made 
them bored with the experiment very soon and perhaps contributed to their lack of 
understanding of the videos.  
In future studies, we suggest that it is vital to enhance the monkeys’ attention 
to the stimuli. This could be achieved by conducting the experiment live with actors, 
as in Martin and Santos, instead of displaying videos and by reducing the number of 
trials for each participant but increasing the number of participants in total. In 
addition, if eye tracking devices can be used in the experiment, a monkey-controlled 
presentation of videos might achieve a better effect in delivering the experimental 
conditions.  
5.4.2 Summary 
In conclusion, we found that the monkeys performance in this this experiment 
gave no evidence of automatic coding of Belief of Intentionality, but it also gave no 
evidence of coding guided by the differential properties of the video displays, as 
suggested for the performance of the human adults in Experiments 4 and 5. The lack 
of any differential effect, except for the introductory trials, suggests that either the 
monkeys did not pay enough attention to the video displays to be able to react to 
the different presented contents, or they were not able to perceive the intended 
differences. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
6.1 A review of the rationale & aims 
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand others’ mental states 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978), is an important ability for highly socialized species like 
human beings. An increasing body of study has focused on the different mechanisms 
of ToM and their development and evolution, with a particular focus on so called 
“implicit” or automatic mechanisms (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Aschersleben et al., 
2008; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Leslie, 1987a; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian, 2009; 
Woodward, 2009a). Among them, the ability to understand intentionality, i.e., the 
object-directedness from intentional actions to an object, attracts our attention 
because of its early ontogenetic emergence in humans (Woodward, 2009a), early 
phylogenetic emergence in non-human primates (Wood et al., 2007) and a positive 
correlation with other ToM abilities (Aschersleben et al., 2008), which indicate that it 
is likely an important precursor and foundation of ToM abilities in general (Gómez, 
2009). Therefore in this thesis, we have mainly focused on human and non-human 
primates’ ability to understand intentionality. 
The term ‘intentionality’ is used in slightly different senses in psychology and 
philosophy. In psychology it is largely a synonym of ‘goal-directedness’, whereas in 
philosophy it has a wider meaning: it refers to a key property of all mental states —
in that they are always directed to or about something different to themselves. One 
always thinks about something, wants something, sees something, etc. Thus, 
intentional or goal-directed action in the psychological sense would just be a type of 
intentionality in the philosophical sense (Gómez, 2008, 2009). 
Both developmental and comparative studies show that non-human primates 
and human beings understand the relation between intentional actions and their 
intentional objects (e.g., Aschersleben et al., 2008; Hauser & Wood, 2010; Kano & 
Call, 2014; Woodward, 1999). For example, studies with infants suggest that they 
distinguish object-directed actions from non-object-directed actions and recognize 
its feature of directedness to an object that is the goal of the action (e.g., Biro & 
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Leslie, 2007; Phillips & Wellman, 2005; Woodward, 2009a). Non-human primates 
share this ability as well (Kano & Call, 2014).  
It has been suggested that applying the wider philosophical notion of 
intentionality to this type of study may offer an alternative means to of 
understanding the problem of the evolution of Theory of mind, one that goes 
beyond the traditional disputes contrasting Behaviour-reading (animals just code the 
observable aspects of behaviour) with Mind-reading (animals code behaviour and 
the unobservable mental states beyond behaviour) (Gómez, 2009). The proposal is 
that, if intentionality in the philosophical sense is the key defining feature of mental 
states, then what an organism needs to do to be a ‘mentalist’ is to code the 
directionality of behaviour to external objects, and this can be done through some 
type of Gestalt perception where a relation is perceived between other organisms 
and their objects of action or attention. Thus, the object-directed actions, the object 
and the directedness from the action to the object are perceived as a whole. The 
above cases of perceiving the goal-directedness of actions to objects would be 
examples of this, but also abilities such as following the gaze of others to the objects 
they are looking at (Gomez, 2008, 2009). Findings in favour of this ability to code 
intentionality can be found in studies of gaze following, attention understanding and 
object-choice (see more discussion of these studies in chapter 1).  
This Gestalt perspective on intentional relations predicts that when only part 
of a relation is observable, the whole relation can still be perceived or coded from 
the available elements. Some physiological studies, for example, suggest that even 
after an object has been covered behind a screen, object-directedness can still be 
triggered by the observation of the object-directed action (Umiltà et al., 2001). It 
indicates the possibility that the hidden object is remembered and when an 
appropriate action is performed the coding of object-directedness is triggered by 
combining the currently perceived action with the remembered object (Gómez, 
2009).  
This result is particularly interesting because it suggests an ability to attribute 
“intentionality” (both in the psychological sense of goal-directedness and the 
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philosophical sense of object-directedness) when the object of an action is not 
directly perceived. Some of the key ToM skills, that have frequently been considered 
to be exclusive human, are the ability to engage in pretend play (for example, acting 
upon imaginary objects) and the ability to attribute false beliefs (for example, 
predicting that someone will try to find an object where it actually is not). These two 
abilities involve the attribution of objects that can not be directly perceived (because 
they are imaginary or no longer exist) to actions. 
However, the physiological experiments discussed above demonstrated the 
ability to ‘imagine’ the object of the action only after the object had been previously 
shown to the observer (Umilta et al., 2001). So, it was more a matter of 
“remembering” rather than imagining or inferring the object. Could object-
directedness be triggered and the object be imagined from only the observation of 
object-directed action, without previous information about whether or not there is 
or not an object? According to Gómez (2008), this would be a more important ability 
to understand the origins of the skills of Pretence and False belief attribution. 
The ability to infer an object from the perceived intentionality of an action 
might be a crucial component of ToM development and evolution. However, no 
direct experimental evidence exists about this ability. Gaze following experiments 
suggest that both human and non-human primates might expect an object when 
they see someone looking in a particular direction (Rosati & Hare, 2009). However, 
no studies have specifically and systematically targeted the ability to infer objects 
from actions when no previous information has been given about the existence of an 
object.  
Therefore, this thesis sought to comparatively examine the coding of object-
directedness from the perception of actions without previous knowledge of their 
objects in both human adults and non-human primates. In the following sections of 
this chapter, we will recap the findings of our studies and discuss their implications 
for our knowledge of how humans and primates understand object-directedness and 
the notion of implicit Theory of Mind abilities.  
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6.2 Summary of the experiments 
We conducted two comparative studies using two different paradigms in this 
thesis: first, a study of capuchin monkeys (chapter 2) and human adults (chapter 3) 
about their inference of a potential object from object-directed and non-object 
directed actions; and second, a study of capuchin monkeys (chapter 5) and human 
adults (chapter 4) about their automatic understanding of the intentional relation 
between an agent and an object in a paradigm initially designed to assess implicit 
understanding of other’s belief.  
6.2.1 Capuchin monkeys’ inference of object from object-
directed action (Chapter 2) 
The results of the first experiment showed two main findings. Firstly, when an 
object is revealed after the actions, the capuchin monkeys can differentiate the 
object-directed action and the non-object directed action by expecting the object-
directed action to be directed at the goal-object. This was shown by participants’ 
longer looking time, ( i.e., ‘surprise’), at the outcome when the object-directed 
action, grasp (but not the non-object directed action, flop) had been directed to the 
alternative location instead of where the object was revealed. We suggest from 
these results that capuchin monkeys showed an understanding of object-
directedness that goes beyond that shown in the findings with pre-verbal infants 
(Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Woodward et al., 2002; Woodward, 1999) and non-
human primates (Kano & Call, 2014). Our findings suggest that the intentional 
relation of object directedness can be coded even if the action and the object have 
never been seen at the same time.  
Secondly, the experiment indicated that if no object was revealed after the 
action, capuchin monkeys were apparently not able to imagine and infer the object, 
as indicated by their lack of longer looking time when no object was revealed either 
behind the congruent or the incongruent location. This suggested that, although 
capuchin monkeys understood object-directedness from the action without having 
to see the object at the same time, this was not due to the inference of an object 
behind the screen from the action alone. We suggested that a possible 
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interpretation was that the object-directed action might provoke the coding of an 
“object-slot”, but in the absence of a real object appearing shortly afterwards, this 
was not enough to generate a violation of expectation. It is as if the reality of there 
being no object overrides any suggestion of object-directedness generated by the 
contemplation of the action.  
This would fit with the idea that non-human primates may have a cognitive 
system geared towards suppressing counterfactual representations (Gómez, 2008, 
2009). Human children engage in pretend play from an early age, for example, 
pretend that a banana is a phone. But non-human primates do not seem to do so, 
perhaps due to the rooted ability to understand intentionality. A key step in the 
evolution of pretence and false belief understanding might be the inhibition of such 
suppression, or the intentionality to a certain realistic object, enabling the evolution 
of mental representation.   
6.2.2 Adult humans’ inference of object from object-directed 
action (Chapter 3) 
In the next chapter we aimed to compare adult humans in a similar paradigm 
using the same stimuli as with the monkeys, but with reaction time measures instead 
of looking time as the dependent variable, to investigate whether human adults 
could infer an object from object-directed actions.  
The results, to our surprise, showed no evidence that adult humans 
understood object-directedness. Unlike the capuchin monkeys (chapter 2), adult 
humans didn’t distinguish the object-directed from the non-object-directed action 
when the object was not shown at the same time as the action, and seemed to 
regard all the actions as non-object-directed. Thus, when the object appeared at the 
incongruent location to the direction of the action, they didn’t show any effect in 
their reaction times, suggesting that they did not expect the object directed action to 
be congruent with the object location. In this respect, their performance was worse 
that of capuchin monkeys (chapter 2). Neither did they show either any ability to 
infer a potential object from object-directed action when no object was revealed 
behind any of the screens, because they showed longer reaction times in the 
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absence of the object to both the object and the non-object directed actions. We 
discussed the possibility that these negative results were due to methodological 
aspects of the design, specifically the relatively long interval between the beginning 
of the action with the object cue (grasp vs flop) and the opportunity to respond to 
the outcome, and the 50% validity rate (percentage of trials where the action was 
congruent with the object), both of which might have given a better opportunity to 
the human participants to override any implicit, automatic ToM computations and 
control their response more explicitly. 
However, if this were the case, then this would open up the need to question 
the adaptive value of the hypothetical implicit ToM systems. Apperly & Butterfill 
(2009) suggested that humans have an implicit ToM system, which deals with ToM-
like problems but does not involve mental representation. This system provides us 
an automatic and fast way to problem solve in social situations. However, if an 
interval above 1 sec between the cueing action and the outcome is enough to make 
disappear any automatic computation of intentionality, one wonders if such an 
alleged implicit system would have any adaptive effect in real life situations, beyond 
artificial laboratory conditions where drastically abridged stimuli and outcomes (e.g., 
photos of actions instead of video clips) are shown. 
On the other hand, we found no evidence of a decreased effect of the 
intentionality cues over blocks of trials, which would have been consistent with the 
idea that the adults were learning to ignore the cues because of their low predictive 
value. 
The results from this chapter suggested that adult humans showed no effect of 
automatically encoding object-directedness in this task. This result was all the more 
surprising as Capuchin monkeys did show some ability to code object-directed 
intentionality with exactly the same stimuli when tested with a looking time 
measurement. 
6.2.3 Summary of chapter 2 and 3 
These first two empirical chapters (chapter 2 and 3) were designed to study 
intentionally by examining if the participants can infer the object from object-
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directed actions when the object was not known beforehand. The comparative study 
expended our knowledge of the ability to understand object-directedness from 
human infants to non-human primates and directly compared the performance of 
the two species using the same stimuli. 
Despite this positive result, neither the capuchin monkeys nor the adult 
humans succeeded in inferring the object from only observing the object-directed 
action. The Capuchins showed no evidence of ‘surprise’ when no object at all 
appeared after the grasping action, and the humans adults, although clearly showed 
longer RTs to reporting the absence of the object, did so for both object-directed and 
non-object directed actions, including one in which the action did not refer at all to 
the screens (tap at the centre). 
Therefore, it would appear that, at best, the Capuchins were capable of coding 
an intentional relation only if they had been exposed to separate direct evidence of 
both the action and the object, but not from the action alone. In this respect, our 
behavioural findings extend the physiological findings of Umiltà et al. (2001). Here a 
non-human primate species, macaque monkeys, was capable of coding an action 
alone as object-directed if the presence of the object had been shown in advance. 
We show that Capuchins can code object-directedness even if the object is shown 
after the completion of the action.  This suggests a flexible and sophisticated ability 
to code object-directed intentionality as a relation between agents and objects that 
is not dependent upon direct simultaneous perception of both components of the 
relation. However, it falls short of showing the ability we were targeting — inference 
of an object expectation from the action alone, without any direct evidence of the 
object. The observation of object-directed actions alone is not sufficient in triggering 
the participants’ inference of an object, or at least any inferred representation of an 
object is not strong enough to resist the perception of counterfactual reality. We 
suggested that it could, for example, consist of something like an “object slot” 
associated to a specific spatial location that would only be activated if an actual 
object appears, congruent or incongruent with that location. 
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Given the different results between capuchin monkeys and adult humans, 
especially the negative results from humans, we raised two doubts. Firstly, is the 
paradigm in chapter 3 adequate for detecting the adults’ implicit ability? Secondly, is 
it valid to compare the two species using two different measurements of their 
reaction to the same stimuli, i.e. looking time for capuchin monkeys and reaction 
time for adult humans? Therefore in the next two experiments, we used a different 
paradigm, which had purportedly succeeded in comparing adult humans with RT 
measures with non-verbal human infants using Looking time measures, to re-
examine capuchin monkeys’ and adult human adults’ understandings of object-
directedness.  
6.2.4 Adult humans’ automatic encoding of object-directedness 
and their implicit understanding of belief (Chapter 4) 
In the third empirical chapter (chapter 4) we modified a published 
experimental paradigm (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010) which originally succeeded 
in investigating implicit Theory of Mind ability in adult and infant humans. The 
authors interpreted their results as providing evidence of automatic belief 
computation, but we suggested that they could be interpreted through the 
automatic encoding of object-directedness in terms of the intentional relation 
between the agent and the object. We extended the original paradigm (entirely 
based on reactions to outcomes where the object was expectedly or unexpectedly 
present) by adding conditions where the object was absent in the final outcome, and 
reasoned that the predictions in the absent conditions would be different for a belief 
and an object-directedness interpretation. In addition, given that this paradigm 
successfully found comparable results with adult humans using reaction time and 
infants using looking time as measurements, we hoped it could be used in comparing 
adult human and capuchin monkeys (chapter 5) in the same task with the same 
stimuli.  
The results were unexpected.  They did not support either the Belief or the 
Object-directed interpretation, because to begin with we failed in the attempt to 
replicate Kovács et al’s original results in the relevant conditions of our experiments 
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1 & 2. To try to determine if the source of our failure to replicate was slight changes 
we had introduced to the experimental procedure (aiming at a better control of 
variables such as the structure of the events shown in the videos corresponding to 
the different conditions) we conducted a number of additional experiments. The 
results from these experiments (experiment 3, 4 & 5) suggested that, rather than 
belief understanding or object-directedness, our results, and those of Kovacs et al 
(2010) could be better explained by superficial differences in the specific 
presentation of the stimuli that might actually have affected the participant’s 
reaction time. Specifically, we found evidence that could support the alternative 
explanation recently proposed by Heyes (2014; paper published after we had 
completed our experiments) that the RT effects might have been caused by 
retroactive inhibition in the key conditions. Heyes suggested that due to the 
procedural difference between the conditions in Kovács et al’s experiment, the 
events might interfere with the participants’ memory and thereby affect their 
response in the test. This suggestion is very similar to our earlier discussion about 
procedural differences. Our experimental manipulations effectively (and unwittingly) 
controlled for retroactive inhibition by making all conditions comparable in this 
respect. 
In sum, the absence of evidence provided no support for adults’ ability in 
understanding either automatic belief computation or object-directedness, and they 
support recent alternative interpretations suggesting that instead of implicit ToM, 
results like Kovacs et al’s might be interpreted as driven by other factors, “sub-
mentalizing” processes (i.e., domain general cognitive processes) for example (Heyes, 
2014). 
6.2.5 Capuchin monkeys’ automatic encoding of object-
directedness and their implicit understanding of belief (Chapter 
5) 
The aim of the final empirical chapter was initially to expand Kovács et al’s 
experimental paradigm (either in its Belief or its intentional object-directedness 
interpretations) to non-humans. Despite the negative results obtained with human 
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adults, we reasoned that the Capuchin monkeys might react differently to the stimuli, 
and we wanted to investigate whether by using a different measurement, looking 
time, the experimental design could work for Capuchin monkeys. 
The results, however, indicated no encoding of either object-directedness or 
Belief by capuchin monkeys, as had been was found with the adults. Moreover, the 
capuchin monkeys were indifferent to the four experimental conditions, indicating 
no effect of their own perspective (i.e., having last seen the object present or 
absent). After completing our experiment, a new paper by Martin and Santos (2014) 
reported a similar study using an adaptation of Kovacs et al, paradigm with rhesus 
macaques. The authors reported no Belief sensitivity in their monkeys. Although 
they had no control human group using the same adapted stimuli, they reported 
that the monkeys looking time was affected by their previous own knowledge of the 
object, i.e., they looked for longer if no objects appeared where they had just seen 
one.  The complete lack of differentiation among conditions that we found in our 
Capuchin subjects led us to conclude that they might have failed to attend to or 
understand properly the experimental videos. Note that the Martin and Santos study 
with rhesus macaques was conducted using real people and with live manipulation 
of actual objects as opposed to our virtual ones. 
6.2.6 Summary of Chapter 4 and 5 
Chapters 4 & 5 used similar paradigms with identical stimuli to compare adult 
humans and capuchin monkeys in a task aimed at distinguishing the encoding of 
object-directedness in terms of encoding the intentional relationship between an 
agent and an object and the implicit computation of others’ beliefs. Unfortunately, 
the results of the baseline conditions failed to replicate the original findings of 
Kovács et al (2010), thereby rendering impossible the exploration of the alternative 
interpretations. However, our exploration of this failure to replicate the original 
results with successive modifications in the experimental procedure led us to 
conclude that the reported effects might have been due to uncontrolled differences 
in the superficial structure of the experimental videos, which would support the sub-
mentalizing’ interpretation of implicit false belief recently proposed by Heyes (2014). 
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6.2.7 General conclusions & implications about the 
understanding of intentionality  
The main aim of the thesis was to determine if Capuchin monkeys could infer 
(or imagine) the existence of an object that they have not seen from seeing an 
object-directed action such as grasping performed towards behind a screen. 
Following Gómez (2008), it was assumed that human adults would be capable of this. 
But we did not know whether a nonhuman primate would be. It was known that 
nonhuman primates can code intentional relations between the action of grasping 
and the object of the action when both terms of the relation are visible. Physiological 
evidence further suggested that grasping could be coded when the object of the 
grasp was no longer visible (but had been seen before), but not if the monkeys had 
been shown that there was no object behind the screen What remained to be 
determined, according to Gomez, was whether monkeys would be able to infer an 
object when they did not know if there was anything behind the screen (an ability 
that was assumed human adults would undoubtedly possess). 
What we found was that the monkeys showed an intermediate ability: they 
were not able to infer the existence of an object from the grasping action alone, as 
far as their looking time reflected no surprise at the screens being empty, but when 
an object appeared, they expected the object to be congruent with the grasping 
action that was no longer being performed (but not with a non-object directed act 
such as flop). This suggests that the grasping action alone does indeed provoke some 
object expectation, but this might not consist of a full representation of there having 
to be an object, but something akin to an ‘object slot’ that only becomes fully 
activated if an object appears. Alternatively, as suggested by Gómez (2008, 2009), 
the processing of reality (in this case, the absence of an object) might immediately 
and completely override any object inference suggested by the contemplation of the 
action alone. This would be similar to the finding reported by Umiltà et al. (2001) 
that the mirror neurons for grasping fail to activate when the monkeys know in 
advance that there is no object behind the screen the human is reaching for. Gómez 
speculation was that this might mean that the key step in the evolution of the ability 
to represent objects counterfactually (e.g. in pretence or in false belief attribution) 
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might have consisted, rather than in the creation of a new cognitive ability, in 
modifying the way in which representations of reality interact with previous non-
matching representations. For example, in pretend play, the ability to represent a 
banana as a phone does not necessarily require the development of a new cognitive 
ability, such as mental representation. But to achieve it, available skills are 
rearranged. The intentionality from the mind to the banana already exists, thereby 
creating an object-slot for the mind. By retrieving a phone from the memory to fill in 
the object-slot, the banana is now pretended to be a phone. 
The observation of the object-directed action was not enough to trigger the 
inference of the object, at least not in our paradigm. Note that inferring the object 
when it had not been displayed earlier in our paradigm was very demanding: we 
allowed very restricted information for the participants to observe, e.g., we 
eliminated the cue from gaze in the grasping/flop study. This may have resulted in 
too few pieces of information to form the whole “intentional relation” picture. In 
future studies, it will be interesting to investigate if providing more information, for 
example, grasping paired to looking, will facilitate the participants’ ability to infer 
about the object, and how much information is essential to trigger the inference.  
Our studies add important evidence to the literature on non-human primate 
regarding their ability to understand object-directed actions (Kano & Call, 2014). We 
have demonstrated behaviourally that a nonhuman primate is capable of coding 
object-agent relations when the action and the agent are not perceived together. 
Until now this skill had only been suggested by the physiological evidence of mirror 
neuron studies with macaques, and in conditions where the presence/absence of the 
object was known in advance. Our study shows that the nature of the action 
displayed can be remembered and this affects the way in which the subsequently 
perceived object is processed.  
The surprising, totally unexpected, finding was the lack of any evidence of 
object inference in human adults. As mentioned, the assumption was that they 
would be capable of demonstrating this in the RT paradigm; however, they not only 
failed to do so, but even failed to show the more modest ability of ‘retrospective’ 
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object-directedness shown by the Capuchin monkeys. This was an indication that 
some assumptions made about the implicit ToM skills in human adults might be 
wrong, and this was further re-enforced by our failure to replicate the well-known 
results of Kovacs et al in another implicit ToM task. 
6.3 About Implicit ToM 
The second paradigm was developed from a task testing the ability to implicitly 
register other’s belief. Here we investigated the ability of the two species about their 
implicitly understand of other’s belief (chapter 4 & 5).  We were particularly 
interested in our series of experiment with adult humans in Chapter 4. We suggest 
that more investigation is needed to further assess whether adults’ have an implicit 
understand of other’s belief. 
6.3.1 Implicit ToM and the two system proposal 
Recently, a core cognitive system was suggested to be responsible for 
spontaneous and implicit understanding of others’ beliefs and other mental states in 
humans (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013; Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012; van der Wel, Sebanz, & 
Knoblich, 2014).  
Implicit ToM tasks with adult humans showed evidence that adults were 
affected by others’ beliefs even though these were irrelevant to the task they were 
performing (Kovács et al., 2010; van der Wel et al., 2014). Several recent studies 
show that infants’ as young as 7-months-old and far before developing the capability 
to succeed in the classic false-belief task, were sensitive to false beliefs as well (e.g., 
Kovács et al., 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).  
The ability to implicitly understand ToM seems quite robust in humans across 
different developmental stages. However, when it comes to people with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD), the situation becomes complicated. ASD individuals are 
generally known to have difficulties in ToM abilities (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Baron-cohen, 2001; Peterson & Bowler, 2000; Senju, 2011; Surian & Leslie, 
1999). Although some high-function children and adults in this spectrum can infer 
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other’s mental states when explicitly prompted to do so (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), they fail to show the precursors and implicit 
understand of false belief (Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux, 2013; Schuwerk, 
Vuori, & Sodian, 2014; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Senju, 2012). For 
example, Senju and colleagues (Senju et al., 2009) used an eye-tracking device on a 
group of individuals with Asperger syndrome and tested their anticipatory looks in a 
FB task. They reported that the participants failed to spontaneously anticipate 
other’s behaviour based on other’s belief. On the other hand, “they are able to do so 
in explicit tasks through compensatory learning” (Senju et al., 2009). In another 
study, Schneider and colleagues (2013) compared typical adults and high-functioning 
ASD individuals. They found that both of them could pass the explicit false belief task 
but ASD group failed in an implicit task even with intense practice. 
Based on this evidence, Apperly and colleagues (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; 
Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013) 
proposed an interesting two-system model regarding tracking beliefs and belief-like 
states. They suggested that one system is predominantly in charge of implicit belief-
understanding. The implicit abilities demonstrated by infants and adults, for instance, 
would be powered by this system. The other system, which is not only related to 
ToM abilities but also depends on the facilitation of inhibitory control and language, 
would be responsible for explicit theory of mind. When children reason about the 
protagonist’s belief in the Sally-Ann task, it involves this second system. In the case 
of ASD individuals, their implicit ToM system is impaired and it hinders their ToM 
abilities. Yet through facilitation from language and other abilities, some of them can 
accomplish the explicit task by logical reasoning (e.g., Pyers & Senghas, 2009; Tager-
Flusberg & Joseph, 2005). Apperly and Butterfill further proposed that these two 
systems operate in different manners, i.e., the former is fast and of low cost while 
the latter is relatively slower and of high cost. To better explain about the difference 
between the two systems, they made an analogy with the domain of number 
cognition. For numbers, a fast but inflexible cognitive system is used to recognize 
small amounts of numbers (less than 3 or 4) while another more cognitively 
demanding and flexible system is employed to process larger amounts. The case is 
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similar for ToM: “a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like 
states” (cognitive system 1, CS1 hereafter) enables infants and nonhuman animals to 
understand ToM before they can succeed in the classic FB task; this capacity persists 
together with “a later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding 
theory-of-mind abilities” (cognitive system 2, CS2 hereafter) that allows children and 
adult to deal with more complex social contexts. These two systems work together 
in providing humans with sophisticated skills in social contexts (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009).  
More and more researchers are in favour of the two system hypothesis and 
have put forward two-system views of different sorts (e.g., De Bruin & Newen, 2012; 
Low & Perner, 2012). Nevertheless, some questions remain to be answered before 
we settle on the two systems hypothesis.  
6.3.2 Undecided questions 
6.3.2.1 The overlap of the two systems? 
Firstly, if there are two systems for theory of mind processing, how do the two 
systems function together? And to ask the question in another and a more 
fundamental way, is the implicit ToM system distinct from the other one? Or, are the 
two just different developmental stages of the same system?  
Apperly and Butterfill suggested that CS1 allows infants to understand basic 
social situations without consciously knowing about others’ belief (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009). Adults’ implicit encoding of others’ belief, for example, depends on 
this very system (CS1). CS2 allows more complicated reasoning and more 
sophisticated representation of other’s mental states, especially when some 
peripheral capabilities, e.g., language, executive function, become mature and 
provide better facilitation of belief understanding. The latter system leads to the 
capability to understand false belief when children reach 4-years of age (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013).  
It is, however, not certain whether the two systems are truly distinct from each 
other. Firstly, some evidence suggests that implicit ToM abilities in infancy might be 
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predictive of children’s later performance on explicit tasks (Aschersleben et al., 2008; 
W. A. Clements, Rustin, & Mccallum, 2000; Low, 2010; Wellman et al., 2004; 
Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008). For example, infant’s ability to 
perceiving or encoding the relation between goal-directed actions and the goal 
predicts children’s understanding of FB at 4-years old (Aschersleben et al., 2008; 
Wellman et al., 2004). The correlation of performance in implicit understanding of 
object-directedness and in explicit false belief tasks indicats possible similarity in the 
fundamental cognitive process. If, on the other hand, the two systems are totally 
distinct, they are not likely to interfere with each other.  
It is also problematic that the investigation into implicit ToM processing itself 
does not truly distinguish itself from explicit ToM tasks (Schneider Slaughter Dux, 
2014). Some researchers argue that whether ToM behaviour occurs without 
consciousness remains unclear (Schneider Slaughter Dux, 2014). Indeed, the 
elimination of additional requirements such as language and inhibitory control ruled 
out some confounding factors (Hale & Tager-flusberg, 2003; Mckinnon & Moscovitch, 
2007; Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011); nonetheless it 
doesn’t guarantee an isolated and implicit process. It is possible that less 
experimental demand allows more cognitive resource, which in turn allows success 
in ToM processing, but that these capabilities are not truly based on another system 
rather than part of CS2. In this case, once the cognitive load increases, the 
participants might show a deficit in “implicit ToM” tasks. There is some evidence in 
support of this suggestion. For example, Schneider and colleagues (2012) reported 
that when cognitive load increases, e.g., the participants had to listen to strings of 
letter and to report the letters while doing an implicit ToM task at the same time, 
implicit ToM processing was disrupted. They suggested that implicit ToM processing 
might exist, but executive function act as an important factor in affecting it (see also 
Mckinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Schneider, 
Lam, et al., 2012). 
Apart from executive function, language development also plays an important 
role in false-belief reasoning (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Villiers, 2005; 2007). For 
example, language ability significantly correlates with performance on explicit false-
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belief tasks (Astington, 2006; Low, 2010; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). In 
addition, the evidence from deaf children also provides support that language ability 
correlates with ToM: the development of ToM is delayed for deaf children if their 
ability in language is hindered. However, if they have acquired sign language from 
birth, they have no deficit or delay in explicit false belief tasks (Schick, Villiers, Villiers, 
& Hoffmeister, 2007). Although the correlation doesn’t necessarily implicate a causal 
relationship between the development of language and explicit ToM (Slade & 
Ruffman, 2005), it is very likely that the development of language assists the explicit 
expression of belief understanding (Milligan et al., 2007). For example, children who 
have more conversation using words that involve mental representation (like think, 
belief, etc.) perform better in ToM tasks (e.g., Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Ted 
Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Some researchers further suggest that language 
might bridge implicit and explicit understanding of false belief (Juan & Astington, 
2011). For example, Juan and Astington (2011) argued that labelling by language 
reduces the cognitive load for children in explicit ToM tasks and therefore allows 
explicit demonstration of their implicit understanding of other’s belief. In other 
words, the implicit ability and explicit ability both depend on the same system to 
track other’s belief, but language makes the difference between whether the 
understanding can be expressed explicitly. Thus they concluded that language 
development allow the transition from implicit to explicit ToM understanding (Juan 
& Astington, 2011). 
In support of this position, fMRI studies indicate that several common brain 
areas are activated in both implicit and explicit ToM tasks (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; A. 
M. Kovács, Kühn, Gergely, Csibra, & Brass, 2014). Though a few differences are 
detected between the implicit and explicit tasks, they seem to have more 
commonalities than differences (Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012). 
To summarize, implicit ToM correlates with explicit ToM abilities. The 
capability to understand implicit and explicit ToM may depend on the availability of 
cognitive resources; the capability to explicitly express the implicit understand of 
ToM might largely depend on language skills; and the activation of brain areas 
overlap in explicit and implicit Tom tasks. Therefore we suggest that it remains to be 
 
 
198 
 
determined whether the two systems are truly distinct from each other. And we 
tend to believe that they are not totally different, or at least, they share some 
commonalities.  
6.3.2.2 Can human adults attribute belief implicitly? 
The second question concerns whether adult can attribute belief implicitly as 
infants do. It comes from our failure in replicating Kovacs et al’s results, together 
with many other reports that indicated adults’ failure in implicit ToM. Can human 
adults implicitly and automatically encode other’s belief?  
Kovács et al’s study (2010) was one of the most highly cited articles among the 
ones we introduced earlier in support of automatic and implicit ToM processing 
(Kovács et al., 2010; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Low & Watts, 2013; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Schneider, Nott, & Dux, 2014; 
Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Our failure to replicate it, however, rings an alarm bell for 
both the study and its interpretation, as well as other literature that reports adult’s 
ability in implicit ToM understanding. Should the results be attributed to implicit 
ToM processing, or to other confounding factors? 
It has only been very recently that Heyes (2014) has suggested plausible 
alternative interpretations of the findings about implicit ToM, both in human infants 
and adults, which might dispute the conclusion that they provide evidence for an 
implicit ToM system. Heyes suggests that many, if not all of the results, reported in 
these experiments, could be explained as the result of general-purpose cognitive 
mechanisms responding to relatively superficial features of the stimuli. Unwittingly, 
our experiments in chapters 4 and 5, designed and conducted before the publication 
of Heyes papers, have turned out to be a partial empirical test of some of her claims. 
We used an experimental procedure that was slightly different from the 
original design. Specifically, we felt that it was necessary to modify the order of 
events displayed in the videos so that they were unified across conditions 
(Experiment 1 and 2 in chapter 5). With these better controlled stimuli, in which the 
factor of “retroactive inhibition” identified by Heyes (2014) as a potential 
explanation of the results, was kept constant in all conditions, we failed to replicate 
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Kovacs et al’s results with human adults. In contrast, once the procedure of video 
presentations (and data analysis) was exactly the same as Kovács et al’s design, the 
same results emerged, i.e., adults appeared to encode others’ beliefs or object-
directedness implicitly (Experiment 3 and 4 in chapter 5). However, when the 
intentional agent was replaced by a pile of boxes which was entirely non-intentional, 
if the procedure and sequence of events remained exactly the same as in the version 
of the video with an agent (with the boxes moving in and out of the scene), the 
participant showed the same results as with an agent, as if they were attributing a 
belief to the boxes (Experiment 5 in chapter 5). Kovacs et al. had used a “pile of 
boxes” control in which they found no belief computation; however, they had failed 
to make the control fully equivalent (e.g., the boxes did not move in and out of the 
scene, as in our version). As pointed out by Heyes (2014), this might have resulted in 
retroactive inhibition operating in the agent version, but not the boxes version, of 
their videos. The results of our controls, therefore, lend empirical support to Heyes’ 
suggestions. 
Taking these result together we concur with Heyes that adult participants do 
not truly display implicit understanding of other’s belief or object-directedness, at 
least not in our paradigm nor in the original paradigm by Kovács et al (2010). The 
positive results (experiment 3 and 4 in chapter 5; experiment 1 and 2 in Kovács et al., 
2010) may have been an artefact provoked by the confounding effects of the 
experimental design. The empirical support that our results provide for Heyes’ 
critical reinterpretation of Kovacs results from a “sub-mentalizing” perspective opens 
up the possibility that the notion of implicit systems of theory of mind capable of 
computing belief-like states may need to be revised, including notions of dual 
systems of ToM (e.g., Apperly and Butterfield (2009).  
In fact, Apperly and Butterfield have themselves reported results casting doubt 
on the existence of an ability to automatically compute others’ beliefs in adults. For 
example, Apperly and colleagues (2010) reported that adult participants would not 
automatically track others’ belief if not explicitly instructed to do so. In three 
experiments, they showed participants pictures that involved the location of an 
object and a character’s belief about where the object was and measured the 
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participants’ reaction time in reporting the object’s location according to either 
reality or to the character’s belief. Their results showed that unless explicitly 
instructed to, the participants wouldn’t spontaneously keep track of others’ belief 
but would focus their attention on reality. They suggested that belief was not 
ascribed automatically, but explicitly and intentionally (Back & Apperly, 2010).  
Other criticism brings into question the results of the experiments that 
describe infants’ achievements in implicit ToM. For example, Heyes (2014) reviewed 
more than 20 relevant experiments that use violation of expectancy or anticipatory 
looking paradigm and suggested that “their results can be explained by the 
operation of domain-general processes and in terms of low-level novelty”. Similarly, 
Perner and Ruffman (2005) argued that Onishi and Barllargeon’s (2005) experiment 
could be based on behaviour rules and they suggested that neuronal activation could 
have easily explained their results rather than touching the topic of belief or ToM 
understanding. Although abundant studies using various methods have tried to 
investigate infant’s ToM abilities, debates and doubts continue as new evidence 
keeps accumulating.  
Here we suggest that more attention should be lent to the negative results. 
With further investigation, the studies with negative results can provide important 
evidence either in ruling out confounding factors that prevent the detection of 
implicit ToM abilities, or on the other hand, prove the implicit ToM proposal wrong. 
Either way, it would be of great significance in progressing the field of ToM research. 
6.3.2.3 Gestalt encoding of object-directedness? 
We proposed in the introduction that the ability to automatically infer the goal 
and understand object-directedness in a gestalt way might be a fundamental process 
and an important step towards mental representation. When inferring about other’s 
mental states, one has to reason from other’s behaviour to imagine and uncover the 
underling intention. Similarly, when perceiving object-directedness, one needs to 
infer from the object-directed actions about the potential goal-object. The processes 
are alike, i.e., infer the unobservable aspect from the available information, though 
the latter is much easier. “Mentalistic skills”, therefore, might be built depending on 
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the basic understanding of object-directedness where expectation of potential 
outcome can be formed (Gómez, 2009).  
The partially positive results we obtained with Capuchin monkeys in the grasp 
versus flop object-directed experiment suggest that the notion of computing 
intentional relations between agents and objects may play a role in this re-
assessment of the notion of implicit mentalism and the significance of the empirical 
evidence on which it is based. Rather than automatic coding of representations 
equivalent to the epistemic notions of belief or desire, considered as unobservable 
mental states separate from their behavioural expressions; implicit ToM encoding 
could rest on the use of alternative mechanisms, such as computation of  intentional 
relations between agents and objects of the environment which capture the key 
mental property of “directedness” or “aboutness” (Gómez, 2008, 2009) or 
computation of relations of “registration” attributed to agents (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009). 
However, our results were only partially positive while the majority of the 
results indicated little supporting evidence. Nonetheless, we suggest that the curtain 
should not be closed so soon. Firstly, as we have discussed earlier in the introduction 
(chapter 1), abundant literature had suggested the prospect that primates and 
human might be able to infer an object from intentional actions. Behavioural studies, 
such as the object-choice task (Wood & Hauser, 2011a, 2011b) and geometrical gaze 
following (Tomasello et al., 1999), and physiological studies, such as the mirror 
neuron study in macaques (Umiltà et al., 2001), all suggested a high probability that 
an object could be inferred. Given this evidence, it is plausible that intentionality is 
understood in a gestalt manner. Nevertheless, to support the gestalt proposal, it 
remains to be determined whether the object can be inferred from the object 
(Gómez, 2009). Our experiment provides the first direct test of this proposal, 
although it provides negative evidence. Note that in our paradigm, we allowed very 
little information for the participant to observe, e.g., we eliminated the cue from 
gaze in the first paradigm. It may have resulted in too few pieces of parts for the 
brain to automatically self-organize and form the whole picture. We suggest that 
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further investigation is essential in confirming our findings and further development 
of the topic of object-directedness is still warranted. 
In addition, although the ability to infer the potential object does not stand 
firm, there is ample evidence that primates and human share the ability to encode 
object-directed action together with its goal (Kano & Call, 2014). Given the early 
emergence of this ability both from the evolutionary perspective and the human-
ontogenetic perspective, it is very likely to be a basic and fundamental ability. 
Moreover, considering the fact that such ability predicts the performance in ToM 
task when children grows to around 4 years of age, it might be a cornerstone for 
Theory of Mind development, and in a broader sense, for social cognition 
(Aschersleben et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2004; Woodward, 2009). In spite of it, 
how are the action and the object encoded together and how this ability assists ToM 
development remains unclear. At least, it seems from the empirical works in this 
thesis that the gestalt perception of object-directedness fail to answer this question. 
But with accumulating evidence both about intentionality and about implicit ToM, 
we suggest future studies move from investigating the behavioural phenomenon to 
the mechanism of the behaviours. For example, fMRI studies might provide 
important evidence on whether crucial brains areas involved in ToM tasks are also 
activated in the object-directed action task, which might provide important support 
for the above issue. However, to conduct such experiment, participants that can 
succeed in both tasks are vital. Therefore adult participants should be given more 
attention as their results might reveal important evidence (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009). Howver, an oddity has been revealed with our experiment with adult humans: 
they seem to lack the ability to encode object-directed action and the object 
together (chapter 3). Given that infant masters this skill, it is not intuitive to see why 
adults do not encode the relationship between the action and the object any more. 
We suggest attributing their failure to the experimental paradigm, instead of the 
subjects’ incapability, but it is still essential to re-examine this issue in the future. If 
adults indeed no longer possess this ability when they have reached a certain 
developmental stage, it is likely that the ability has transited to a part of ToM ability 
over development. If so, the study from infants to children to adults, in order to 
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setup a continuous spectrum of their ability of objet-directedness and ToM abilities 
may help us to understand this process. Another possibility is that adults are 
dominated by explicit reasoning, instead of the implicit and reflexive behavioural 
response. In this case, it would also be interesting in investigating how implicit and 
explicit ToM understanding relate to each other.  
Although we didn’t find clear evidence from our experiments, we suggest that 
the gestalt inference of object-directedness and the encoding of the object-directed 
action together with the object might both provide interesting possibility for 
intention understanding and ToM development. Further investigation on this topic 
will be essential in investigating the gestalt inference of intentionality and ToM.    
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Appendix II. Test of monkeys’ attention 
across sessions in chapter 2 
We assessed whether monkeys’ attention to the test phases, i.e., phase two and three 
together, remained at the same level across sessions (see Figure 2-6), because some 
monkeys did not seem to remain interested in the experiment during the last sessions. We 
calculated each monkey’s average looking time in each session during the 10-second 
window of phase 2 and 3 combined, regardless of the action or the outcome. The looking 
time data across the 9 sessions was examined by a one-way repeated-measure analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), using session number as the only factor. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(35) = 62.402, p = 0.012) therefore the 
Greenhouse-Geisser approach was used to adjust the p value. An ANOVA showed that the 
difference between sessions was approaching significance (F(8, 64) = 2.53, p = 0.06) , 
suggesting that the monkeys average looking time in each session was not equally 
distributed across the 9 sessions. Paired T-test with Bonferroni adjustment showed no 
significant difference between the looking time of any pair of the sessions. Nevertheless, the 
monkey’s looking time at the 7th session had dropped below any of the previous session and 
did not recovered in the last two sessions. This might indicate a trend towards loss of 
attention and the non significant difference might be due to the sample size (n=9) and the 
large variance.  
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Figure 2 -  10 Monkey’s average trial-looking time in each session 
 
Independent of the looking time, the number of attended trials could also indicate the 
monkeys’ attention to the experiments. Table 2-2 showed the monkeys’ number of attended 
trials in each session. About half of the monkeys were only paying attention to one or two 
trials in the 8th and 9th session. And in the 7th session, one monkey, Diego, did not pay 
attention to any of the trials at all. Therefore we concluded that the monkey attention 
dropped in the last few sessions, especially the last three.  
Table 2 -  3 Number of attended trials (6 in total) in each session 
 Session number 
Monkey 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
Anita 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 
Chico 5 4 6 6 6 1 4 2 1 
Diablo 5 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 - 
Diego 4 2 4 3 3 4 0 1 6 
Figo 4 5 4 4 1 6 3 2 3 
Inti 5 3 5 6 4 3 3 5 3 
Junon 2 1 3 4 3 5 4 2 1 
Meako 4 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 2 
Ruben 4 6 5 5 3 1 3 3 4 
Torris 2 6 2 5 6 4 3 5 3 
Ximo 5 1 5 6 4 3 1 3 2 
Total 42 40 47 50 39 37 34 33 29 
 
We grouped the first three, second three and the last three sessions together and 
examined the monkey’s average looking time at a trial, regardless of trial-condition to test 
this proposal. We conducted an one-way repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with one factor, i.e., average looking time of trials in session 1-3, session 4-6 and session 7-9 
(see Table 2-3 and Figure 2-7). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had not been violated (χ2(2) = 2.49, p = .29). The ANOVA showed a significant effect of 
groups (F(2, 20) = 4.62, p = .02) indicating different average looking time of trials in the three 
session-clusters. The post-hoc test (T-test with Bonferroni’s procedure) suggested that the 
monkeys looked significantly shorter in the last three sessions than the first three sessions 
(I(10) = 3.32, I = 0.02) and the difference between the last three and the second three 
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sessions was approaching significance (I(10) = 2.72, I = 0.06), however, no significant 
difference was found between the first and the second three sessions (I(10) = 0.22, I= 1.000). 
 
Table 2 -  4 Average looking time of trials in every three sessions. 
 Sessions 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 
Mean looking time (s) 1.84 1.89 1.38 
SD 0.18 0.16 0.16 
 
 
Figure 2 -  11 Monkey’s average looking time of trials in every three 
sessions 
Considering the drop of interest in the last three sessions, we decided to only include 
the first 6 sessions in further data analysis. When not specified, the statistical analysis in the 
following sections only included the first 6 sessions. 
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Appendix III. The questionnaire in 
experiment 1 of Chapter 2  
What do you think of the images? 
Please tick on the scale which best describes your opinion on the following 
statements. 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 
Strongly disagree – disagree – slightly disagree – neutral – slightly agree – 
agree – Strongly agree 
 
1. Participant No.  
_________________________________ 
2. Gender * 
○         Male ○ Female ○ Prefer not answer 
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 3. Please tick on the scale which best describes your opinion on the following 
statements. * 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree 
slightly 
disagree 
neutral 
slightly 
agree 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1. This action 
indicates the 
location of the 
object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. This action 
distracts me 
from the task. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. The actress 
knows if there’s 
an object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. This action 
had nothing to 
do with the 
object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. I ignored the 
action when 
making the 
judgement. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. The actress 
did the action 
randomly. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7. This action is ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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helpful for me 
to succeed in 
the task. 
8. This action is 
directed to an 
object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9. I tried to 
ignore the 
action. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10. The actress 
did the action 
for some 
purpose. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11. This action 
looks random 
and irrelevant 
to the task. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
12. This action 
does not 
distract me at 
all. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
13. The action 
was aimed to 
the object.• 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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 4. Please tick on the scale which best describes your opinion on the following 
statements. * 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree 
slightly 
disagree 
neutral 
slightly 
agree 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1. This action 
indicates the 
location of the 
object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. This action 
distracts me 
from the task. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. The actress 
knows if there’s 
an object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. This action 
had nothing to 
do with the 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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object. 
5. I ignored the 
action when 
making the 
judgement. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. The actress 
did the action 
randomly. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7. This action is 
helpful for me 
to succeed in 
the task. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8. This action is 
directed to an 
object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9. I tried to 
ignore the 
action. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10. The actress 
did the action 
for some 
purpose. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11. This action 
looks random 
and irrelevant 
to the task. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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12. This action 
does not 
distract me at 
all. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
13. The action 
was aimed to 
the object. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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Appendix IV. Example of the form in chapter 
3 and 4 
Example of forms in chapter 3 
Verbal instruction 
In the following experiment, we'll present you with several videos. In the videos, there 
will be two hiding-screens and you'll try to react as quickly and accurate as possible when 
the hiding-screens open to inform about an object behind the screens. There will also be 
some questions somewhere, asking what the last action was. So please watch the videos 
carefully.  
During the experiment, please always keep your right hand on the direction keys, with 
the index finger, middle finger and the ring finger on LEFT, DOWN and RIGHT key, 
respectively [point out the keys and ask the participants to do so]. Press left if you find the 
object behind the left screen press right if right, and press down if nothing’s there. 
You'll finish 4 test blocks in total, before that, you’ll have a practice block, where you'll 
have feedback after each trial, and in the other 4 test blocks, you'll not have any feedback. 
The task will last for about 20 minutes. After the reaction task, we’ll ask you to finish a 
questionnaire, which will take less than 5 minutes. 
If you have any questions, please come to me.  
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Participant information sheet 
 
Project Title Where’s the apple? A reaction time task  
What is the study about? 
We invite you to participate in a research project which concerns the reaction time and 
accuracy of your reaction about the presence of an object at different locations in a scenario.  
This study is being conducted as part of my, Ruoting Tao’s, PhD Thesis in the School of 
Psychology and Neuroscience. 
Do I have to take Part? 
This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part.   It 
is up to you and you alone whether or not to take part.   If you do decide to take part you 
will be free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason.    
What would I be required to do? 
You will be presented with video clips of an actress and two hiding-screens on a computer. 
The actress will perform an action and after that the two hiding-screens will open. You will 
then need to press a key on the keyboard to indicate as quickly and accurate as possible if 
there's an object and behind which hiding-screen it is. Please follow the instructions on the 
computer during the experiment. This reaction test will last about 20 minutes. After that 
you’ll be asked to fill a brief questionnaire about the task.  
Will my participation be Anonymous and Confidential? 
Only the researcher(s) and supervisor(s) will have access to the data which will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your permission will be sought in the Participant Consent form for the 
data you provide, which will be anonymised, to be used for future scholarly purposes. 
Storage and Destruction of Data Collected 
The data we collect will be accessible by the researcher(s) and supervisor(s) involved in this 
study only, unless explicit consent for wider access is given by means of the consent form.   
Your data will be stored for a period of 5 years since time of publication of the results before 
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destroyed in an anonymised format in a hard drive which will be locked in a storage 
cupboard. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be finalised by 2014 and written up as part of my PhD Thesis and they may 
be published as part of journal articles or conferences presentations  
Reward  
£5 for your participation 
Are there any potential risks to taking part? 
No. If you notd not feel comfortable about any part of the experiment, you could withdraw 
at any time. 
Questions 
You will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to this project before giving 
completing a Consent Form. 
Consent and Approval 
This research proposal has been scrutinised and been granted Ethical Approval through the 
University ethical approval process. 
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical 
Committee is available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/ 
Contact Details 
Researcher:  Ruoting Tao 
Contact Details: Email: rt33@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor:  Dr. Juan-Carlos Gomez 
Contact Details: Email: jg5@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 46 2059 
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Participant Consent Form (Anonymous Data) 
Project Title: Where’s the apple? A reaction time task 
Researcher(s) Name(s)  
Ruoting Tao 
Email: rt33@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors Names  
Dr. Juan-Carlos Gomez 
Email: jg5@st-andrews.ac.uk  
Tel: 01334 46 2059 
The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research.  We 
therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature 
confirms that you are happy to participate in the study. 
What is Anonymous Data? 
The term ‘Anonymous Data’ refers to data collected by a researcher that has no identifier 
markers so that even the researcher cannot identify any participant.  Consent is still required 
by the researcher, however no link between the participant’s signed consent and the data 
collected can be made. 
Consent 
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let 
you understand what it entails.   Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do 
not wish to do. 
Material gathered during this research will be anonymous, so it is impossible to trace back to 
you.   It will be securely stored in a hard drive for 5 years since the time of publication before 
destroyed. Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research 
data. 
I have read and understood the information sheet.  Yes   No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  Yes  No 
I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.  Yes  No 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study without having to 
give an explanation. 
 Yes  No 
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I understand that my data once processed will be anonymous and that 
only the researcher(s) (and supervisors) will have access to the raw 
data which will be kept confidentially. 
 Yes   No 
I understand that my data will be stored for a period of 5 years since 
the time of publication being destroyed   
 Yes  No 
I have been made fully aware of the potential risks associated with 
this research and am satisfied with the information provided. 
 Yes   No 
I agree to take part in the study  Yes   No 
 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before 
you can participate in this research.   
 
Name in Block Capitals 
 
Signature 
 
Date 
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Participant Debriefing Form 
Project Title: Where’s the apple? A reaction time task  
Nature of Project 
This postgraduate research project was conducted to investigate whether human will 
automatically relate an intentional action, for example grasping, but not a non-intentional 
action, a resting movement, to a potential object. If you do infer the object from the action, 
you’ll react quicker when the object position is congruent. In separate studies, we are trying to 
investigate if non-human primates can do this as well; data with humans will help us to better 
interpret our results with non-human primates. 
Storage of Data 
As outlined in the Participant Information Sheet your data will now be retained for a period of 
5 years since time of publication of the results before being destroyed. Your data will remain 
accessible to only the researchers and supervisors if you have given permission on the 
Consent Form.    
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical 
Committee are outline on their website http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/  
 
Contact Details 
Researcher:  Ruoting Tao 
Contact Details: Email: rt33@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor:  Dr. Juan-Carlos Gomez 
Contact Details: Email: jg5@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 46 2059 
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Example of forms in chapter 4 
Verbal instruction 
PRESENCE 
You’ll take part in a study investigating visual attention through reaction times. You 
will watch a series of short movies featuring Mario, a ball and a hiding-screen.  
At a certain point in each of the videos, you’ll see the hiding-screen scrolls down. Your 
task is to press the “ENTER” key on the keyboard as soon as the hiding-screen opens and you 
detect that the ball is present. If the ball is absent, you don’t have to do anything. Try to be 
as fast as possible, press the key as soon as the screen scrolls down. We’ll measure how fast 
you can detect the presence of the ball, while at the same time please avoid making 
mistakes. 
In order to make sure you pay attention to the whole video, we also ask you to press 
the “SPACE” key when Mario leaves the scene. We will record your response, but not the 
speed. 
Between videos, you’ll be asked to press “SPACE” or “ENTER” to continue the 
experiment. Please do so when you are ready to start. 
The study will take about 15 minutes, please try to pay attention to all the videos and 
crucially remember that you have to press the “Enter” key as fast as you can when the 
hiding-screen opens and you find the ball was present behind the screen. 
Now you will have 4 practice trials. Do you have any questions before we start?  
Please keep your hands on the keyboard and follow the instructions on the screen. 
ABSENCE 
You’ll take part in a study investigating visual attention through reaction times. You 
will watch a series of short movies featuring Mario, a ball and a hiding-screen.  
At a certain point in each of the videos, you’ll see the hiding-screen scrolls down. Your 
task is to press the “ENTER” key on the keyboard as soon as the hiding-screen opens and you 
detect that the ball is absent. If the ball is present, you don’t have to do anything. Try to be 
as fast as possible, press the key as soon as the screen scrolls down. We’ll measure how fast 
you can detect the absence of the ball, while at the same time please avoid making mistakes. 
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In order to make sure you pay attention to the whole video, we also ask you to press 
the “SPACE” key when Mario leaves the scene. We will record your response, but not the 
speed. 
Between videos, you’ll be asked to press “SPACE” or “ENTER” to continue the 
experiment. Please do so when you are ready. 
The study will take about 15 minutes, please try to pay attention to all the videos and 
crucially remember that you have to press the “Enter” key as fast as you can when the 
hiding-screen opens and you find the ball was absent. 
Now you will have 4 practice trials. Do you have any questions before we start?  
Please keep your hands on the keyboard and follow the instructions on the screen. 
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Example of information form 
Project Title  
Visual detection tasks: how fast can you find the object? 
 
What is the study about? 
We invite you to participate in a research project which concerns the reaction time and 
accuracy of your reaction about the absence of an object in a scenario. This study is being 
conducted as part of my, Ruoting Tao’s, PhD Thesis in the School of Psychology and 
Neuroscience. 
Do I have to take Part? 
This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part.   It 
is up to you and you alone whether or not to take part.   If you do decide to take part you 
will be free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason.    
What would I be required to do? 
You will be presented with animation video clips of an agent, a ball, a hiding screen and a bin 
on a computer. The agent will come into the scene or leave the scene at some points. The 
ball will roll around in the scene. At the end the hiding screen will vanish and you will need 
to press a key on the keyboard to indicate as quickly and accurate as possible if the ball was 
absent behind the screen. Please follow the instructions on the computer during the 
experiment. This experiment will last about 30 minutes.  
Will my participation be Anonymous and Confidential? 
Only the researcher(s) and supervisor(s) will have access to the data which will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your permission will be sought in the Participant Consent form for the 
data you provide, which will be anonymised, to be used for future scholarly purposes. 
Storage and Destruction of Data Collected 
The data we collect will be accessible by the researcher(s) and supervisor(s) involved in this 
study only. Your data will be stored for a period of 5 years since time of publication of the 
results before destroyed in an anonymised format in a hard drive which will be locked in a 
storage cupboard. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be finalised by 2014 and written up as part of my PhD Thesis and they may 
be published as part of journal articles or conferences presentations. 
Reward  
£3 for your participation 
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Are there any potential risks to taking part? 
No. If you don’t feel comfortable about any part of the experiment, you can withdraw at any 
time. 
Questions 
You can ask any questions in relation to this project before completing the Consent Form. 
Consent and Approval 
This research proposal has been scrutinised and been granted Ethical Approval through the 
University ethical approval process. 
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical 
Committee is available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/ 
Contact Details 
Researcher:  Ruoting Tao 
Contact Details: Email: rt33@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor:  Dr. Juan-Carlos Gomez 
Contact Details: Email: jg5@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 46 2059 
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Example of the consent form 
Project Title 
Visual detection tasks: how fast can you find the object? 
 
Researcher(s)  Name(s)  
Ruoting Tao 
Email: rt33@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
 
Supervisors Names  
Dr. Juan-Carlos Gomez 
Email: jg5@st-andrews.ac.uk  
Tel: 01334 46 2059 
The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research.  We 
therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature 
confirms that you are happy to participate in the study. 
What is Anonymous Data? 
The term ‘Anonymous Data’ refers to data collected by a researcher that has no identifier 
markers so that even the researcher cannot identify any participant.  Consent is still required 
by the researcher, however no link between the participant’s signed consent and the data 
collected can be made. 
Consent  
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let 
you understand what it entails.   Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do 
not wish to do. 
Material gathered during this research will be anonymous, so it is impossible to trace back to 
you.   It will be securely stored in a hard drive for 5 years since the time of publication before 
destroyed. Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research 
data. 
I have read and understood the information sheet.  Yes   No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  Yes  No 
I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.  Yes  No 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study without having to  Yes  No 
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give an explanation. 
I understand that my data once processed will be anonymous and that 
only the researcher(s) (and supervisors) will have access to the raw 
data which will be kept confidentially. 
 Yes   No 
I understand that my data will be stored for a period of 5 years since 
the time of publication being destroyed   
 Yes  No 
I have been made fully aware of the potential risks associated with 
this research and am satisfied with the information provided. 
 Yes   No 
I agree to take part in the study  Yes   No 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before 
you can participate in this research.   
Name in Block Capitals  
Signature  
Date  
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Example of the debriefing form 
 
Project Title 
Visual detection tasks: how fast can you find the object? 
 
Nature of Project 
This postgraduate research project was conducted to investigate whether human will 
automatically encode intentionality of an agent to a potential object. The agent in the video 
does not affect the presence/absence of the ball, however, some evidence suggested that 
his presence and his belief about the ball will affect your reaction time.  
In separate studies, we are trying to examine this phenomenon in non-human primates. The 
comparison will help us to better understand the evolution of our cognitive abilities in 
understanding the others. 
 
Storage of Data 
As outlined in the Participant Information Sheet your data will now be retained for a period 
of 5 years since time of publication of the results before being destroyed. Your data will 
remain accessible to only the researchers and supervisors if you have given permission on 
the Consent Form.    
 
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical 
Committee are outline on their website http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/  
 
Contact Details 
Researcher:  Ruoting Tao 
Contact Details: Email: rt33@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor:  Dr. Juan-Carlos Gomez 
Contact Details: Email: jg5@st-andrews.ac.uk    Tel: 01334 46 2059 
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Appendix V. The comparison of the 
experiments in chapter 5 
Comparison of experiments three, four and five 
The videos of the last three experiments had the same procedure but different 
scenarios. To examine if the three scenarios had any effect on reaction time, we conducted a 
two-ways mixed ANOVA using the four conditions as with-in subject factor and the three 
experiments as between-subject factor. Mauchly’s test showed the assumption of Sphericity 
was not meet (χ2(5) = 25.47, p < .001), so we reported the ANOVA with Greenhouser-
Geisser adjustment. The mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of conditions, 
(F(3,219) = 28.10, p < .001). But the interaction between experiment and conditions was not 
significant (F(6,219) = 0.15, p = .99), indicating that the scenarios did not affect the pattern 
of reaction time across the conditions.  
Therefore we combined the data in the three experiments (see Figure 4 - 15 and Table 
4 - 16) and analysed the effect of conditions using a one-way repeated ANOVA. Mauchly’s 
test suggested the assumption of sphericity was not met (χ2(5) = 26.20, p < .001); therefore 
the following analysis was adjusted using Greenhouser-Geisser adjustment. The reaction 
time in the four conditions were significantly different (F(3,225) = 28.95, p < .001). 
Paired T-test with Bonferroni adjustment showed significant longer reaction time in P-
A- than the other three conditions, P+A- (t(75) = 7.94, p < .001), P-A+ (t(75) = 6.48, p < .001) 
and P+A+ (t(75) = 4.01, p = .001). And the participants responded more slowly in P+A+ 
condition than P+A- (t(75) = 4.57, p < .001) and P-A+ (t(75) = 3.24, p = .011). No difference 
was found between P+A- and P-A+ (t(75) = 0.88, p = 1.00). Paired T-test without adjustment 
showed the same results (see Table 4 - 17). 
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Table 4 - 16 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment three, four and five combined 
 P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
Mean 444.0 380.1 385.6 407.0 
SD 97.5 85.6 72.4 85.1 
 
 
Figure 4 - 15 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment three, four and five combined (error bar: SE) 
Table 4 - 17 Results of the paired T-tests for experiment three, four and 
five combined 
Pair of conditions 
 
t(75) 
P (2-tailed) 
Bonferroni 
adjustment 
No adjustment 
P-A- vs P+A- 7.94 .000*** .000*** 
P-A- vs P-A+ 6.48 .000*** .000*** 
P-A- vs P+A+ 4.01 .001*** .000*** 
P+A- vs P+A+ -4.57 .000*** .000*** 
P-A+ vs P+A+ -3.24 .011* .002* 
P+A- vs P-A+ -.88 1.00 .38 
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Comparison of the two different procedures 
We conducted an additional test to compare whether the two procedures had 
different effect on the participant’s pattern of reaction time to the four conditions. We 
grouped the data from experiment 1 (the presence group) and 2 together, and the data from 
the last three experiments together, creating two groups that experienced the two different 
experimental methods (see Figure 4 - 16 and Table 4 - 18). A two-way mixed ANOVA using 
the four conditions as the with-in subject factor, and Procedure as the between-subject 
factor revealed a significant main effect of conditions (F(3,37) = 24.89, p < .001), and a 
significant interaction (F(3,37) = 5.01, p = .003). The p-values reported here were adjusted by 
Greenhouse-Geisser approach because Mauchly’s test showed the assumption of Sphericity 
was not met (χ2(5) = 24.35, p < .001). The results suggested that the different procedures 
indeed affected the pattern of reaction time in the four conditions.  
For detailed pattern of reaction time for the two procedures, we have reported the 
results in the last section and in experiment 2. To have a quick recapture, when the 
procedure of video in each condition were neat (in experiment 1 and 2, the reaction time in 
P-A- were significantly longer than that in P+A- and P+A+, but not longer than P-A+; when 
the procedure followed Kovács et al’s original design, the reaction time was longer in the P-
A- than the other three conditions and the reaction time in P+A+ was longer than the P+A- 
and P-A+ condition (Figure 4 – 15).  
Table 4 - 18 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions in experiment for the two experimental procedures 
Experiment  P-A- P+A- P-A+ P+A+ 
1,2 Mean 374.0 345.3 353.6 349.1 
 SD 81.2 77.0 68.4 97.8 
3,4,5 Mean 444.0 380.1 385.6 407.0 
 SD 97.5 85.6 72.4 85.1 
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Figure 4 - 16 Participants’ average reaction time (ms) to the four 
conditions for the two experimental procedures (error bar: SE) 
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